State v. Miller

• Decision Date: 23 December 2013
• Docket Number: No. 33,571.,33,571.
• Citation: 314 P.3d 655
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner, v. Andrew Jamal MILLER, Defendant–Respondent.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

314 P.3d 655

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Petitioner,

v.Andrew Jamal MILLER, Defendant–Respondent.

No. 33,571.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Nov. 18, 2013.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 23, 2013.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Ralph E. Trujillo, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Bennett J. Baur, Acting Chief Public Defender, William A. O'Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} We issued a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision that the district court's sentence of Defendant Andrew Miller violated the terms of a plea agreement that the district court had accepted. We agree with the Court of Appeals that his sentence violates the plea agreement. However, we disagree with the remedy that the Court of Appeals ordered and clarify our case law on this account. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the Court of Appeals consistent with this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

{2} In 2008, Defendant faced sixty-one counts consisting mostly of fraud and embezzlement charges between two indictments against him. He entered into a plea agreement with the State covering both indictments, which the district court accepted. Defendant pleaded Guilty or No Contest to four second-degree felonies and two third-degree felonies. In exchange for Defendant's pleas, the State dropped all but six charges against him.

{3} The plea agreement in this case contains three provisions relevant to sentencing. First, the agreement states that the parties agree to run the sentence for each count consecutively. Second, under the heading “SENTENCING AGREEMENT” it reads, in part: “The parties agree that there shall be a minimum sentence of ten (10) years and a maximum sentence of 40 years at initial sentencing.” There was also a handwritten clause below this that stated: “The remaining two years of the 42 year exposure shall run concurrent with parole of two years.” Finally, under the heading “POTENTIAL INCARCERATION” it reads:

If the court accepts this agreement, the defendant will be ordered to serve a minimum sentence of ten (10) years and a maximum sentence of 40 years in the Department of Corrections at initial sentencing. The Defendant may be given a period of probation. If the defendant later violates that probation or parole, the defendant may be incarcerated for the balance of the sentence.

{4} Prior to sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his pleas, arguing that the State was not fulfilling its promise regarding allowed visitations from his son. The State responded that it would be highly prejudiced if Defendant were permitted to withdraw his pleas. The district court denied Defendant's motion and sentenced Defendant. The judgment and sentence the district court ordered provided, in part:

The sentences in [the first indictment] are to [run] consecutively to the sentences in [the second indictment] for a total incarceration of forty two [sic] (42) years, followed by two years of parole. The court further orders that nine (9) years is suspended for an actual sentence of imprisonment of thirty three (33) years.

Instead of signing the judgment and sentence, Defendant wrote by the signature line that he objected to the length of the sentence, among other things.

{5} Defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the district court imposed a longer sentence than contemplated by the plea agreement since the plea agreement called for a maximum sentence of forty years and the court sentenced him to forty-two years. State v. Miller, 2012–NMCA–051, ¶ 17, 278 P.3d 561. The State responded that the forty-year maximum term in the plea agreement applied solely to “initial sentencing,” meaning it only applied to the cap on the initial period of incarceration. Id.

{6} Initially, the Court of Appeals determined that the forty-two-year sentence might be a clerical error in the written judgment so it remanded the case to the district court to clarify the sentence and enter findings or a corrected judgment. Id. ¶ 6. However, the district court did not amend the sentence and instead entered a finding that “by its plain meaning the cap on the term of incarceration applies only at, ‘initial sentencing.’ ” “Such language does not speak to the overall sentencing exposure for the required basic sentences which the court must impose for each count.” The district court also entered several conclusions of law, which discussed the district court's authority to sentence and concluded that it was required by law to impose a forty-two-year sentence in the absence of aggravating or mitigating factors. The district court determined that Defendant had “no grounds on which to be allowed to withdraw his plea agreement” and denied Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea agreement.

{7} The Court of Appeals “reverse[d] the denial of Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.” Id. ¶ 27. However, the Court of Appeals then also concluded “that the district court rejected the plea agreement by sentencing Defendant to two years more than the maximum contemplated by the agreement” and held that Defendant must be given the opportunity to withdraw his plea or, if both parties agreed, “the district court may also re-sentence Defendant in accordance with the plea.” Id. ¶ 28.

{8} The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari, which we granted. The State argues that the district court sentenced Defendant in conformity with the explicit terms of the plea agreement. We disagree with the State and agree with Defendant and the Court of Appeals that the forty-two-year sentence violates the plea agreement. However, we reverse the Court of Appeals' remand order for the reasons explained below. We remand to the district court to sentence Defendant according to his reasonable understanding of the plea agreement, requiring that his sentence contain a total period of incarceration between ten and forty years.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{9} Since the State maintains that Defendant was sentenced according to the terms in the plea agreement, our task is to evaluate the terms in the plea agreement. “Upon review, [appellate courts] construe the terms of the plea agreement according to what Defendant reasonably understood when he entered the plea.” State v. Fairbanks, 2004–NMCA–005, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 783, 82 P.3d 954 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord State v. Mares, 1994–NMSC–123, ¶ 12, 119 N.M. 48, 888 P.2d 930. “A plea agreement is a unique form of contract whose terms must be interpreted, understood, and approved by the district court.” State v. Gomez, 2011–NMCA–120, ¶ 9, 267 P.3d 831. If the language in the written agreement is ambiguous, it is the district court's task to resolve that ambiguity with the parties. Id. If the court resolved the ambiguity, the agreement can no longer be said to be ambiguous as to that point. Id. But if the court failed to resolve the ambiguity and there is no presentation of extrinsic evidence that would resolve it, then we “may rely on the rules of construction, construing any ambiguity in favor of the defendant. Under such circumstances, we review the terms of the plea agreement de novo.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

{10} The State argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. However, the Court of Appeals ultimately evaluated the plea agreement for ambiguity using a de novo standard. Miller, 2012–NMCA–051, ¶¶ 25–27, 278 P.3d 561. The abuse of discretion standard of review is inappropriate in this case because Defendant was entitled to appeal the sentence based upon his claim that it did not conform to the agreed upon plea agreement regardless of whether he had ever moved to withdraw his pleas. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (providing that aggrieved parties have the absolute right of one appeal); see, e.g., Gomez, 2011–NMCA–120, 267 P.3d 831 (addressing the defendant's appeal of the district court's sentence, which he argued violated the terms of his plea agreement).

III. DISCUSSION

{11} As in this case, the interplay between our sentencing statutes is often the source of confusion in disputes over whether a sentence complies with a plea agreement. The Legislature has imposed basic sentencing requirements, but it has also granted courts broad discretion over certain sentencing elements. NMSA 1978, Section 31–18–15(B) (2007) requires that “[t]he appropriate basic sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed ... unless the court alters the sentence pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act.” (Emphasis added.) The Criminal Sentencing Act provides the guidelines for altering the basic sentence, permitting the court to consider mitigating and aggravating factors to reduce or increase the basic sentence by up to one-third. SeeNMSA 1978, § 31–18–15.1(A), (G) (1993, amended 2009), held unconstitutional by State v. Frawley, 2007–NMSC–057, ¶ 29, 143 N.M. 7, 172 P.3d 144 (unconstitutionality abrogated by the 2009 amendment—the court now must find that aggravating factors exist beyond a reasonable doubt). A sentencing court also has authority to defer the sentence or suspend the execution of a sentence. SeeNMSA 1978, § 31–20–3(A), (B) (1985). Also, “whether multiple sentences for multiple offenses run concurrently or consecutively is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Allen, 2000–NMSC–002, ¶ 91, 128 N.M. 482, 994 P.2d 728 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Finally, the court has control over whether the maximum period of incarceration applies solely to initial sentencing or to post-sentencing aspects as well, such as probation revocation consequences. SeeNMSA 1978, § 31–21–15(B) (1989) (giving the court broad discretion when a probation violation is established to “continue the original probation, revoke the probation and either order a new...