State v. Miles

Decision Date26 October 2021
Docket Number2020AP96-CR
PartiesState of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Frank K. Miles, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Wisconsin

This opinion will not be published. See Wis.Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County No 2018CF760: GLENN H. YAMAHIRO, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Brash, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Dugan, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in Wis.Stat. Rule 809.23(3).

PER CURIAM.

¶1 Frank K. Miles, Jr., appeals from a judgment, entered on his guilty pleas, convicting him of possession of a firearm by a felon and fifth offense operating while intoxicated (OWI). Miles contends the circuit court erroneously denied his suppression motion, which was premised on a claim that Miles was illegally seized and searched. We conclude that the circuit court did not err, so we affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

¶2 According to the criminal complaint, City of Greenfield Police Officer David Meyer was dispatched to a subject with gun complaint at a bar called Drift Inn on February 5, 2018. P.A.L. reported that he and his girlfriend, S.L.H., had been watching two men playing video gambling machines. The two men got up and said they would not be back for twenty minutes. P.A.L. went to use one of the machines, but then the men returned. The men and P.A.L. began arguing. P.A.L. said "What are you going to do, call the cops?" One of the men pulled out a silver handgun, pointed it at P.A.L and said, "This is your cops." The two men then fled the bar.

¶3 P.A.L. said that the man with the gun fled in a silver Cadillac. S.L.H. obtained a number from the car's snow-covered license plate; she believed it to be 888-XGP. The Drift Inn's bartender said that one of the two men involved in the altercation was a regular named Frank. Through some investigation, Meyer discovered documentation of a recent police contact with Miles and the silver car-actually a Lincoln, registered to Miles's wife, with the license plate 888-WXP-at a location adjacent to the Drift Inn. Meyer looked up Miles's description, which was a "close" match to the description of the suspect given by P.A.L. A photo array was developed. P.A.L identified Miles in the array, although he was not fully confident in his choice. In looking up Miles's description, Meyer also learned that Miles had a prior felony conviction.

¶4 On February 12, 2018, Meyer sat in his squad car and monitored Miles's home from the road, intending to arrest Miles for the Drift Inn incident. When Meyer saw the silver car pull into the driveway, he initiated a traffic stop. He activated his lights and parked his car at the end of the driveway. Meyer observed the driver reaching around the car. The driver-Miles-then got out of the car. As Meyer took Miles into custody, the officer noticed that Miles was slurring his speech and smelled strongly of alcohol and marijuana. At some point, Meyer's dispatcher informed him that Miles was subject to a .02 blood-alcohol limit due to prior convictions. Miles was arrested for the firearm incident and operating with a prohibited alcohol concentration. Meyer then searched the car incident to arrest and found a silver Ruger .357 Magnum in the center console.

¶5 The State charged Miles with two counts of possession of a firearm by a felon-one for the bar incident and one for the day of the arrest-and one count of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated as a fifth or sixth offense. Miles moved to suppress "all evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search of his vehicle and any other derivative evidence." He claimed that there was no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify the traffic stop; even if the stop was justified, his warrantless arrest was improper; and even if the arrest was proper, the search of the vehicle was unconstitutional, both as an invalid search incident to arrest and as a warrantless search conducted within the curtilage of Miles's home. The circuit court held a motion hearing at which only Meyer testified. Following the hearing, the circuit court denied the suppression motion. Miles then pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon and operating while intoxicated as a fifth offense. The other possession charge was dismissed and read in, as were charges from three other cases.[1] The circuit court imposed consecutive sentences totaling eight and one-half years of imprisonment. Miles appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶6 The only issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred when it denied Miles's suppression motion. Review of an order denying a motion to suppress evidence is preserved notwithstanding Miles's guilty pleas. See Wis Stat. § 971.31(10) (2019-20).[2] A circuit court's decision on a motion to suppress is reviewed in two steps. See State v. Roberson, 2019 WI 102, ¶66, 389 Wis.2d 190, 935 N.W.2d 813. First, we will uphold the trial court's findings of historical fact unless clearly erroneous. See State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ¶12, 311 Wis.2d 358, 752 N.W.2d 748. A factual finding is clearly erroneous if it is contrary to the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. See id. We then review de novo whether those facts warrant suppression. See State v. Hampton, 2010 WI.App. 169, ¶23, 330 Wis.2d 531, 793 N.W.2d 901.

I. Reasonable Suspicion for the Stop

¶7 Miles contends that Meyer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. The temporary detention of a person during a traffic stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See State v. Gaulrapp, 207 Wis.2d 600, 605, 558 N.W.2d 696 (Ct. App. 1996).

Thus, an investigatory stop is subject to the constitutional requirement of reasonableness. See State v. Post, 2007 WI 60, ¶12, 301 Wis.2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. When conducting an investigatory stop, officers must have reasonable suspicion, grounded in specific articulable facts and reasonable inferences therefrom, that a particular person has violated the law. See State v. Gammons, 2001 WI.App. 36, ¶6, 241 Wis.2d 296, 625 N.W.2d 623; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984).

¶8 Miles contends that he was seized at the moment Meyer activated his lights and parked his car behind Miles but, at that moment, Meyer lacked reasonable suspicion because he "had no knowledge of who was inside the Lincoln when he conducted the traffic stop[.]" Thus, Miles argues, Meyer "acted on an 'inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch'" rather than reasonable suspicion, and an inchoate hunch is insufficient to pass constitutional muster.

¶9 It is true that Meyer did not know who was driving the Lincoln at the moment he initiated the traffic stop. What he did know was that Miles was a suspect in the prior week's Drift Inn incident; during that incident, Miles fled in a silver car; the license plate of that car, as provided by S.L.H., was substantially similar to the actual license plate of a silver Lincoln registered to Miles's wife; Miles and the Lincoln appeared in another incident report for a location near the Drift Inn; and Meyer was currently observing the Lincoln pull into the driveway of the Miles home. The circuit court stated, and we agree, that it was a reasonable inference that the spouse (Miles) of a registered vehicle owner (Miles' wife) may be driving that vehicle; this is particularly true where, as here, there is relatively recent documentation of the spouse doing just that. Thus, there were specific, articulable facts from which Meyer could reasonably infer that Miles had committed a crime and it was further reasonable to initiate the traffic stop to investigate whether Miles was currently in the target vehicle.

¶10 Further, when Miles opened the car door, which turned on the interior light, Meyer observed nothing that might have dissipated his reasonable suspicion, such as a person of a different gender. See, e.g., State v. Newer, 2007 WI.App. 236, ¶8, 306 Wis.2d 193, 742 N.W.2d 923 ("If an officer comes upon information suggesting that [an] assumption is not valid in a particular case … reasonable suspicion would, of course, dissipate."). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and, thus, the circuit court properly declined to suppress evidence on that basis.

II. Probable Cause for Arrest

¶11 Miles next argues that, even if the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion, Meyer still lacked probable cause to arrest him. "Warrantless arrests are unlawful unless they are supported by probable cause." State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶34, 362 Wis.2d 138, 864 N.W.2d 26. The State bears the burden of showing it had probable cause for the arrest. See id. "Probable cause for arrest exists when the totality of the circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a crime." State v. Kutz, 2003 WI.App. 205, ¶11, 267 Wis.2d 531, 671 N.W.2d 660. "In determining whether probable cause exists, the court applies an objective standard[.]" Id., ¶12.

¶12 "While the information must be sufficient to lead a reasonable officer to believe that the defendant's involvement in a crime is 'more than a possibility,' it 'need not reach the level of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not.'" Id., ¶11 (citation omitted). Whether the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate probable cause is a question of law, which we review de novo. See id., ¶13.

¶13 Miles asserts that he was arrested the moment Meyer ordered him out of the car at gunpoint, and that the timing of the arrest is important because it limits the facts this court can...

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