State v. Mitchell, 13757

Citation104 Idaho 493,660 P.2d 1336
Decision Date11 February 1983
Docket NumberNo. 13757,13757
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Betty Jane MITCHELL, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

David H. Leroy, Atty. Gen., Lynn E. Thomas, Sol. Gen., Boise, for plaintiff-respondent.

BAKES, Justice.

Defendant appeals from a conviction of first degree murder.

Betty Jane Mitchell, the defendant appellant, arrived at her home on the evening of January 23, 1978, and found her husband, "Mitch", dead. Initial investigation indicated that Mitch had been murdered by strangulation during a burglary of their home, but police attention subsequently focused upon Mrs. Mitchell and the possibility that she had arranged to have her husband killed.

On January 31, 1978, Mrs. Mitchell was in Boise, Idaho, and registered at The Boisean Motel. At approximately 12:45 p.m. Lt. Tom Taylor of the Ada County Sheriff's Additional facts relevant to this appeal are that Mrs. Mitchell had ingested alcohol and prescribed medication prior to and during the interrogation. Before going to her motel room, Lt. Taylor had been advised that Mrs. Mitchell was observed at a bar that morning. Lt. Taylor had also been informed that Mrs. Mitchell took prescribed medication daily. Additionally, Mrs. Mitchell consumed one can of beer and part of another can during the interview. At the completion of the interrogation, during which Mrs. Mitchell made several incriminating statements, Mrs. Mitchell was taken to the sheriff's office and charged with first degree murder.

[104 Idaho 495] Office, accompanied by two detectives, contacted Mrs. Mitchell at her motel room and advised Mrs. Mitchell that he wanted to talk to her. Lt. Taylor handed Mrs. Mitchell a printed form that contained Miranda rights and an express waiver and requested her to read and complete the form. Mrs. Mitchell then substantially completed the form and signed the waiver, which will be discussed infra, and Lt. Taylor began his tape recorded interview. Lt. Taylor did not inform Mrs. Mitchell that he possessed a warrant for her arrest when she was given the Miranda rights, nor did he readvise Mrs. Mitchell of her Miranda rights when he specifically informed her that she was under arrest.

Although the crime was committed on January 23, 1978, trial was not held until May 19, 1980. In the intervening period, defendant appellant requested and received psychiatric evaluations. Additionally, defendant made several motions to suppress the recorded interrogation or any reference thereto on the grounds that she was incapable of knowingly and voluntarily waiving her Miranda rights or of knowingly and intelligently making a voluntary statement. On December 22, 1978, the trial court determined that the question of voluntariness was an issue of fact for the jury. Pursuant to defendant's appeal by certification under I.A.R. 12, this Court, on April 8, 1980, held that the question of voluntariness is controlled by State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 947, 28 L.Ed.2d 223 (1971), which established the rule that voluntariness is, in the first instance, a question of law for the trial court. 1 State v. Mitchell, 101 Idaho 108, 109, 609 P.2d 175 (1980).

Upon remand, the district court suppressed the entire tape recording and transcription thereof. However, the trial court determined that Mrs. Mitchell's statements did not become involuntary until a point referred to by the parties as approximately one-third of the way into the interview, and the court permitted Officer Taylor to testify concerning the interrogation up to that point. The court suppressed any reference to the interrogation past that point. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the first degree, and the court sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate life term. Defendant appeals her conviction.

Defendant appellant presents three principal issues for our review on appeal, none of which involve any claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. The issues raised are: (1) Whether the trial court erred by refusing to suppress all reference to the interview with the appellant; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court's suppression of the last two-thirds of the interview rendered the showing of probable cause at the preliminary hearing insufficient to bind the appellant over for trial; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the jury panel as a whole. The alleged errors will be discussed in the order raised by the appellant.

I

On appeal, appellant argues that there are several reasons why the trial court Testimony elicited at both the preliminary and pretrial hearings, transcripts of which are contained in the record, establish that Lt. Taylor, upon gaining admittance to appellant's motel room, advised appellant that he wanted to talk to her. Lt. Taylor did not inform appellant of the arrest warrant in his possession at that time, but handed her a copy of the rights and waiver form used by the Ada County Sheriff's Office. 2 He requested appellant to read the form and place her initials at the end of each delineated right to indicate that she understood her rights. Lt. Taylor testified that he advised appellant to tell him if she did not understand anything and that he would explain it to her. Lt. Taylor further testified that appellant put on her glasses, read the form and placed her initials after all but one of the rights. The failure to initial the statement regarding her rights to a public defender was brought to appellant's attention, whereupon she responded by placing her signature at the bottom of the form. 3 Lt. Taylor then turned on the tape recorder and began his interrogation. Appellant was not informed of the arrest warrant against her or that she was under arrest until several minutes later in the interview. 4

[104 Idaho 496] erred in refusing to suppress the entire interrogation. Appellant first argues that the Miranda warnings given to her were inadequate and that she did not effectively waive those rights. A review of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation at this juncture will facilitate a determination of these arguments.

The warnings contained in the form given to appellant are not challenged as insufficient under the standards prescribed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Appellant's challenge is instead directed to the timing of those warnings. In a somewhat novel approach to the Miranda question, appellant argues essentially that the warnings were given too early, as opposed to too late or not at all, the usual arguments concerning the timing of giving Miranda rights. See, e.g., State v. McCurdy, 100 Idaho 683, 603 P.2d 1017 (1979); State v. Thomas, 94 Idaho 430, 489 P.2d 1310 (1971); State v. Sanchez, 94 Idaho 125, 483 P.2d 173 (1971); State v. Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 471 P.2d 582 (1970). Appellant argues that, when viewed under an objective test, the interrogation did not become custodial until she was specifically informed of her arrest. 5 She further contends that since the warnings were not repeated when the interrogation became custodial, the warnings given immediately prior to the commencement of the interview did not effectively protect the defendant's rights against self incrimination, nor comply with the safeguards established in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. We disagree.

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that in the absence of other fully effective means, the following The Miranda warnings given to appellant were substantively sufficient and effectively informed appellant of her rights. It was not necessary that the rights be repeated at the moment in time asserted by appellant to be the point at which the interrogation is alleged to have become custodial, particularly where appellant had been given her rights just five to ten minutes earlier. See United States v. Paulton, 540 F.2d 886, 890-91 (8th Cir.1976) (warnings did not have to be repeated where defendant had essentially received the warnings and advice required by Miranda a short time earlier).

                [104 Idaho 497] measures are required procedural safeguards in the event of a custodial interrogation outside the presence of counsel:  "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed."  384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07.   The instructive phrase in determining the effectiveness of the warnings given to appellant prior to the point in time at which she claims the interrogation became custodial is "[p]rior to any questioning ...."  Lt. Taylor, in attempting to discharge his responsibilities, gave appellant the Miranda statement immediately after entering her motel room and prior to any questioning and thereby satisfied the Miranda requirements.  The fact that appellant was not explicitly informed that the officers had an arrest warrant at the time that she received the warnings does not invalidate their effectiveness.  It is not essential that a suspect be informed of the charges against her before being interrogated.  See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 186, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 52 L.Ed.2d 238, 244 (1977);  State v. Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 445 P.2d 731, 736 (1968)
                

Appellant also argues that she did not effectively waive her Miranda rights. The state, in attempting to introduce statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation and outside the presence of an attorney, must establish a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver of the suspect's...

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