State v. Miller
| Decision Date | 31 March 1870 |
| Citation | 45 Mo. 495 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent, v. WILLIAM H. MILLER, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis Court of Criminal Correction.
Hart & Peacock, for appellant.
The indictment is framed under a section of a law which is unconstitutional and void, because, 1st, it treats of two subject-matters; 2d, the particular subject-matter treated in it is not mentioned in its title; 3d, nor is such subject-matter germain to that mentioned in the title of the act, which treats of transfers to bailees, and not sales to vendees. (Const. Mo., art. 4, § 32; State ex rel. Hixon v. Schofield et al., 41 Mo. 39.) The act relates to a class of offenses of a kindred character, all relating to trusts in matters of trade and commerce. These trusts may differ in species, but in their general nature they harmonize and agree.
At the November term, 1868, of the St. Louis Criminal Court, the appellant was indicted upon the charge of violating the provisions of the thirteenth section of “an act to prevent the issue of false receipts or bills of lading, and to punish fraudulent transfers of property by warehousemen, wharfingers, and others.” The section alluded to is as follows: “Whosoever shall purchase any goods, wares, and merchandise, or other commodity, for cash, and shall sell, hypothecate, or pledge the same to another, and use the proceeds thereof for any purpose other than the payment of the seller or vendor, with intent to cheat or defraud such seller or vendor, or who shall conceal, ship, or otherwise make way with, or deliver to another, any goods, wares, merchandise, or other commodities so purchased, without paying for the same, with the intent to cheat or defraud the seller or vendor thereof, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not exceeding five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.” (Acts 1868, p. 13, § 13; 1 Wagn. Stat. 221, § 12.)
There were four counts in the indictment. The first count charged that on the 8th day of August, 1868, the appellant purchased one thousand sacks of corn, of the value of $2,500, of John M. Gilkeson and James L. Sloss, for cash, and, with intent to cheat and defraud said Gilkeson and Sloss, unlawfully and feloniously sold the same and used the proceeds thereof for a purpose other than the payment of the sellers and vendors. The second count charged that he hypothecated the corn so purchased, and used the proceeds thereof for a purpose other than the payment of the sellers and vendors. The third count charged that he delivered said corn to another without paying for the same, and the fourth count charged that he shipped the same without paying therefor. There being no evidence to support the fourth count, it was withdrawn; and after hearing the evidence the jury returned a verdict against the defendant of guilty of felony, as charged in the first, second, and third counts of the indictment, and assessed his punishment at a fine of two thousand dollars.
The verdict was amply sustained by the evidence, and there is no reason for reviewing or commenting on the instructions of the court, as in my judgment they are unexceptionable. But there is one question on which I have had serious doubts, and that is the constitutionality of the law as applied to this case. This is really the only point in the case requiring serious consideration. It involves a construction of section 32, article 4, of the constitution of this State, which declares that “no law enacted by the general assembly shall relate to more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” This provision has of late been several times before this court. The courts in all the States where a like or similar provision exists have given it a very liberal interpretation, and have endeavored to construe it so as not to limit or cripple legislative enactments any further than what was necessary by the absolute requirements of the law. An exact and strict compliance with the letter would render legislation almost impracticable, and would lead to a multiplicity of bills which would make our statutes ridiculous. The principle is a correct one, and the...
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State v. Parker Distilling Co.
...the case of State v. Bengsch, 170 Mo., loc. cit. 105, 70 S. W. 710, and Judge Wagner, in speaking for this court, in the case of State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495, said: "Now the nature and object of the act is clearly defined in the title. It is to prevent the issue of false receipts of bills of......
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State v. Roach
...same rule had been laid down in several previous cases. City of St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Matthews, 44 Mo. 523; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; City of Hannibal v. County of Marion, 69 Mo. 571; State ex rel. v. Mead, 71 Mo. 268. The act in question fixes the number of directors......
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State v. Vandiver
...relates to the subject therein stated, then the act is single, and does not offend against said constitutional provision. State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; State ex rel. v. Miller, 100 Mo. 439, 13 S. W. 677; Town of Kirkwood v. Heege, 135 Mo. 112, 36 S. W. 614; E......
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In re Fourth Judicial District
...566; Poffenger v. Smith, 27 Neb. 788; St. Louis v. Teifel, 42 Mo. 578; State v. Matthews, 44 Mo. 523; State v. Bank, 45 Mo. 528; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495; State v. Ransom, 73 Mo. 78; Ewing Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 64; Mayor v. State, 30 Md. 112; State v. Union, 33 N. J. L., 350; Bellville, et......