State v. Miglin
| Citation | 125 A. 250,101 Conn. 8 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 02 June 1924 |
| Parties | STATE v. MIGLIN. |
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Newell Jennings Judge.
Information against George Miglin for violation of the liquor law containing originally 32 counts. By amendment the first 2 counts were dropped and 11 more added, and the accused on his arraignment entered a plea of guilty to 15 of these in succession, and the remaining 26 counts were nolled by the state's attorney. By a second part, or supplemental information, the defendant was also charged with having been previously convicted of unlawfully selling, and offering for sale, spirituous and intoxicating liquors, to wit, whisky and upon this supplemental information the defendant, on his arraignment, also entered a plea of guilty. The court suspended judgment on 8 of the 15 counts and sentenced the defendant on the remaining 7 counts. He was sentenced as a second offender under each count pursuant to the provisions of Acts 1921, c. 291, § 10, and the defendant appeals. No error.
Franklin Coeller, of New Haven, for appellant.
Walter M. Pickett, Asst. State's Atty., of New Haven, for the State.
Of the 24 grounds of appeal, 8 were not pressed, and the remaining 16 may be grouped under four heads, viz. that the court erred (1) in its interpretation of Acts 1921, c. 291, § 10, relating to second offenses; (2) in holding the defendant to be a second offender under the information as drawn; (3) in holding that the information charged separate and distinct offenses, and in imposing sentences accordingly, rather than treating it as charging one continuing offense only; and (4) in imposing maximum sentences on 2 counts.
The reasons of appeal grouped under the first head are, in effect, that Acts 1921, c. 291, § 10, is void for uncertainty, and that it was error for the court to give it the effect of making the defendant a second offender under each count in the present information and in imposing sentences accordingly. The defendant fails to point out, either in his brief or argument, wherein this section is " too vague and uncertain for a penal enactment and that the statute was void for uncertainty" as claimed in the twenty-fourth reason of appeal.
An examination of the language of that enactment discloses a clearly expressed intent to create a status, and give the court a right to increase the penalty of one who violates the act more than once. State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 701, 705, 706, 110 A. 550.
It is immaterial what particular portion of the act was violated; i.e., whether selling or owning or keeping with intent to sell. The obvious purpose of the act can only be effected by such construction. Under the construction contended for by the defendant, one could violate all these provisions singly and in succession, and retain upon each conviction the status of a first offender, and the end sought by the statute would be largely unattained.
It follows that when this defendant entered a plea of guilty under the present information, and admitted that he had been convicted of a prior violation of the law, he became a second offender, by whatever means he violated it, whether by keeping with intent to sell, by selling, offering for sale, or otherwise. Under each count of the present information to which he pleaded guilty, his status was that of a second offender, and he was properly so treated by the court.
The defendant further contends that he should not have been treated as a second offender by reason of his plea of guilty to the supplemental information, because the charge in the first information, there recited, was bad for duplicity. The charge was that the defendant " did unlawfully sell and offer for sale spirituous and intoxicating liquors, to wit, whisky * * *"
It is true that selling and offering for sale are, under the statute, separate and distinct offenses, and, when properly so charged,...
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State v. Jones
...the time of trial. State v. Lorusso, 151 Conn. 189, 192, 195 A.2d 429; State v. Mola, 128 Conn. 407, 410-411, 23 A.2d 126; State v. Miglin, 101 Conn. 8, 11, 125 A. 250; State v. McGee, 80 Conn. 614, 617, 69 A. 1059. As this court said in an analogous situation: 'The defendant . . . (has) al......
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Lapinski v. Copacino.
...States Supreme Court, but upon other points. Griffith v. Connecticut, 218 U.S. 563, 31 S.Ct. 132, 54 L.Ed. 1151. See also State v. Miglin, 101 Conn. 8, 12, 125 A. 250. In Gulf, C. etc., R. Co. v. Texas, 246 U.S. 58, 38 S.Ct. 236, 62 L.Ed. 574, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of a Te......
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State v. Farnsworth, 5815
...in this court." See, also, Feinberg v. United States, 2 F.2d 955, 958; Harris v. State, 142 Miss. 342, 107 So. 372; State v. Miglin, 101 Conn. 8, 125 A. 250; Camarota v. United States, 2 F.2d The legislature provided the penalties, and the court had discretion as to which penalty was to be ......
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State v. Cofone
...Y, or crime Z, he understandably may be left in a quandary. Grasso v. Frattolillo, 111 Conn. 209, 212-213, 149 A. 838; State v. Miglin, 101 Conn. 8, 10-11, 125 A. 250. Correspondingly, a trial court may not amend an indictment substantively to include acts not contemplated in the original i......