State v. Miller
| Decision Date | 26 July 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 4977.,4977. |
| Citation | 727 S.E.2d 32,398 S.C. 47 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Phillip MILLER, Appellant. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., all of Columbia; and Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield, Jr., of Lancaster, for Respondent.
Phillip Miller appeals his conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. He argues the trial court erred in admitting the drugs into evidence and in denying his motion for a new trial based on a juror's failure to respond to a question asked during voir dire. We affirm the admission of the drugs. As to the ruling on the new trial motion, we reverse the trial court's finding that the information the juror concealed would not have been a material factor in Miller's use of his peremptory challenges. We remand for a factual determination of whether the juror intentionally concealed the information.
Miller was tried in Lancaster County. During voir dire, the trial court asked potential jurors: “Is there any member of the jury panel who has been a victim of a crime in Lancaster County or member of your immediate family a victim of a crime ... ?” Ten months earlier, the juror at issue testified for the State in a Lancaster County assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK) trial of a man accused of stabbing the juror's mother. Despite this, the juror did not respond to the voir dire question. Defense counsel had two peremptory strikes remaining when the juror was seated.
The jury found Miller guilty. After the verdict was published but before the jury was released, former Lancaster County assistant solicitor William Frick entered the courtroom. Frick was one of the prosecutors in the ABWIK trial, and he “immediately recognized” the juror. At his first opportunity, which was after the trial court excused the jury, Frick told Miller's lawyer about the juror's involvement in the ABWIK trial.
Miller filed a motion for a new trial based on the juror's failure to disclose the attack on her mother. At the hearing on the motion, Miller offered an affidavit prepared by Frick. In the affidavit, Frick explained that he interviewed the juror before the ABWIK trial and conducted her direct examination. Based on Frick's interactions with the juror, he stated he was “absolutely certain” of her identity. Miller also offered the indictment, the sentencing sheet, and a docket report from the ABWIK trial. However, neither the State nor Miller contacted the juror, nor did she appear at the hearing. The trial court did not rule on the motion at the hearing. Instead, the court left the record open to give the parties a chance to subpoena the juror to testify. The juror was never called to testify. The court later denied Miller's motion in a written order.
The trial court must grant a motion for a new trial based on a juror's failure to disclose information requested during voir dire “when the court finds the juror intentionally concealed the information, and that the information concealed would have supported a challenge for cause or would have been a material factor in the use of the party's peremptory challenges.” State v. Woods, 345 S.C. 583, 587, 550 S.E.2d 282, 284 (2001). A circuit court's ruling on a new trial motion will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion amounting to an error of law. State v. Sparkman, 358 S.C. 491, 495, 596 S.E.2d 375, 377 (2004).
The trial court based its decision solely on the second prong of Woods, ruling that the concealed information would not have supported a challenge for cause and would not have been a material factor in Miller's use of his peremptory challenges. The written order states in its entirety: 1
We believe the trial court took too narrow a view of materiality. “Material” means “[o]f such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person's decision-making; significant; essential.” Black's Law Dictionary 1066 (9th ed.2009). Here, a juror failed to disclose that, just ten months earlier, she participated in a criminal trial in which a man who had stabbed her mother was successfully prosecuted by the same solicitor's office that was prosecuting Miller. This information would have been significant to Miller, and therefore a material factor, in deciding how to use his peremptory challenges. Accordingly, we find the trial court committed an error of law.
The State argues the information concealed by the juror would not have been a material factor because unlike the ABWIK case, Miller's case concerned drug possession, involved no weapons or violence, and had no “other logical connection to the trial involving her mother's attacker.” We disagree. The “logical connection” that makes the information material is the solicitor's office, which prosecuted both defendants and with which the juror cooperated in convicting the person who stabbed her mother. The focus of the voir dire question on crimes occurring in Lancaster County indicates that at least part of the question's purpose was to identify potential jurors who may be biased for or against members of the local criminal justice system, such as prosecutors, defense attorneys, or law enforcement officers.
The supreme court's holding in Woods supports our conclusion. In that case, the defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. 345 S.C. at 585, 550 S.E.2d at 283. The defendant later learned that before his trial, one of the jurors had volunteered as a victim's advocate in the solicitor's office that prosecuted him. Id. In analyzing whether this information would have been a material factor, the supreme court focused on the juror's connection to the prosecution, not on whether she had participated in factually similar cases. See345 S.C. at 590, 550 S.E.2d at 286 (). Despite the differences between the drug case being tried and the crimes that connected the juror to the solicitor's office, the supreme court found the juror's previous relationship with the office would have been a material factor. Id.
The situation here is comparable to Woods because of the relationship between the juror and the solicitor's office. Standing alone, a juror's participation in a factually dissimilar trial might not be significant in trial counsel's decisions on peremptory strikes, particularly if the earlier trial occurred in another state or even a different county. Here, however, the information withheld has significance beyond the nature of the other case. The juror's participation in the ABWIK trial reveals a relationship between the juror and the solicitor's office prosecuting Miller. The mere existence of this relationship is significant. The fact that this relationship developed in the context of the juror's participation in the office's successful attempt to incarcerate a man who attacked her mother increases its significance.
We hold the information withheld by the juror would have been a material factor in the use of Miller's peremptory challenges in this case. The information also could not support a challenge for cause. Therefore, we reverse.
The trial court made no factual determination on the first prong of the Woods test—whether the juror intentionally concealed the information. Because we believe this determination should be made by the trial court based on information that is not in the record before us, we remand the case to the trial court.
At the hearing before the trial court, the State argued the juror must provide an explanation before the court could decide if the concealment was intentional. The assistant solicitor stated:
I don't know how we can answer whether she understood it, didn't understand it, didn't hear it, thought you were referring to a case involving the same prosecutors and defense lawyers that are here. We don't have that information about her and ... I'd argue it's probably fatal to the motion without having some testimony or explanation from her.
The trial court disagreed with the State's argument, stating:
[Woods ] says “reasonably comprehensible to the average juror”.... So they ... put it on the reasonable man type of concept; i.e., a reasonable average juror, not the individual ... state of mind of the juror at the time they didn't reveal information[. That] is the way I interpret the case, which is contrary to what you're saying.
After much discussion, the trial court returned to the question of the juror's testimony, stating to the assistant solicitor:
Your initial argument was that you felt like there's no way I could make this decision without knowing why she didn't [answer] and whether it was intentional or not and [I] can't make the determination of intention without having talked with her. So I'm offering the opportunity to bring her in under oath and ask her the question if you think that's necessary to your argument.
The assistant solicitor then stated “I think it's necessary to his argument.” The trial court's response and the ensuing dialogue indicate the trial court believed that if the juror's testimony was necessary, the responsibility to obtain it belonged to the State.
The Court: Okay. Well, he doesn't think so. You're the one who brought it up.
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