State v. Miller

• Decision Date: 04 March 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-0291-CR,92-0291-CR
• Citation: 499 N.W.2d 215,175 Wis. 2d 204
• Parties: STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Eugene C. MILLER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

Page 215

499 N.W.2d 215

175 Wis.2d 204

STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Eugene C. MILLER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 92-0291-CR.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 6, 1992.

Opinion Released March 4, 1993.

Opinion Filed March 4, 1993.

Before GARTZKE, P.J., and DYKMAN and SUNDBY, JJ.

SUNDBY, Judge.

The defendant, Eugene C. Miller, attacks a condition of his probation which prohibits him from telephoning any woman without permission of his probation officer. He claims that the condition does not relate to the offense for which he was convicted and is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation. He further claims that the condition violates his first amendment right of expression and association and is overly broad and vague. We conclude that the condition is reasonably related to Miller's rehabilitation and that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when it imposed the condition. We further conclude that the condition is not legally erroneous. We therefore affirm the judgment of conviction and the order denying Miller's motion to modify the conditions of his probation.

Miller pled guilty to burglary and theft and judgment of conviction was entered. The presentence investigation report revealed that Miller had several convictions in 1988 and 1990 for harassing telephone calls to women. The calls were sexual or pornographic in nature. The court placed Miller on probation and ordered that he "is not to make any calls to any female on the phone except family" without prior approval of his probation officer. ¹ Miller claims that this condition is unreasonable and unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. We disagree.

Sentencing courts may impose "any conditions [of probation] which appear to be reasonable and appropriate." Section 973.09(1)(a), Stats. We review conditions of probation to determine whether they serve the objectives of probation: rehabilitation and protection of the state and community interest. Huggett v. State, 83 Wis.2d 790, 797-98 n. 5, 266 N.W.2d 403, 406 n. 5 (1978). Whether a condition of probation violates defendant's constitutional rights is a question of law which we review without deferring to the circuit court. Edwards v. State, 74 Wis.2d 79, 84-85, 246 N.W.2d 109, 111 (1976). The conditions of probation may impinge upon constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation. Id.

We first consider Miller's claim that the condition of probation is unreasonable because it does not relate to the offenses for which he was convicted and is not sufficiently related to his rehabilitation. We review this claim to determine whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion.

Whether conditions of probation must relate to the offense for which the defendant is convicted appears to be a question of first impression in Wisconsin. Miller cites the following decisions from other jurisdictions: In re Mannino, 14 Cal.App.3d 953, 92 Cal.Rptr. 880 (1971) (probation conditions not adequately related to the offense of conviction were improper); People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal.App.2d 623, 64 Cal.Rptr. 290 (1967) (probation condition prohibiting defendant from becoming pregnant while unmarried was improper because not related to her offense of robbery or to her future criminality); Wiggins v. State, 386 So.2d 46 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (condition prohibiting probationers convicted of uttering a forged instrument and burglary from engaging in sexual intercourse with individuals to whom they were not married was not reasonably related to probationers' criminal conduct); and State v. Bubar, 146 Vt. 398, 505 A.2d 1197 (1985) (condition prohibiting defendant convicted of sexual assault from being alone in the presence of any female person other than his wife was unreasonable). The state counters with decisions which have approved conditions of probation unrelated to the defendant's crime: United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573 (7th Cir.1991) (condition of probation which prohibited defendant from associating with skinheads and neo-Nazis was valid); United States v. Gracia, 755 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.1985) (condition of probation valid which enjoined defendant convicted of criminal contempt from consorting with suspected or actual members of terrorist groups); Yadyaser v. State, 430 So.2d 888 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (condition of probation which required Iranian national convicted of theft to present to court a one-way airline ticket to Iran or some other approved foreign destination was valid); and Barlip v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 45 Pa.Commw. 458, 405 A.2d 1338 (1979) (there need be no direct relation between crime and parole condition).

The state suggests that we should follow the California approach which permits conditions of probation which "require or forbid conduct that is reasonably related to future criminality." People v. Bauer, 211 Cal.App.3d 937, 942, 260 Cal.Rptr. 62, 65 (1989). We need not go that far in this case. The presentence investigation report defines a very specific area of criminality in which Miller has recently been involved. While his past criminal conduct of making sexually explicit telephone calls to women is unrelated to the offenses for which he was convicted, Miller needs to be rehabilitated from that conduct. The condition that Miller not telephone any woman other than a family member is rationally related to Miller's need for rehabilitation. We conclude that the condition is "reasonable and appropriate." State v. Heyn, 155 Wis.2d 621, 628-29, 456 N.W.2d 157, 161 (1990).

We next consider Miller's claim that the condition of probation imposed in this case unduly restricts his freedom of expression and his freedom of association, in violation of his first amendment rights. He concedes that simply because a condition of probation infringes on first amendment rights does not make the condition invalid. See State v. J.E.B., 161 Wis.2d 655, 469 N.W.2d 192 (Ct.App.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 940, 112 S.Ct. 1484, 117 L.Ed.2d 626 (1992) (first amendment activity linked to criminal conduct not protected).

Miller argues, however, that the condition imposed on him is too broad. He notes that the court could have imposed a condition that he not make unwelcome telephone calls to women to harass them or for his sexual gratification. He cites several cases from other jurisdictions in which a condition of probation impinging the defendant's first amendment rights was held to be overbroad: Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.1971) (condition of probation prohibiting defendant from circulating material attacking income tax and federal reserve systems was overbroad); People v. Pointer, 151 Cal.App.3d 1128, 199 Cal.Rptr. 357 (1984) (condition of probation prohibiting woman convicted of child endangerment from becoming pregnant was overbroad infringement on right to privacy); and In re Mannino, 14 Cal.App.3d 953, 92 Cal.Rptr. 880 (1971) (condition of probation prohibiting d...