State v. Minkel, 11469

CourtSupreme Court of South Dakota
Citation89 S.D. 144,230 N.W.2d 233
Docket NumberNo. 11469,11469
PartiesSTATE of South Dakota, Respondent-Appellee, v. Dean E. MINKEL, Petitioner-Appellant.
Decision Date12 June 1975

Milton Buechler, Lennox, for petitioner-appellant.

Earl Mettler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Pierre, for respondent-appellee; Kermit A. Sande, Atty. Gen., Pierre, on the brief.

WINANS, Justice.

The petitioner in this appeal, Dean Minkel, was convicted of violating SDCL 32--34--3 and 5, which set forth the duty of a vehicle operator to stop in the case of an accident and give information and render aid.

At his trial the only evidence offered by the prosecution to prove the hit-and-run offense was a stipulation stating what the investigating officer would have said if he had been present in Court. In substance, the stipulation stated that petitioner, while driving his motor vehicle, struck a man on a bicycle causing him to crash to the ground resulting in his injury and death. Further, that petitioner failed to immediately stop his vehicle and give information and reasonable assistance to the victim.

Petitioner contends that his conviction is invalid because the state failed to prove the element of his knowledge of the accident and that he was unaware of the accident until he returned home and noticed that his right mirror was bent, whereupon he promptly called the police and returned to the scene of the mishap.

Based on his conviction for hit-and-run it was found that petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of a suspension of imposition of sentence for a Burglary in the Third Degree conviction which occurred in 1973. The court, therefore, issued an order revoking the suspension of imposition of sentence and ordered that the defendant (petitioner) be imprisoned in the state penitentiary for two years. Petitioner subsequently applied for and was denied a Writ of Habeas Corpus. It is from this denial that petitioner appeals.

In this case the defendant is seeking habeas corpus instead of post-conviction relief under SDCL 23--52--3.1. The same situation arose in Crew v. Nelson, 1974, S.D., 216 N.W.2d 565, 566, where we said:

'SDCL 23--52--3 replaces all other remedies, including habeas corpus, which were previously available to a defendant challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence. The appellant's petition, while nominally seeking a writ of habeas corpus, does not refer to any statute and fulfills all of the requirements of the post-conviction statute. The circuit court took jurisdiction and held a post-conviction hearing; following which it 'quashed the writ of habeas corpus'. We will treat the matter here as a denial of post-conviction relief as no one has been prejudiced by the use of the wrong words in seeking the right remedy.'

It appears to us that we should approach this case in the same manner; therefore, the cases cited by respondent, Attorney General, pertaining to habeas corpus are inapposite, as the post-conviction statute gives greater latitude in raising appealable error than does habeas corpus.*

Under this approach, we reach the substantive question raised concerning knowledge of the defendant at the time of the collision.

If this Court were to hold that knowledge is to be considered a requirement of SDCL 32--34--3, adequate proof of this element was presented by the prosecution at Appellant's trial. It has been stated that 'Knowledge may be proved by circumstantial evidence and the jury may consider all of the facts and circumstances which are indicative of knowledge'. State v. Snell, 1964, 177 Neb. 396, 128 N.W.2d 823, 828. See also 23 A.L.R.3d 514.

This Court believes that proof of an auto accident which is so serious that it results in death may, in itself, be sufficient for an inference of knowledge, absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances. The issue of whether defendant possessed the knowledge requisite for a conviction was for the trier of fact. It is emphatically not an appropriate function of this Court in a criminal case to 'resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence'. State v. Snell, supra, 128 N.W.2d at 826. On the stipulation of facts in the record, with no evidence to the contrary and no objection to the evidence by counsel, it cannot be said that the trial court erred in its findings. Indeed, the assertions in the stipulation at Petitioner's trial only support the inference of knowledge. The stipulation states:

'That if Lyle B. Nelson were present in Court he would testify that he is a South Dakota State Patrol Officer, and investigated an accident occurring on the 26th of November, 1973 on Highway #44 immediately south of Elm Street in Lennox, Lincoln County, South Dakota; that the defendant, Dean E. Minkel, operated a motor vehicle at said place at about 11:15 o'clock A.M. in such a manner that the right side of said motor vehicle struck Glen Erwin Brookens, who was operating a bicycle, resulting in injury and death of Mr. Brookens, and that Dean E. Minkel failed to immediately stop the vehicle he was operating at the scene of said accident and give his name and...

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36 cases
  • State v. Floody, 17366
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • January 22, 1992
    ...of witnesses, or weigh the evidence. Such functions are within the province of the jury. State v. Minkel, 89 Page 258 S.D. 144, 230 N.W.2d 233 (1975). Therefore, an expert "witness" should not invade the province of the jury. State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151, 157 "Syndrome" testimony is a sle......
  • State v. Tennant, 15978
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of West Virginia
    • July 12, 1984
    ...P.2d 604 (1980); Commonwealth v. Kauffman, 470 A.2d 634 (Pa.Super.Ct.1983); State v. Szarek, 433 A.2d 193 (R.I.1981); State v. Minkel, 89 S.D. 144, 230 N.W.2d 233 (1975); Goss v. State, 582 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Ct.Crim.App.1979); Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 38 S.E.2d 328 (1946); St......
  • Clark v. Regent Ins. Co., 12207
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • September 6, 1978
    ...compilers have consistently used it in the captions, and this court has referred to them as "hit-and-run" statutes (see State v. Minkel, S.D., 230 N.W.2d 233 (1975)) even though there is no statutory requirement of a physical contact, only that the automobile be "involved in an accident." 1......
  • State v. Honomichl, 15424
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • July 29, 1987
    ...evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or weigh the evidence. State v. Battest, 295 N.W.2d 739 (S.D.1980); State v. Minkel, 89 S.D. 144, 230 N.W.2d 233 (1975). Questions of credibility and weight of the evidence are jury questions. Blakey, supra; State v. Peck, 82 S.D. 561, 150 N......
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