State v. Miranda, s. 3D12–269
| Decision Date | 02 April 2014 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 3D12–269,3D12–270.,s. 3D12–269 |
| Citation | 137 So.3d 1133 |
| Parties | The STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. Hugo MIRANDA, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Douglas J. Glaid, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and John Eddy Morrison, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
Before SHEPHERD, C.J., and WELLS and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
The State of Florida appeals from a non-final order finding Hugo Miranda (“the defendant”) incompetent to proceed and from related orders. 1 Because the State's request for an evidentiary hearing should have been granted, we reverse the orders under review and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
The defendant was arrested and charged with the aggravated stalking of two minors in April 2011. Soon thereafter, the trial court ordered pretrial release of the defendant on the condition that the defendant stay away from the victims. Within days of his release, however, the defendant was re-arrested and later charged in two separate cases with the aggravated stalking of the same two minors, and his pretrial release was revoked.
While the defendant was incarcerated, he was evaluated by three psychologists, Dr. Gustavo Fonte, Dr. Elsa Marban, and Dr. Marie DeFeo, to determine whether the defendant was competent to proceed. In evaluating the defendant's competency, each of the psychologists considered the factors articulated in section 916.12(3)(a)-(f), Florida Statutes (2011), including whether the defendant had the capacity to: appreciate the charges or allegations; appreciate the range and nature of possible penalties; understand the adversarial nature of the legal process and proceedings; communicate with and disclose pertinent information to his attorney; appropriately assist in his defense; manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; and testify relevantly. Based on their independent evaluations, all three psychologists concluded the defendant did not have a mental illness,2 but was incompetent to proceed due to his intellectual deficits. The psychologists also concluded that the defendant did not meet the criteria for involuntary commitment under Chapter 916, Florida Statutes (2011), because, in their opinion, the defendant did not pose a danger to himself or others.
Dr. Fonte found that the only identified competency factor the defendant sufficiently demonstrated was his ability to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior. In his report, Dr. Fonte described the defendant as a “primitive individual at the cognitive level,” and opined that the defendant “appears to be cognitively and intellectuallylimited and likely functions at a borderline intellectual level.” Dr. Fonte additionally noted that the defendant had no schooling and cannot read or write.
Dr. Marban noted in her report that she had not performed any formal intellectual testing, but nonetheless suspected that the defendant suffers from mental retardation and/or a developmental disorder. She also opined that the defendant “is not restorable to competency due to his concrete thinking style and deficit cognitive abilities.” Dr. DeFeo, who also concluded that the defendant is incompetent to proceed, appeared somewhat more optimistic regarding the defendant's ability to obtain competency to proceed with treatment or training.
After the psychologists submitted their reports, the trial court conducted several hearings to address the defendant's competence to proceed. SeeFla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(b). At a hearing conducted on December 13, 2011, the State conditionally stipulated to the psychologists' reports regarding the defendant's incompetency. At subsequent hearings, however, the State maintained that, despite the defendant's incompetency to proceed, the defendant was being properly held in custody based on his violation of his pretrial release conditions, and that the trial court should order the defendant to receive his competency treatment in jail pursuant to Graham v. Jenne, 837 So.2d 554, 559 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), and Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(c)(2). Initially agreeing with the State, the trial court orally ordered that the defendant be detained and that he receive the necessary treatment to achieve competency to proceed. The written order subsequently entered by the trial court found the defendant incompetent to proceed, but failed to address any of the factors required by Chapter 916, Graham, or rule 3.212(c)(2).
Shortly after the trial court issued its written order, Dr. Fonte and Dr. DeFeo submitted addenda to their competency evaluations. Both Dr. Fonte and Dr. DeFeo recommended competency training outside of the jail setting based on the defendant's deficits and specific needs, but did not specify the type of training necessary or where such training was available.
After reviewing these reports, as well as the defendant's motions for reconsideration and for release, the trial court concluded that, based on Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972), it was required to release the defendant. Thereafter, the trial court entered its written order granting the defendant's motion for reconsideration and for release and also denied the State's oral motion for an evidentiary hearing regarding the defendant's competency and to determine whether the defendant should be required to receive his competency treatment and/or training in jail.
In its written order, the trial court specified that the defendant's incompetency was “not because of retardation or mental incapacity but rather because of being grossly illiterate and being unable to understand abstract concepts such as the judicial system.” The trial court also found that because the defendant does not meet the criteria for forensic commitment under Chapter 916, the trial court had only two options: (1) civil commitment under the Baker Act (Chapter 394, Part I, Florida Statutes (2011)), or (2) conditional release pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(d). Based on the psychologists' reports, wherein the psychologists found that the defendant is not a danger to himself or others, the trial court found the defendant did not meet the criteria for civil commitment and, thus, the only option was to conditionally release the defendant under rule 3.212(d).
Based on the above findings, and over the State's objection and request for an evidentiary hearing, the trial court released the defendant on his own recognizance and again ordered him to stay away from the victims. Although the trial court noted that the psychologists' written reports, upon which it heavily relied, did not address what type of treatment was needed to enable the defendant to attain the requisite competency to proceed or how long such treatment would take, the trial court ordered the defendant to enroll in school or a “teaching facility” within thirty days to learn how to read and write in an effort to attain competency to proceed. These non-final appeals followed.
The State contends that the trial court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing, as requested, to determine: whether the defendant is competent to proceed; if the defendant is incompetent to proceed, whether he meets the criteria for involuntary commitment; what treatment or training, if any, the defendant needs to attain a level of legal competency to proceed; how long the treatment or training would take; and what facilities are available to provide the necessary treatment or training. Because our review of the psychologists' reports indicates that much of this information, which must be considered under Chapter 916, is absent from the reports, we conclude the trial court erred by not conducting the requested evidentiary hearing.
I. Chapter 916, Florida Statutes (2011)
Chapter 916 of the Florida Statutes—the “Forensic Client Services Act”—addresses the treatment and training of mentally ill, mentally retarded, or autistic criminal felony defendants who have been found incompetent to proceed, §§ 916.10, 916.105, Fla. Stat. (2011), including the involuntary commitment of incompetent defendants. At the time of the psychologists' evaluations, Chapter 916, utilized the word “retardation,” which was defined as having “the same meaning as in s. 393.063.” § 916.106(15), Fla. Stat. (2011). Section 393.063(32), Florida Statutes (2011), defined “retardation” as follows:
[S]ignificantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior that manifests before the age of 18 and can reasonably be expected to continue indefinitely. “Significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning,” for the purpose of this definition, means performance which is two or more standard deviations from the mean score on a standardized intelligence test specified in the rules of the agency. “Adaptive behavior,” for the purpose of this definition, means the effectiveness or degree with which an individual meets the standards of personal independence and social responsibility expected of his or her age, cultural group, and community.
However, effective July 1, 2013, the term “mental retardation” was replaced with the term “intellectual disability.” Ch. 13–162, sec. 28, Laws of Fla. (2013). There are no material differences between the definitions of “retardation” set forth in section 393.063(32), Florida Statutes (2011), and “intellectual disability” set forth in section 393.063(21), Florida Statutes (2013). Section 393.063(21), however, further provides:
For purposes of the application of the criminal laws and procedural rules of this state to matters relating to pretrial, trial, sentencing, and any matters relating to the imposition and execution of the death penalty, the terms “intellectual disability” or “intellectually disabled” are interchangeable with and have the same meaning as the terms “mental...
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