State v. Miller

• Court: Appellate Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: Pellegrino
• Citation: 757 A.2d 69,59 Conn.App. 406
• Parties: (Conn.App. 2000) STATE OF CONNECTICUT V. DARIUS MILLER (AC 19027)
• Decision Date: 15 August 2000

757 A.2d 69 (Conn.App. 2000) STATE OF CONNECTICUT
V.
DARIUS MILLER (AC 19027) THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT Argued May 3, 2000 August 15, 2000

Jerald S. Barber, special public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Frederick W. Fawcett, supervisory assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Joseph T. Corradino, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Landau, Mihalakos and Pellegrino, Js.

Pellegrino, J.

OPINION

The defendant, Darius Miller, appeals from judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (4)¹ and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§§§ 53a-48 and 53a-134 (a) (4).² The defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) restricted the defendant's cross-examination of a witness, (2) ruled on evidentiary matters and (3) denied his motion for judgment of acquittal, which he based on insufficient evidence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On December 23, 1996, at approximately 1 p.m., the defendant, Michael Capozziello, Charles Jones and Jasper Dudley participated in the armed robbery of a Bridgeport auto parts store.³ Capozziello subsequently confessed to the crime, implicating the defendant and the two others. Capozziello testified against the defendant at trial. Additional facts will be discussed where relevant to the issues on appeal.

I.

The defendant claims first that the court improperly restricted his cross-examination of Capozziello, thereby effectively depriving him of his right to confront the witnesses against him under article first, §§ 8,⁴ of the constitution of Connecticut, and the sixth⁵ and fourteenth⁶ amendments to the United States constitution. We do not review this claim.

The defendant did not preserve this issue at trial and, therefore, he can obtain review of this claim only under the doctrine enunciated in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989),⁷ or the plain error doctrine. Practice Book §§ 60-5; see State v. Quinones, 56 Conn. App. 529, 531, 745 A.2d 191 (2000). The defendant's claim does not satisfy the criteria established under either doctrine.

It is the responsibility of the defendant to provide this court with an adequate record and to brief each issue adequately. Practice Book §§ 61-10; Taylor v. State Board of Mediation & Arbitration, 54 Conn. App. 550, 558, 736 A.2d 175 (1999), cert. denied, 252 Conn. 925, 747 A.2d 1 (2000) ("`[i]t is the responsibility of the appellant to provide an adequate record for review'"); State v. Ramos, 36 Conn. App. 831, 839, 661 A.2d 606, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 902, 665 A.2d 905 (1995) ("[w]e are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief"). The defendant has not presented this court with an adequate record to review this claim, nor has he provided any analysis of this claim in his brief to support a reversal of the court's judgment on the basis of Golding review.⁸ "[C]laims on appeal that are inadequately briefed are deemed abandoned.... This rule applies to claims that the defendant is entitled to... Golding review." State v. Salvatore, 57 Conn. App. 396, 401, 749 A.2d 71 (2000). Accordingly, this claim is deemed abandoned. See State v. Perry, 58 Conn. App. 65, 71 n.4, 751 A.2d 843 (2000) (inadequately briefed claim deemed abandoned). Additionally, the defendant did not request review of this claim under the plain error doctrine. We therefore decline to afford review to this unpreserved claim.

II.

In his second claim, the defendant argues that the court improperly ruled on an evidentiary matter. Specifically, he claims that the trial court improperly failed to admit into evidence a handwritten receipt from a jewelry store owner, thereby violating his right to compulsory process under the sixth amendment to the United States constitution. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In support of the defendant's alibi defense, his wife testified that the defendant and Dudley accompanied her to New Haven on December 23, 1996, the day of the robbery, where she purchased a ring for her brother. She stated that although the original receipt for the transaction was probably somewhere in her home, she had in her possession a duplicate handwritten receipt with her that was issued by Richard Estelle, the store's owner, in July, 1997. Estelle testified that the receipt, which he described as a letter, was not the standard form of receipt issued by his store, that he could not locate a receipt for the items the defendant and Dudley claimed they purchased that day, that he had no present recollection of the events of the day of the robbery and that Dudley had provided the information contained in the receipt.

The defendant sought to admit the receipt as a full exhibit "for the purpose of the credibility of the witness." The court sustained the state's objection that the information contained in the receipt was hearsay and that the witness' credibility could not be bolstered by such hearsay. The defendant argued that the...