State v. Miller
| Citation | 388 A.2d 218,76 N.J. 392 |
| Parties | STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Frank M. MILLER, Jr., Defendant-Respondent. |
| Decision Date | 24 May 1978 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey) |
Marianne Espinosa, Designated Counsel, Newark, for plaintiff-petitioner (Peter N. Gilbreth, Deputy Atty Gen., of counsel; Marianne Espinosa and Peter N. Gilbreth on the briefs; John J. Degnan, Atty. Gen., attorney).
E. Neal Zimmermann, Designated Counsel, Cliffside Park, for defendant-respondent (Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, attorney).
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Defendant was indicted for the murder of Deborah S. Margolin, a 17-year old girl, was tried by jury and found guilty of murder in the first degree. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in State Prison. The principal evidence against him was his oral statement, recorded on tape, made while he was being questioned at police barracks, in which he admitted killing the girl. On appeal, the Appellate Division, in an unreported opinion, reversed the conviction on the ground that defendant's confession was involuntary in the constitutional sense. This Court granted certification of the State's petition. 70 N.J. 141, 358 A.2d 188 (1976).
The essential facts are as follows. On the morning of August 13, 1973, Deborah Margolin, 17 years of age, was sunbathing on the patio of her parents' farmhouse in East Amwell Township, Hunterdon County. She was wearing a two-piece bathing suit at the time. While she was there a white car drove up to the house and the driver sounded the car's horn several times. The girl's brothers, Daniel and Bernard, from upstairs windows in the house, observed a dusty white vehicle with two severe dents in its right side and its trunk tied shut. The male driver wore loose fitting clothes and "looked like a factory worker." Daniel heard the man tell Deborah that a heifer was loose down at the bottom of the driveway. The girl told her brother that she didn't need any help, got into a family car and drove down the driveway. She was never seen alive again.
Later that afternoon when the girl failed to return home, a search of the area was made and Deborah's body was found face down in a stream. Her throat had been slashed, severing her windpipe and jugular vein. The girl was nude except for a part of her bathing suit around her waist. Stab and cutting wounds had been inflicted in her pelvic area and vagina. Her right breast had been cut.
The description of the car in the driveway given to the police directed immediate attention to defendant who was then on parole from a 1969 conviction of carnal abuse and who had been arrested on July 10, 1973 on another morals charge. The arresting officer in that case, who was also participating in the investigation of the Deborah Margolin homicide, noted that the description of the car seen in the Margolin driveway was similar to the one owned by defendant. Miller's appearance also conformed with the description of the driver of that car given by one of the brothers.
Two police officers located defendant at approximately 10:50 p. m. that same day and interviewed him at a plastics factory in Flemington where he was employed. After some conversation during which defendant gave the officers permission to examine his car which was parked there, defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the Flemington police barracks for further questioning. They arrived at the barracks at about 11:49 p. m. The questioning began about two hours later and lasted for about 58 minutes. The interview was tape recorded.
Defendant initially was read his Miranda rights and expressed his willingness to talk without an attorney being present. However, he asked for and was given reassurance of his right to stop at any time and remain silent. Defendant then signed and dated a Miranda rights card. In the beginning defendant denied any involvement in the episode at the Margolin farmhouse and the girl's subsequent death. However, he was confronted with time discrepancies in his story as to his whereabouts at the time. The officer pointed out that the description of the vehicle seen in the Margolin driveway matched defendant's car to a "T" and that the inspection of defendant's car in the parking lot of the plastics factory disclosed fresh blood in the front seat. The officer said that the description of the driver of the car fitted defendant and the clothes he was wearing. Despite this, defendant continued to insist that he never talked to the girl and that he was not going to admit to something that he "wasn't involved in."
The conversation then got around to the subject of the mental condition of the person who had committed the crime. Defendant said that "whoever did it really needs help." The officer suggested that such a person was not really a criminal who should be punished, but rather needed medical treatment. The officer said he would do all he could to help defendant but that defendant had to help himself first by talking about it.
Finally, the defendant admitted that he was the person who drove up the Margolin driveway and spoke to the girl about the cow. He said that he had driven back to where he had seen the cow, with the girl following him in her car. They started walking through the fields when, according to defendant, he heard the girl scream, he turned and saw a man with a knife cutting the girl. Defendant said he tried to help the girl but the man cut him with the knife and ran away. Defendant put the girl in his car but panicked because he thought she was dead and when he got to a bridge over a stream he "dropped her off" the bridge into the stream.
The officer said that defendant was not being completely honest with him stating "you killed this girl didn't you?" When defendant answered "No I didn't" the officer repeated, Defendant's reply was
I'm telling you the truth. Sure, that's her blood in the car because when I seen the way she was cut I wanted to help her, and then when she fell over I got scared to even be involved in something like this, being on parole The officer persisted that truth was the issue, and truth would prevail in the end. He urged defendant "to be truthful with yourself." Defendant began to waver in his denial, saying, "This is going to kill my father." Seizing on the reference to his father, the officer said
(i)f the truth is out, he will understand. That's the most important thing, not, not what has happened, Frank. The fact that you were truthful, you came forward and you said, look I have a problem. I didn't mean to do what I did. I have a problem. This is what's important, Frank.
Defendant then confessed. He said that when they were unable to find the cow, the girl got into his car to go down the road to see if the cow was there. They drove down by the bridge where defendant took a pen-knife from his pocket and started cutting the girl. Defendant said he had no real recollection of just what he did to the girl or why, although he remembered throwing her body off the bridge. After the incident defendant said he drove home and, using a hose, washed the blood from the seat of the car. In answer to the officer's inquiry, defendant indicated he would be willing to give a formal statement.
Shortly after the questioning was terminated, defendant appeared to go into a state of shock. He slid off the chair onto the floor and had a blank stare on his face. When he did not respond to questions, he was taken to the Hunterdon Medical Center.
The tape recording was the principal evidence against defendant at his trial. It was admitted into evidence over defendant's objection and following a voir dire hearing at which defendant testified that he remembered going to the barracks for questioning but had no recollection of his interrogation, as recorded on the tape. According to defendant, the first thing he remembered after being in the barracks' coffee room was when he came to in the medical center.
The trial judge attached no particular significance to defendant's lack of present recollection of the taped interview. He found the questioning not to have been improper or coercive and that defendant's statement was voluntary and admissible. At the conclusion of the State's case, defendant elected not to take the stand and testify in his own defense.
During the trial an incident took place which defendant claimed also prejudiced his right to a fair trial. Because of the nature of the crime, 16 persons were chosen to hear the case pursuant to R. 1:8-2(d). The rule is intended to insure a sufficient number of jurors to render a verdict should a juror die or become ill, disabled or otherwise disqualified from continuing to sit. The rule is particularly useful in a protracted trial where the loss of a juror would otherwise require a mistrial. The rule then provided as follows: 1
(d) Alternate Jurors; Civil and Criminal Actions. The court in its discretion may direct the impanelling of a jury of such number as is appropriate under the circumstances not to exceed 16, having the same qualifications and impanelled and sworn in the same manner as a jury of 12. If a juror is excused after he has been sworn but before any opening statement is begun, another juror may be impanelled and sworn to take his place. All the jurors shall sit and hear the case, but the court for good cause shown may excuse any of them from service provided the number of jurors is not reduced to less than 12 or 6 as the case may be or such other number as may be stipulated to. If more than such number are left on the jury at the conclusion of the court's charge, the clerk of the court in its presence shall put their names on slips folded to conceal the names, shall place the slips in a suitable box and from it shall draw such number of names as will reduce the jury to the number required...
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