State v. Minneapolis & N. Elevator Co.

• Decision Date: 18 January 1908
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. MINNEAPOLIS & NORTHERN ELEVATOR CO.

17 N.D. 23

114 N.W. 482

STATE

v.MINNEAPOLIS & NORTHERN ELEVATOR CO.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Jan. 18, 1908.

Syllabus by the Court.

Chapter 113, p. 167, of the Laws of 1907, which is entitled “An act requiring elevator companies transacting business in this state to return certificates of inspection and weighmaster's certificate of weight to the local buyer,” and which provides for the return of such certificates by the elevator companies, etc., to their local agents, and also that the latter shall post the same in a conspicuous place in the elevators, does not contravene section 61 of the state Constitution, which requires that no bill shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. The subject or object of the act is to furnish information to the public of the facts which such official certificates will impart, and the provisions of section 2 (page 168) requiring local agents to post such certificates in their elevators are germane to the provisions of section 1, and hence to the subject embraced in the title of the act.

Such act is not vulnerable to the objection that it contravenes the provisions of the interstate commerce clause of the federal Constitution, as its operation will not directly or remotely interfere with interstate commerce; but its enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.

Appellant's contention that the law is void, because it attempts to make acts or omissions committed in a foreign state a crime in this state, is not sustained. The conditions on which foreign corporations are permitted to do business in this state are within the legitimate power of the state to prescribe, and defendant corporation, having been authorized to transact business in this state, is amenable to its laws enacted under its police powers to the same extent as its citizens.

Appeal from District Court, Cass County; Chas. A. Pollock, Judge.

The Minneapolis & Northern Elevator Company was convicted of violation of the elevator law, and appeals. Affirmed.Ball, Watson, Young & Hardy, for appellant. T. F. McCue, Atty. Gen., R. N. Stevens, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. H. Barnett, State's Atty., and Seth Richardson, Asst. State's Atty., for respondent.

FISK, J.

The defendant and appellant was convicted in the district court of Cass county for the violation of the provisions of chapter 113, p. 167, of the Laws of 1907, and a judgment was rendered imposing a fine against it in the sum of $100, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.

This statute is as follows:

“An act requiring elevator companies transacting business in this state to return certificate of inspection and weighmaster's certificate of weight to the local buyer.

* * * Every elevator company, corporation, co-partnership or association of individuals, operating any elevator, building or place in this state for the purchase, storage, or deposit of any grain or other farm commodity, shall return to the local buyer at the place where such grain or other farm commodity is purchased, stored or deposited. the official certificate of inspection, together with the weighmaster's certificate for any such grain or other farm commodity sold, whether said grain is sold in this state or in any foreign state where such grain is weighed and inspected. * * * It shall be the duty of the local buyer or agent of the elevator company or other association enumerated in section one of this act, to post in a conspicuous place in such elevator building or place, the official weighmaster's certificate, and the official inspector's certificate, and have the same at all times so that the public may inspect the same. * * * The elevator company or other association enumerated in section one of this act, shall forthwith upon the sale of each car or part of car of grain or other farm commodity, return the certificates provided for in this act. * * * Any elevator company, corporation, co-partnership, or other association of individuals or any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and all right to transact any business in this state shall be forfeited.”

A demurrer to the information was interposed upon the ground, as stated in such demurrer, “that it appears upon the face thereof that the facts stated therein do not constitute a public offense, in this: (1) That the act under which the information is drawn is void in its entirety; (2) that said act is void so far as the same applies to the facts set out in the information.” The material facts alleged in the information, and which are admitted by the demurrer to be true, are, in substance, as follows: That defendant is a foreign corporation duly authorized to operate a line of elevators or warehouses in this state, and as such it had an elevator at Argusville, in said county, with an agent in charge, which was on May 27, 1907, and prior thereto used by it for the purpose of receiving and storing grain for others and also grain purchased by it; that on said date defendant, having on hand in said elevator certain flax which it had purchased from farmers in that vicinity, shipped the same to Duluth, Minn., where it sold said grain; that the same was regularly inspected and weighed by the state inspector of the state of Minnesota; and that defendant has failed, neglected, and refused to return to its said agent at Argusville an official certificate of the inspection and the official weighmaster's certificate of the weight of the grain so sold by it.

No question is raised by appellant's counsel as to the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the information to constitute the crime defined by said statute, although there are no allegations therein that any official certificates such as are mentioned in the statute were ever in fact issued and delivered to defendant, or that under the laws of Minnesota there is any provision or requirement for the issuance and delivery of such certificates. The necessity for such allegation is to our minds quite apparent. In view, however, of the fact that no such question is raised by the demurrer, we will dispose of the appeal solely upon the grounds urged in appellant's printed brief. But two errors are assigned, and they relate to the same question, to wit, the validity of the act in question; it being appellant's contention, first, that said act is void in its entirety, and, second, that it is void at least so far as it applies to the facts alleged in the information. If either contention be sound, it was error to overrule the demurrer, and the judgment appealed from must be reversed. In disposing of appellant's contention, we must be governed by certain well-established rules of statutory construction, among which are the following: A statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless in plain violation of some constitutional provision. Every presumption is in favor of the validity of a statute, and in case of a reasonable doubt as to its constitutionality it is the duty of a court to sustain it. A statute will be construed, if possible, in harmony with the Constitution, and a part may be unconstitutional and the remainder valid, provided the invalid part is so independent of the remainder that it may be eliminated without rendering ineffective the entire statute, unless the invalid portion was evidently the inducement for the enactment of the remainder; but where a law is so emasculated by the elimination of invalid portions that it cannot be said that the Legislature would probably have enacted the law in its form as thus emasculated, if it had known that the portions thus eliminated were unconstitutional and void, the whole law must fall. The prime object sought in the construction of a law is to ascertain as far as possible and render effectual the legislative will. The wisdom or policy of a law and the motives which prompted its enactment by the Legislature are matters with which the courts have no concern. Keeping in mind these rules for our guidance, we will dispose of appellant's points in the order in which they are discussed in the brief.

First. It is asserted that the entire act is void because it contravenes the provisions of section 61 of the state Constitution, which requires that a bill shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. The argument, in brief, is that sections 1 and 2 each relate to different subjects; the first to the duty enjoined upon elevator companies to transmit to their local agents the official certificates of inspection and weights, and the second to the duty enjoined upon the local agents...