State v. Mitchell, No. 32857.

CourtCourt of Appeals of Idaho
Writing for the CourtWalters
Citation146 Idaho 378,195 P.3d 737
PartiesSTATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Marcus Anthony MITCHELL, II, Defendant-Appellant.
Decision Date18 August 2008
Docket NumberNo. 32857.
195 P.3d 737
146 Idaho 378
STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Marcus Anthony MITCHELL, II, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 32857.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
August 18, 2008.
Review Denied October 27, 2008.

[195 P.3d 740]

Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett; Dennis A. Benjamin, Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cudé, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cudé argued.

WALTERS, Judge Pro Tem.


Marcus Anthony Mitchell, II, appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentences for aggravated battery, robbery, and burglary. We affirm.

I.
BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of July 11, 2005, two people forced themselves into an apartment belonging to a drug-dealer in Meridian, Idaho. During the ensuing scuffle, John "Jake" Hargis was shot five times, and one of the intruders, Matthew "Motu" Nuuvali, was shot once through the hand. The two intruders fled, taking $500 in cash from Hargis's dresser drawer. Hargis initially identified his shooter as "Lucky," who was "the only black person I've ever been acquainted with, friends with." Upon further reflection, however, Hargis realized that the shooter was actually taller and darker than his friend Lucky. DNA testing revealed that blood at the scene belonged to Nuuvali, who was arrested a few days after the shooting with a gunshot wound to the hand. Police also identified Marcus "Lucky" Mitchell as a potential suspect, although no one saw him in the apartment. A friend of Hargis who was present at the time of the shooting described a female as the second person who entered the apartment, wielding a gun. One of Hargis's friends identified Denise Quintana from a photo-lineup as that woman; Quintana was Mitchell's girlfriend. Police identified shell-casings in Hargis's apartment imprinted with GFL 9 mm Luger, which was a brand of ammunition Hargis did not own. Officers were not familiar with the GFL brand, and after some research discovered it was European-made and was sold locally in one store in Nampa. Two GFL 9mm Luger cartridges were later discovered in a suitcase in Mitchell and Quintana's apartment in Nampa.

Nuuvali, Mitchell, and Quintana were indicted on one count each of aggravated battery, I.C. §§ 18-903(c), 18-907(1)(b), 18-204, robbery, I.C. §§ 18-6501, 18-6502, 18-204, and burglary, I.C. § 18-1401. Additionally, Nuuvali was indicted for use of a firearm in the commission of a crime, I.C. § 19-2520. Nuuvali pleaded guilty to the charges of aggravated battery and use of a firearm, and the remaining two counts against him were dismissed. He testified at Mitchell's trial, detailing a plan devised by Nuuvali, Mitchell and Quintana to steal from Hargis because Mitchell knew Hargis had $5,000 in cash in his apartment. Nuuvali testified that Mitchell stayed in the car so as not to be recognized by Hargis while Nuuvali and Quintana entered the apartment to commit the robbery. Evidence was introduced at trial that Mitchell tried unsuccessfully to coerce Nuuvali into changing his story in order to get Mitchell out of trouble; Mitchell also scripted an exculpatory story for his cellmate to testify to regarding what Nuuvali purportedly told him about the morning of July 11.

Mitchell's niece, Y.M., testified that she was watching television in the front room of the house where she lived with her siblings, mother, and grandmother on the night of the shooting. Mitchell had moved out of that

195 P.3d 741

house only a few weeks prior to the shooting. Sometime after dark, Y.M. heard a knock at the door, and her mother opened the door to admit Mitchell and Nuuvali. Mitchell was nervous and jumpy, while Nuuvali was quiet, but breathing heavily; he was cradling one arm against his chest as though injured. Nuuvali went directly into the bathroom, and when Y.M. later went into the bathroom, there was blood on the cabinet. Y.M. and her siblings were ordered to go downstairs while the adults remained upstairs. The next morning, while Y.M. was having breakfast, her grandmother came in from the back yard holding two guns, which were immediately placed in a box and then removed from the house.

Mitchell was found guilty by a jury on all three counts. He was sentenced to twenty-five years for the robbery with eight years determinate; fifteen years for the aggravated battery with eight years determinate; and ten years for burglary with eight years determinate; all sentences to run concurrently. Mitchell filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction in his sentence, which the district court denied. Mitchell now appeals as to the sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate the accomplice testimony and to uphold his conviction for aggravated battery, and from the denial of his Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence.

II.
DISCUSSION

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Horejs, 143 Idaho 260, 263, 141 P.3d 1129, 1132 (Ct.App. 2006); State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Ct.App.1998); State v. Reyes, 121 Idaho 570, 572, 826 P.2d 919, 921 (Ct.App.1992). We will not substitute our view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App.1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001.

1. Sufficiency of the evidence to corroborate accomplice testimony

Mitchell asserts that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony from Nuuvali, his alleged accomplice, and therefore Nuuvali's testimony should not have been considered by the jury. Idaho Code prohibits a conviction on the basis of accomplice testimony unless such testimony is "corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense." I.C. § 19-2117. If the corroboration only shows "the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof," it is not sufficient for a conviction. Id. Corroborating evidence is required to protect against the danger that an accomplice may wholly fabricate testimony, incriminating an innocent defendant in order to win more favorable treatment for the accomplice. Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367, 972 P.2d 737, 745 (Ct.App 1998).

Corroborating evidence does not need to be sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own, nor must it corroborate every detail of the accomplice's testimony. State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 364, 690 P.2d 293, 299 (1984); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630, 97 P.3d 1014, 1019 (Ct.App.2004); Matthews, 136 Idaho at 50, 28 P.3d at 391; State v. Campbell, 114 Idaho 367, 370, 757 P.2d 230, 233 (Ct.App.1988). Corroborating evidence may be slight, need only go to one material fact, and may be entirely circumstantial. State v. Jones, 125 Idaho 477, 486, 873 P.2d 122, 131 (1994); Hill, 140 Idaho at 630, 97 P.3d at 1019. Statements attributed to the

195 P.3d 742

defendant himself may serve as the necessary corroboration. Matthews, 136 Idaho at 50, 28 P.3d at 391; Campbell, 114 Idaho at 370, 757 P.2d at 233.

There was sufficient evidence presented by witnesses other than Nuuvali that tends to connect Mitchell with the forced entry, robbery, and shooting of Hargis. First, shell-casings were recovered at the scene which were manufactured by GFL, a relatively unknown brand in Meridian at the time of the shooting. GFL cartridges were subsequently located at Mitchell and Quintana's apartment in Nampa, and the only local retailer of that brand was also discovered in...

To continue reading

Request your trial
13 practice notes
  • State v. Clinton, Docket No. 38755
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • August 20, 2012
    ...lack of an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation is likely foreclosed by application of the Perry fundamental error standard. In State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 385, 195 P.3d 737, 744 (Ct. App. 2008), this Court stated that "sentencing is considered a critical stage in the trial process, and the 'con......
  • Hansen v. State, Docket No. 35778 (Idaho App. 5/6/2010), Docket No. 35778.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • May 6, 2010
    ...sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own, nor must it corroborate every detail of the accomplice's testimony." State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 382, 195 P.3d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 2008). The corroborating evidence may be slight, need only go to one material fact, and may be entirely circ......
  • State v. Boyd, Docket No. 39085
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • August 6, 2012
    ...sentencing decision and therefore was harmless. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010); State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 385, 195 P.3d 737, 744 (Ct. App. 2008). Boyd also argues that his sentences are excessive. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discret......
  • State v. Hopkins, Docket No. 41824
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • March 12, 2015
    ...957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. Moreover, "direct evidence of intent is not required." State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008). Intent may be inferred from "circumstantial evidence" including "the defendant's acts and conduct."......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
13 cases
  • State v. Clinton, Docket No. 38755
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • August 20, 2012
    ...lack of an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation is likely foreclosed by application of the Perry fundamental error standard. In State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 385, 195 P.3d 737, 744 (Ct. App. 2008), this Court stated that "sentencing is considered a critical stage in the trial process, and the 'con......
  • Hansen v. State, Docket No. 35778 (Idaho App. 5/6/2010), Docket No. 35778.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • May 6, 2010
    ...sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own, nor must it corroborate every detail of the accomplice's testimony." State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 382, 195 P.3d 737, 741 (Ct. App. 2008). The corroborating evidence may be slight, need only go to one material fact, and may be entirely circ......
  • State v. Boyd, Docket No. 39085
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • August 6, 2012
    ...sentencing decision and therefore was harmless. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010); State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 385, 195 P.3d 737, 744 (Ct. App. 2008). Boyd also argues that his sentences are excessive. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discret......
  • State v. Hopkins, Docket No. 41824
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Idaho
    • March 12, 2015
    ...957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001. Moreover, "direct evidence of intent is not required." State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, 384, 195 P.3d 737, 743 (Ct. App. 2008). Intent may be inferred from "circumstantial evidence" including "the defendant's acts and conduct."......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT