State v. Mills

• Decision Date: 04 April 2000
• Citation: State v. Mills, 748 A.2d 318, 57 Conn. App. 202 (Conn. App. 2000)
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: (Conn.App. 2000) STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICARDO MILLS AC 17986

748 A.2d 318 (Conn.App. 2000)

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. RICARDO MILLS

AC 17986

Connecticut Court of Appeals

Argued October 21, 1999

April 04, 2000

Elizabeth M. Inkster, assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Harry Weller, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were John A. Connelly, state's attorney, and Edward Ricciardi, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Landau, Spear and Vertefeuille, Js.

Spear, J.

OPINION

The defendant, Ricardo Mills, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3)¹ and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (3).² The defendant claims that the court improperly (1) denied his motions for a mistrial and a new trial, which alleged prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments and (2) denied his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to an allegedly unlawful warrantless arrest. We reverse the judgment of the trial court because of prosecutorial misconduct, affirm the ruling on the motion to suppress and remand the case for a new trial.³

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On September 16, 1996, the victim, Ralph Hickey, and several other persons were visiting Laura Blumberg and James Blumberg in Waterbury. At approximately 6:30 p.m. that evening, the defendant, who was known to the Blumbergs, knocked on the door of their apartment. The defendant, after being invited in by James Blumberg, walked straight over to the victim. After the defendant and the victim began arguing about an incident involving the defendant's dog, the defendant punched the victim in the face and a scuffle ensued. During the struggle, the defendant picked up a knife and stabbed the victim several times.⁴

Shortly after the fight, the victim left with Laura Blumberg to go to Southbury. During the trip, the victim began to suffer the effects of the several stab wounds, and he decided to drive into the Southbury Food Center parking lot in Southbury. Police and medical personnel were called, and they transported the victim to St. Mary's Hospital in Waterbury where he died the next morning.

The jury found the defendant guilty of one count of manslaughter in the first degree and one count of assault in the first degree. This appeal followed.

I.

The defendant first claims that the prosecutor made numerous improper statements during closing argument that were so egregious that they deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States constitution, and article first, §§ 8, of the constitution of Connecticut.⁵ We agree.

"`[Our Supreme Court has] previously acknowledged that prosecutorial misconduct can occur in the course of closing argument.' State v. Atkinson, 235 Conn. 748, 768-69, 670 A.2d 276 (1996)." State v. Satchwell, 244 Conn. 547, 564, 710 A.2d 1348 (1998). "Such argument may be, `in light of all of the facts and circumstances, so egregious that no curative instruction could reasonably be expected to remove [its] prejudicial impact.' State v. Fullwood, 194 Conn. 573, 585, 484 A.2d 435 (1984)." State v. Williams, 204 Conn. 523, 539, 529 A.2d 653 (1987).

To review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, "we ask whether the prosecutor's conduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "In determining whether prosecutorial misconduct was so serious as to amount to a denial of due process, [our Supreme Court] in conformity with courts in other jurisdictions, has focused on several factors. Among them are the extent to which the misconduct was invited by defense conduct or argument... the severity of the misconduct... the frequency of the misconduct... the centrality of the misconduct to the critical issues in the case... the strength of the curative measures adopted... and the strength of the state's case." (Citations omitted.) Id., 540. With these factors as a guide, we now review whether the prosecutor's conduct denied the defendant a fair trial.

The record in this case discloses a pattern of misconduct during closing argument that was in no way invited by the conduct or argument of the defense. The severity and frequency of the conduct is demonstrated by the fact that the prosecutor continued on his improper course after successful objections by defense counsel.⁶ The state's case in support of the original murder and assault charges was relatively weak. The numerous requests for reinstruction show that the jury had difficulty reaching its decision. Although the defendant was convicted of two lesser offenses, this does not excuse the prosecutor's conduct.

The prosecutor's actions were so severe that he was admonished by the court outside the hearing of the jury.⁷ In his misguided zeal to convict the defendant, the prosecutor improperly expressed his personal opinions, appealed to the passions and emotions of the jurors, and injected extraneous matters into the case.

A. Expression of Personal Opinion

The prosecutor may not express his opinion, directly or indirectly as to the defendant's guilt. State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 541. "Such expressions of personal opinion are a form of unsworn and unchecked testimony." Id. Furthermore, it is not the state's attorney's right or duty to stigmatize a defendant. State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 562, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192, 105 S. Ct. 967, 83 L. Ed. 2d 971 (1985).

In his closing and rebuttal arguments, the state's attorney improperly gave his personal opinion on numerous occasions. First, he expressed his opinion that society would be in trouble if the defendant were not found guilty of murder.⁸ The prosecutor also attempted to stigmatize the defendant by constantly referring to his acts as vicious or heinous, and by suggesting that the word "back-stabber" was coined because of people such as the defendant.⁹ During his initial closing and again in his rebuttal, the prosecutor stated that justice would require a murder conviction.¹⁰ The prosecutor also emphatically gave his opinion that the police had done good work in getting their man.¹¹

"These expressions of opinion are particularly difficult for the jury to ignore because of the special position held by the prosecutor. State v. Ferrone, [96 Conn. 160, 168-69, 113 A. 452 (1921)]. The jury is aware that he has prepared and presented the case and consequently, may have access to matters not in evidence; United States v. Modica, [663 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989, 102 S. Ct. 2269, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1284 (1982)]; which the jury may infer to have precipitated the personal opinions." State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 542-44. "As we stated in State v. Ferrone, [supra, 168-69] `[b]y reason of his office, [the prosecutor] usually exercises great influence upon jurors. His conduct and language in the trial of cases in which human life or liberty are at stake should be forceful, but fair, because he represents the public interest, which demands no victim and asks no conviction through the aid of passion, prejudice, or resentment.'" State v. Couture, supra, 194 Conn. 564-65. The prosecutor is held in high esteem by the jury because "`[h]e is not only an officer of the court, like every attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people of the State, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the innocent....' State v. Ferrone, [supra, 168-69]." State v. Williams, supra, 537-38.

The prosecutor's repeated appeals to the jury that justice required a conviction coupled with the repeated vitriolic references to the defendant, could reasonably have been a factor in the jury's decision to convict. His opinion that society would be in trouble if the defendant were not convicted might also have played a part in the jury's decision to convict because of a fear that the defendant might strike again if acquitted.

B. Appeals to Emotion

"A prosecutor may not appeal to the emotions, passions and prejudices of the jurors.... [S]uch appeals should be avoided because they have the effect of diverting the jury's attention from [its] duty to decide the case on the evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 545. "When the prosecutor appeals to emotions, he invites the jury to decide the case, not according to a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of powerful and irrelevant factors which are likely to skew that appraisal." Id., 546.

In this case the prosecutor improperly appealed to the emotions and sympathies of the jury on several occasions. In one such appeal, he asked that the jury not victimize the victim again.¹² Later in his rebuttal argument, he appealed to the jurors to convict so that evil would not triumph by their inaction.¹³ By using such dramatic words, the prosecutor was attempting to color the jurors' minds with such emotion that they would consider it their duty to convict regardless of the evidence. On occasions throughout the prosecutor's closing argument, he spoke the victim's name with such repetition and used such strong, inappropriate language that it could only be inferred that his intent was to appeal to the sympathies and emotions of the jury.¹⁴

C. Injection of Extraneous Matters

"[A] prosecutor should not inject extraneous issues into the case that divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.... It is improper for the prosecutor to encourage the jury to identify with the victim and to predict the effect of a not guilty verdict...." (Citation omitted.) State v. Williams, supra, 204 Conn. 547. Although in Williams the victim was not killed, the rationale for precluding such an appeal to the jury is the same and should not be...