State v. Mimms

• Decision Date: 30 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 5252.,5252.
• Citation: 410 S.C. 32,763 S.E.2d 46
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Daisy Lynne MIMMS, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2012–212931.

410 S.C. 32

763 S.E.2d 46

The STATE, Respondent

v. Daisy Lynne MIMMS, Appellant.Appellate Case No. 2012–212931.

No. 5252.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard June 4, 2014.

Decided July 30, 2014.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 17, 2014.

Assistant Public Defender Mark Wise, of Orangeburg, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, both of Columbia, for Respondent.

Opinion

CURETON, A.J.

Daisy Mimms appeals a circuit court order dismissing an appeal of her conviction in magistrate court for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). Mimms contends the circuit court erred in finding the magistrate court did not err in concluding: (1) there is no criminal intent required for the crime of DUI; and (2) veering off a roadway on one occasion was sufficient to show impaired driving. We affirm.

FACTS

On October 23, 2010, Trooper Jamie Burris, while responding to a dispatch call of a driver driving erratically, conducted a traffic stop of Mimms because her car fit the description from dispatch and he observed her drive off the roadway.

Burris “smelled an odor of alcohol” as he walked toward Mimms' car; therefore, he asked her to get out of the car. During the stop, Burris told Mimms, “You [were] weaving all over the roadway.” Burris administered three parts of the Horizontal–Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test to determine if Mimms was under the influence. Mimms was unable to keep her balance while performing the test and she did not successfully complete any portion of the HGN test. Based on Mimms' performance on the HGN test, Burris “did not feel comfortable” requiring Mimms to complete additional field sobriety tests. Additionally, based on her appearance and mannerisms, Burris determined Mimms was “clearly” under the influence of alcohol. Mimms admitted she consumed alcohol earlier that evening. Mimms also told Burris she had cancer and was undergoing chemotherapy treatment. Burris explained to Mimms the mixture of alcohol with her medication could have had a “synergy effect,” impacting her level of intoxication.

Subsequently, the State charged Mimms with DUI, and she proceeded to a jury trial in magistrate court. After the State rested, Mimms moved for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence of impaired driving because the evidence only showed she “ran off the road slightly.” Further, Mimms maintained there was no evidence showing she weaved back and forth, drove into a ditch, or crossed the dotted line. As a second ground for a directed verdict, Mimms argued the State failed to prove an intentional act of violating the law. Mimms asserted the State was required to prove criminal intent and it failed to present such evidence. Mimms contended the evidence did not indicate she knew or had any reason to know she should not have drank a beer or there would be a “synergy effect” when she consumed the medication and alcohol. According to Mimms, there was no evidence she knew combining beer with her medication would impact her ability to drive. The magistrate denied the motion, finding there was sufficient evidence of impaired driving and the DUI statute does not require the State to prove criminal intent. Mimms presented no defense.

Prior to instructing the jury, the magistrate reviewed the parties' proposed jury charges and determined she “[would] not instruct on criminal intent.”¹ The jury convicted Mimms of DUI and the magistrate sentenced her to thirty days' imprisonment, suspended upon payment of a $997.00 fine. Mimms appealed to the circuit court, which dismissed her appeal with prejudice. This appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Section 18–7–170 of the South Carolina Code (2014) articulates the standard of review to be applied by the circuit court in an appeal of a magistrate's judgment:

Upon hearing the appeal the appellate court shall give judgment according to the justice of the case, without regard to technical errors and defects which do not affect the merits. In giving judgment the court may affirm or reverse the judgment of the court below, in whole or in part, as to any or all the parties and for errors of law or fact.

“In criminal appeals from magistrate or municipal court, the circuit court does not conduct a de novo review, but instead reviews for preserved error raised to it by appropriate exception. In reviewing criminal cases, this court may review errors of law only.” State v. Henderson, 347 S.C. 455, 457, 556 S.E.2d 691, 692 (Ct.App.2001) (internal citations omitted). “When there is any evidence, however slight, tending to prove the issues involved, [the appellate court] may not question a magistrate court's findings of fact that were approved by a circuit court on appeal.” Allendale Cnty. Sheriff's Office v. Two Chess Challenge II, 361 S.C. 581, 585, 606 S.E.2d 471, 473 (2004). This court will presume that an affirmance by a circuit court of a magistrate's judgment was made upon the merits where the testimony is sufficient to sustain the judgment of the magistrate and there are no facts that show the affirmance was influenced by an error of law. See Bowers v. Thomas, 373 S.C. 240, 244, 644 S.E.2d 751, 753 (Ct.App.2007). However, “[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which are subject to de novo review and which we are free to decide without any deference to the court below.” State v. Whitner, 399 S.C. 547, 552, 732 S.E.2d 861, 863 (2012).

LAW/ANALYSIS

I. CRIMINAL INTENT

Mimms argues the magistrate erred in failing to charge the jury on criminal intent as an element of DUI. Although our DUI statute does not provide for any mental state, Mimms essentially argues a culpable mental state—intent—must be read into the statute. Otherwise, according to Mimms, her right to due process of law would be violated. We disagree.

Section 56–5–2930(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp.2013) provides:

It is unlawful for a person to drive a motor vehicle within this State while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that the person's faculties to drive a motor vehicle are materially and appreciably impaired, under the influence of any other drug or a combination of other drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties to drive a motor vehicle are materially and appreciably impaired, or under the combined influence of alcohol and any other drug or drugs or substances which cause impairment to the extent that the person's faculties to drive a motor vehicle are materially and appreciably impaired. A person who violates the provisions of this section is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence....

In a trial for DUI, the state has to prove: (1) the defendant's ability to drive was materially and appreciably impaired; and (2) this impairment was caused by the use of drugs or alcohol. State v. Salisbury, 343 S.C. 520, 524, 541 S.E.2d 247, 248–49 (2001).

In offenses at common law, and under statutes which do not disclose a contrary legislative purpose, to constitute a crime, the act must be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to consequences as is regarded by the law as equivalent to a criminal intent.

State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 272, 395 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1990) (quoting State v. Am. Agric. Chem. Co., 118 S.C. 333, 337, 110 S.E. 800, 802 (1922) ). “Of course, the legislature, if it so chooses, may make an act or omission a crime regardless of fault.” Id. at 271–72, 395 S.E.2d at 183 ; see also State v. Manos, 179 S.C. 45, 49–50, 183 S.E. 582, 584 (1936)(“The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer, and if such legislative intention appears the courts must give it effect, although the intent of the doer may have been innocent. This rule has been generally, although not quite universally, applied in the enforcement of statutes passed in aid of the police power of the state, where the word ‘knowingly’ or other apt words are not employed to indicate that knowledge is an essential element of the crime charged. The doing of the inhibited act constitutes the crime, and the moral turpitude or purity of the motive by which it was prompted, and knowledge or ignorance of its criminal character, are immaterial circumstances on the question of guilt.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). “These crimes are referred to commonly as ‘strict liability’ offenses. Whether an offense is a strict liability offense, and if not, what kind of criminal intent is required to satisfactorily show a commission of that offense, are questions of legislative intent.” Ferguson, 302 S.C. at 272, 395 S.E.2d at 183. “Therefore, whether knowledge and intent are necessary elements of a statutory crime must be determined from the language of the statute, construed in the light of its purpose and design.” Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 227, 195 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1973).

“The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Bryant v. State, 384 S.C. 525, 529, 683 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Mid–State Auto Auction of Lexington, Inc. v. Altman, 324 S.C. 65, 69, 476 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1996) ). “[W]hen a statute is penal in nature, it must be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the defendant.” State v. Blackmon, 304 S.C. 270, 273, 403 S.E.2d 660, 662 (1991). The statutory language must be construed in light of the intended purpose of the statute. Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011). “A statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers.” State v. Sweat, 386 S.C. 339, 350, 688 S.E.2d 569, 575 (2010) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “In interpreting a statute, the language of the statute must be read in a sense that harmonizes with its subject matter and...