State v. Moa
| Decision Date | 04 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 20090882.,20090882. |
| Citation | 707 Utah Adv. Rep. 34,2012 UT 28,282 P.3d 985 |
| Parties | STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Charles MOA, Defendant and Petitioner. |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Lori J. Seppi, Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Ryan D. Tenney, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for respondent.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
¶ 1 This appeal encompasses two cases consolidated at the Utah Court of Appeals, each involving a separate shooting. In the first case (First Case), Charles Moa entered a no contest plea to a third degree felony, but later filed motions to withdraw that plea. At the hearing on his motions, he stipulated that his plea was taken in full compliance with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court ultimately concluded that Mr. Moa's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made and denied his motions. On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Moa argued that the district court erred in denying his motions because his plea was not taken in compliance with rule 11. Because Mr. Moa had not preserved this argument, the court of appeals evaluated his claim underthe plain error standard. The court of appeals held that Mr. Moa was not entitled to withdraw his plea because he did not show that the district court committed plain error in denying his plea withdrawal motions.
¶ 2 In the second case (Second Case), Mr. Moa pled guilty to two felonies and a misdemeanor. He was sentenced on the charges, with the sentences to run consecutively to each other and consecutive to any previous sentence. Mr. Moa appealed, arguing that the sentencing judge abused his discretion by considering irrelevant information in imposing consecutive sentences. The Utah Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Moa's argument after concluding that there was no evidence the judge had actually relied on irrelevant information in imposing the sentence.
¶ 3 We granted certiorari to address two issues, one in each case. Regarding the First Case, we consider whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Mr. Moa failed to demonstrate plain error in the district court's denial of his motions to withdraw his plea. Concerning the Second Case, we assess whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the district court's imposition of consecutive sentencing.
¶ 4 We hold that we do not need to address whether the court of appeals correctly evaluated Mr. Moa's claim under the plain error standard because, by stipulating that his plea was taken in compliance with rule 11, Mr. Moa invited the district court's error. In addition, we hold that the court of appeals was correct in concluding that there is no evidence that the district court relied on any improper information in imposing consecutive sentences.
¶ 5 Because this appeal encompasses two consolidated cases, we address the facts and issues of each case individually.
¶ 6 In April 2003, Mr. Moa and two accomplices allegedly drove to a business parking lot, pulled out handguns, and fired several shots at a group of people. A few days later, Mr. Moa left Utah and spent the next three years in Washington and California, where he was charged with various other crimes. Eventually, he was arrested and brought back to Utah to face criminal charges stemming from the alleged shooting. Upon his return, he was charged with three counts of aggravated assault, a second degree felony.
¶ 7 After the charging documents were filed, Mr. Moa's first court-appointed attorney withdrew because of a conflict. On the day of his preliminary hearing, Mr. Moa requested that his second court-appointed attorney be removed. Mr. Moa's third court-appointed attorney attempted to negotiate a plea agreement that would allow Mr. Moa to plead “no contest” to one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a third degree felony.1 In exchange, the State would agree to drop the remaining charges, recommend a suspended sentence of zero to five years, and not bring any additional charges stemming from the shooting. Mr. Moa's counsel completed a plea affidavit outlining the terms of this plea deal. Before Mr. Moa could accept the plea agreement, however, his counsel filed a motion to withdraw on the basis of a conflict. The district court granted the motion and appointed Mr. Moa a fourth attorney.
¶ 8 Upon appointment, Mr. Moa's new counsel reviewed the proposed plea affidavit with Mr. Moa. During this meeting, Mr. Moa agreed to accept the plea deal that his prior counsel had originally prepared. When counsel informed the State of Mr. Moa's decision, however, the State responded that it wished to amend the plea deal so that Mr. Moa's sentence would be consistent with that of an accomplice in the shooting. Specifically, the State wanted Mr. Moa to remain in jail for twenty-one days so that his sentence would be identical to that of his accomplice, who had been arrested before Mr. Moa but had agreed to plead to the same charge of discharging a firearm from a vehicle.
¶ 9 Unhappy with the State's decision to amend the plea agreement, Mr. Moa asked his counsel to renegotiate the plea deal so that he could be released from jail immediately. Before a status conference on the pending charges, the State agreed that if Mr. Moa would plead to the third degree felony of discharging a firearm toward a building, with a suspended sentence of three to five years, he could be released from jail that day.2 Although both plea deals involved third degree felonies under Utah Code section 76–10–508, the amended charge involved different elements and increased the required sentence to a range of three to five years instead of a range of zero to five years.
¶ 10 Before accepting the “no contest” plea, the district court held a hearing where it reviewed the amended charge with Mr. Moa. During this hearing, the original plea affidavit was modified to reflect the new charge and the new sentence. But the modified plea affidavit did not list “intent to intimidate or harass another” as an element of the third degree felony charge. In addition, during the plea hearing, neither the judge, defense counsel, nor the prosecution articulated the necessary intent element of the offense. Nonetheless, the district court accepted Mr. Moa's no contest plea and released him from jail pending sentencing. Prior to sentencing, Mr. Moa filed timely pro se motions to withdraw his plea. In his motions, he argued that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea for three reasons. First, he stated that he had been confused about the sentence that he would receive under the amended charge. Specifically, he stated that he thought he was getting the same deal as the accomplice and that he would receive a sentence range of zero to five years, not a sentence range of three to five years. Second, he complained that his counsel had been ineffective because “he failed to object to the sudden changes in [the] plea agreement.” Third, he asserted that the State had breached the plea deal by filing additional charges stemming from the shooting.
¶ 11 Because Mr. Moa alleged that his prior counsel had been ineffective, the court appointed a new attorney to represent him. At the hearing on these motions, Mr. Moa's new counsel stipulated that Mr. Moa's plea was taken in full compliance with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition, Mr. Moa's prior attorney testified that Mr. Moa had understood that the amended charge required a sentence range of three to five years, but nonetheless wanted to enter a plea in order to be released from jail that day. The State also conceded that it had dropped its additional charges stemming from the shooting. Based on his former counsel's testimony, the State's concession, and the stipulation that the court had complied with rule 11 when accepting the plea, the district court concluded that Mr. Moa's plea was knowingly and voluntarily made. Thus, the court denied his motions and sentenced him to three to five years in prison.
¶ 12 On appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Mr. Moa argued for the first time that his plea was unknowing and involuntary because the district court had failed to comply with rule 11 when it accepted his plea.3 Specifically, Mr. Moa alleged that the district court did not comply with rule 11(e)(4)(A) because it did not inform him of the intent element of the offense.4 Because Mr. Moa had not preserved this argument in the district court, the court of appeals applied the plain error doctrine and required that Mr. Moa show an error existed that was both obvious and harmful. 5 The court of appeals determined that Mr. Moa was not harmed by any error because he could not show prejudice.6 Accordingly, the court of appeals denied Mr. Moa's motions to withdraw his plea.7
¶ 13 We granted certiorari to determine whether the court of appeals erred in holding that Mr. Moa had failed to demonstrate plain error in the acceptance of his plea. Mr. Moa argues that the district court's failure to inform him of all the elements of the offense is harmful per se, so a showing of prejudice is not required. In contrast, the State argues that Mr. Moa's claim should not be evaluated under the plain error standard because, by stipulating that the district court had complied with rule 11 in accepting his plea, Mr. Moa invited any error.
¶ 14 After being released from jail, but before sentencing had occurred in the First Case, Mr. Moa was allegedly involved in another drive-by shooting. This time, he drove a vehicle into a Salt Lake City neighborhood while a passenger in the car fired a gun toward a home. Two people in the neighborhood saw the drive-by shooting, and one of them followed Mr. Moa's car as he drove away. Police officers soon joined the pursuit, and Mr. Moa led police on a high-speed chase. During the chase, Mr. Moa crashed head-on into one of the police vehicles...
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