State v. Miller

Citation13 S.W. 677,100 Mo. 439
PartiesSTATE ex rel. ATTORNEY GENERAL v. MILLER.
Decision Date28 April 1890
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

2. By the act of 1887, portions of the special act (Act Mo. Feb. 13, 1833) creating the school board of St. Louis are repealed or modified, but the sections repealed are not mentioned, nor are the sections modified set out in their modified form. Held not a violation of Const. Mo. art. 4, § 34, declaring that no act shall be amended by providing that designated words be stricken out or certain words inserted, but "the act or section amended shall be set forth in full as amended," because the change is not by inserting or striking out designated words, but is, in effect, a repeal by implication.

3. The act of 1887, prescribing the number of school directors "in all cities of this state now having, or hereafter attaining, a population of over three hundred thousand inhabitants," is not a special or local law, within the meaning of Const. Mo. art. 4, § 53, which declares that the general assembly shall not pass any local or special law regulating the management of public schools. Distinguishing St. Joseph Pub. Schools v. Gaylord, 86 Mo. 406.

F. M. Estes, Thos. P. Bashaw, and Willis H. Clark, for relator. Campbell & Ryan, for respondent.

BLACK, J.

This is an information in the nature of a quo warranto, prosecuted by the attorney general to test the right of the respondent to the office of director in the public schools in the city of St. Louis, and the controversy is made to turn upon the constitutionality of the act of March 30, 1887, (Laws 1887, p. 272.) The special act of February 13, 1833, and the special amendments thereof, (2 Ter. Laws, 399, and 2 Rev. St. 1879, p. 1536,) created a corporation for school purposes by the name of the "Board of President and Directors of the St. Louis Public Schools," embracing the territorial limits of the city of St. Louis as then or thereafter established. Two directors were elected from each ward of the city for the term of three years. To entitle a person to vote for a director, or to hold the office of director, he must, among other things, have paid a city tax; these are some of the features of the special law. The act of March 30, 1887, the one now in question, is entitled "An act fixing the number of directors in public school boards in certain cities, and providing for election of such directors, and for districting said cities therefor." The first section is as follows: "Section 1. In all cities of this state now having, or hereafter attaining, a population of over three hundred thousand inhabitants, the number of school directors or trustees, or number of members of any board having charge of public schools or public-school property in such cities, under and by virtue of any special charter or general law, shall be twenty-one; seven to be elected on general ticket at large by the qualified voters of such city, and fourteen to be elected by districts by the qualified voters of such city districts." Other sections make it the duty of the circuit court of any such city to divide the city into fourteen districts, and to certify the division to the school board. At the first election under the act one director is to be elected from each of the fourteen districts, and seven are to be elected at large. The terms of the old members are to cease when their successors are elected and qualified. Provisions are made whereby part of the directors thus elected at the first election hold for four years, and others for two years. Thereafter the directors are elected, except to fill vacancies, for four years. Payment of a school tax for two consecutive years next before the election is made an additional qualification to hold the office of director. The sixth and last section repeals all conflicting acts and parts of acts. Twenty-one directors were elected under the provisions of this law at the November election, 1887, the respondent being one of the persons then elected as a director at large. He qualified by taking the oath of office, and entered upon and has ever since continued to discharge the duties of a director. The pleadings admit that he possesses all of the qualifications to hold the office. The claim of the relator is that the act of March 30, 1887, is unconstitutional on several grounds, and of these in their order.

1. The title of the act, it is urged, does not conform to section 28 of article 4, which declares: "No bill * * * shall contain more than one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." This section, in the constitution of 1875, and one of a like import in the constitution of 1865, have been the subject of frequent consideration in this court. Its demands are that matters which are incongruous, disconnected, and without any natural relation to each other must not be joined in one bill, and the title must be a fair index of the subject-matter of the bill. A very strict and literal interpretation would lead to many separate acts relating to the same general subject, and thus produce an evil quite as great as the mischief intended to be remedied; hence a liberal interpretation and application must be allowed. In Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64, the following rule, taken from Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Law, (page 521, note,) was approved: "When all the provisions of a statute fairly relate to the same subject, have a natural connection with it, are the incidents or means of accomplishing it, then the subject is single, and, if it is sufficiently expressed in the title, the statute is valid." Substantially the same rule had been laid down in several previous cases. City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Mathews, 44 Mo. 523; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; City of Hannibal v. County of Marion, 69 Mo. 571; State v. Mead, 71 Mo. 268. The act in question fixes the number of directors in cities of over 300,000 inhabitants, prescribes their qualifications, and determines how and for what length of time they shall be elected. All these matters are closely related, and, under the rule before stated, constitute but one subject.

The opposing argument seems to be that while the legislature may deal with one general subject, in one act, under one general title, yet, when it undertakes to deal with particular regulations only, each particular regulation must stand by itself in a single act, with an appropriate title. The act in question, it is said, is bad because it contains three particular regulations, namely, number of directors, election of directors, and districting the cities for these elections. The argument is too subtle and refined to meet with our approval. As we have seen, the act treats of but one subject, namely, the election of directors in certain cities. All the other provisions have a natural relation to and are a part of that one subject. The other requirement is that the subject of the bill must be clearly expressed in the title. In adopting a title, the legislature may select its own language, and may use few or many words. It is sufficient that the title fairly embraces the subject-matter covered by the act; mere matters of detail need not be stated in the title. We see no valid objection whatever to the title of the act now in question. It is a fair index to all that is embraced in the law.

2. The next contention of the relator is that the act violates section 34 of article 4 of the constitution, which declares: "No act shall be amended by providing that designated words thereof be stricken out, or that designated words be inserted, or that designated words be stricken out and others inserted in lieu thereof; but the words to be stricken out, or the words to be inserted, or the words to be stricken out and those inserted in lieu thereof, together with the act or section amended, shall be set forth in full as amended." The object of this section is sufficiently stated in Morrison v. Railway Co., 96 Mo. 602, 9 S. W. Rep. 626, and 10 S. W. Rep. 148. It is there shown that when an act...

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