State v. Miller
| Decision Date | 09 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2016-000862,Opinion No. 27798 |
| Citation | 814 S.E.2d 166,423 S.C. 95 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Jonathan Xavier MILLER, Petitioner. |
Deputy Chief Appellate Defender Wanda H. Carter, of Columbia, for Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General J. Benjamin Aplin, Solicitor Daniel E. Johnson, of Columbia, and Brent H. Arant, of North Charleston, all for Respondent.
Jonathan Xavier Miller appeals his conviction for possession of crack cocaine. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence seized during an inventory search of his vehicle after he was arrested for driving with a suspended license. We find the trial court correctly denied the motion, and affirm.
In January 2013, Columbia Police Department Officers James Westbury and Shaun McDonald were in the Rosewood area of Columbia investigating criminal activity unrelated to this case. During their investigation, a resident of the area informed the officers that an older-model, silver and green Chevrolet with large rims had been making frequent stops at a location known for drug activity.
Later that day, Officer Westbury and Officer McDonald—driving separately—observed a vehicle fitting that description pull into a gas station parking lot. Both officers turned their vehicles around and followed the silver and green Chevrolet as it left the gas station and traveled along several streets. The officers did not activate their blue lights or sirens. The Chevrolet came to a stop in the private driveway of an apartment complex, so the officers parked on the street and exited their vehicles.
After Miller got out of the driver's seat, the officers approached him to ask for identification. Miller told the officers he did not have his driver's license with him, but gave them his name and date of birth. When the officers provided Miller's information to the Department of Motor Vehicles, they discovered his license was suspended, so they arrested Miller for driving with a suspended license in violation of section 56-1-460 of the South Carolina Code (2018). The officers searched Miller incident to his arrest and found an electronic scale in one of his pockets. They asked for consent to search the Chevrolet, but Miller refused.
While the officers were arresting Miller, his girlfriend—Nikea Berry—came out of one of the apartments. She told the officers she lived there, and Miller was visiting her. The officers also learned the owner of the Chevrolet was Cassandra Jones, who did not live at the apartment complex and was not present at the scene.
Columbia Police Department's standard procedures permit its officers to tow vehicles when the driver is arrested away from his residence and there is no responsible party present at the scene. The Department's written policy requires police officers to conduct an inventory search of the passenger compartment of a towed vehicle. Because Miller was arrested away from his residence, and because Jones was not present at the scene, the officers called a towing company to tow the Chevrolet. Before the tow truck arrived, the officers conducted an inventory search and found just under five grams of crack cocaine beneath the driver's seat.
A grand jury indicted Miller for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Prior to his trial, Miller moved to suppress the drug evidence arguing the officers did not have authority to tow the Chevrolet from the private driveway, they were not authorized to conduct the inventory search, and thus the seizure of the drugs violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress.
At trial, the jury found Miller not guilty of possession with intent to distribute, but convicted him of simple possession of crack cocaine, which was his third offense. The trial court sentenced Miller to nine years in prison. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(A) (2018) (). Miller appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion. State v. Miller , Op. No. 2016-UP-040, 2016 WL 245257 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 20, 2016). Miller filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which we granted.
The issue on appeal is whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment for the officers—acting pursuant to their department policy—to seize, search, and then tow the vehicle Miller was driving when he was arrested on private property away from his residence and the owner of the vehicle was not present. The facts relevant to this appeal are not in dispute, so we address the issue as a question of law, which we review de novo. See State v. Adams , 409 S.C. 641, 647, 763 S.E.2d 341, 344 (2014) ().
The Fourth Amendment protects the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Cady v. Dombrowski , 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1973). "Whether a search and seizure is unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." S. Dakota v. Opperman , 428 U.S. 364, 375, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3100, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1009 (1976). In most circumstances, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard must be excluded from trial. State v. Weaver , 374 S.C. 313, 319, 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007).
"Generally, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. However, a warrantless search can be reasonable if it falls under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. One of those exceptions is an inventory search conducted according to standard police procedures. Robinson v. State , 407 S.C. 169, 185, 754 S.E.2d 862, 870 (2014) ().
"For an inventory search to be valid, the vehicle searched should first be in the valid custody of the law enforcement officers conducting the inventory." United States v. Brown , 787 F.2d 929, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Opperman , 428 U.S. at 374, 96 S.Ct. at 3099, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1008 ). "The question ... is ... whether the police officer's decision to impound was reasonable under the circumstances." Brown , 787 F.2d at 932 ; see also United States v. Bullette , 854 F.3d 261, 265 (4th Cir. 2017) () (citing Bertine , 479 U.S. at 371-76, 107 S.Ct. at 741-43, 93 L.Ed.2d at 745-48 ).
The first step in our analysis is to determine whether Officers Westbury and McDonald's decision to seize Miller's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. We find the decision was reasonable under the circumstances, and thus there was no violation.
We begin our explanation with the fact the officers seized and towed the vehicle pursuant to lawful authority. They acted in accordance with the requirements set forth in a written police department policy, which was adopted pursuant to a City of Columbia ordinance, which was passed under authority of a state statute, which the General Assembly enacted pursuant to the Home Rule provisions of the Constitution of South Carolina.
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...is not present at the scene and no other person is present who is authorized to take responsibility for the vehicle." State v. Miller, 814 S.E.2d 166, 170 (S.C. 2018). The policy authorizes tows that meet these requirements irrespective whether the vehicle is located on public or private pr......