State v. Miller
Decision Date | 25 June 1974 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Respondent, v. John Bowman MILLER, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Robert C. Cannon, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Gary D. Babcock, Public Defender, Salem.
Timothy Wood, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Lee Johnson, Atty. Gen., and W. Michael Gillette, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before SCHWAB, C.J., and FOLEY and THORNTON, JJ.
After being charged with first degree robbery, ORS 164.415, and being an exconvict in possession of a concealable firearm, ORS 166.270, defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a search of his person and automobile. The state moved for an order summarily denying the motion on the ground that the motion was vague and conclusory. The trial court agreed with the state and, without holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion, denied it. Defendant was convicted on both charges and now appeals, claiming it was error to not afford him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress.
This claim presents two questions: (1) did the motion to suppress comply with the specificity requirements of our decision in State v. Johnson/Imel, Or.App., 98 Adv.Sh. 1385, 519 P.2d 1053 (1974); and (2) did the motion to suppress comply with the specificity requirements of Lane County Circuit Court Rule 7.015, which provides:
'(1) All motions to suppress evidence must be accompanied by an affidavit or affidavits on behalf of the defendant setting forth all facts within his knowledge upon which he intends to rely in support of the motion. The motion shall make specific reference to any constitutional provision, statute, rule, case or other authority upon which it is based and shall be accompanied by the moving party's brief which shall be adequate reasonably to apprise the court and the adverse party of the facts, arguments and authorities relied upon. Any opposition to a motion to suppress together with any opposing affidavits upon which it is based shall be in writing and shall be served and filed not more than seven (7) days after the motion to suppress has been filed. The opposition shall state the grounds thereof and, if the relief or order requested is not opposed, wholly or in part, a specific statement of the extent to which it is not opposed. Any opposition shall make specific reference to any affidavits relied on and shall be accompanied by an opposition brief adequate reasonably to apprise the court and moving parties of the arguments and authorities relied upon.
'(2) When averments in an affidavit are made upon information and belief, the affidavit shall indicate the basis thereof.
Defendant's motion to suppress was submited with a supporting affidavit and brief. The motion stated that the 'search was warrantless,' and that no 'probable caused existed.' The affidavit, executed by defendant's counsel, stated that based on discussions with his client counsel believed it 'may be true' that 'the officers who made such search did not have § search warrant' and that 'the officers did not have probable cause to make a search.' Defendant's trial brief in support of his motion to suppress again stated the officers who made the search did not have a warrant and argued warrantless searches 'are per se unreasonable.' 1
In Johnson/Imel we held that 'a written motion to suppress evidence must specify with particularity the grounds upon which the motion is based.' 98 Adv.Sh. at 1386, 519 P.2d at 1054. By way of illustration, we stated that a motion claiming 'there was no probable cause to arrest' could be sufficient. 98 Adv.Sh. at 1392, 519 P.2d at 1057. Applying that standard, we here conclude that while the motion and supporting documents are, as the state correctly points out, generally conclusory, they do contain the minimum specificity required by Johnson/Imel.
The primary thrust of Johnson/Imel is to require specificity in the statement of defendant's legal theory. Lane County Circuit Court Rule 7.015 requires substantially more: 'an affidavit or affidavits on behalf of the defendant setting forth All facts within his knowledge upon which he intends to rely in support of the motion (to suppress).' (Emphasis supplied.) During oral argument on the state's motion to summarily deny the motion to suppress the circuit court attempted to explain this requirement of the rule to defense counsel:
The implication is clear that the court, although not necessarily required to do so, was inviting defense counsel to file an...
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