State v. Mobley, 6-337571

Decision Date28 August 1993
Docket NumberNo. 6-337571,No. 6,6-337571,6
Citation634 A.2d 305,42 Conn.Supp. 574
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
PartiesSTATE of Connecticut v. Sharon MOBLEY. New Haven

Joseph J. Harry, Deputy Asst. State's Atty., and Mary A. Reidy, Asst. State's Atty., for state.

Shawn G. Tiernan, Deputy Asst. Public Defender, for defendant.

LEVIN, Judge.

The principal issues in this proceeding, in which the state claims that the defendant violated the terms of her probation, are whether the sentencing judge imposed treatment for alcohol abuse as a condition of the defendant's probation and, if not, whether the defendant's probation officer could and did do so. This court concludes that (1) no condition of probation was imposed by the sentencing judge, (2) the condition of alcohol abuse evaluation and treatment was imposed by the defendant's probation officer, (3) such a condition constitutes medical treatment within the ambit of General Statutes § 53a-30(a) and was a validly imposed condition of probation, and (4) the defendant violated that condition of her probation.

I

On March 13, 1991, the defendant appeared in Superior Court and pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine 1 to the crimes of reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63 2 and threatening in violation of General Statutes § 53a-62. 3 The court, Clark, J., accepted the defendant's pleas. The court thereupon imposed concurrent sentences of three months imprisonment for the crime of threatening and one year imprisonment for the crime of reckless endangerment. The sentences were suspended and the defendant was placed on probation for two years.

The certified transcript of the proceedings before the court reflects that the state recommended a sentence of three months imprisonment for threatening and one year imprisonment for reckless endangerment, to run concurrently, and that the sentences be suspended. The state also recommended, as a condition of probation, "[a]lcohol screening [and] treatment as deemed necessary, by [the office of adult] probation." The defendant's attorney asked the court "to accept the recommendation," adding that "the suspended sentence is a fair disposition to her."

The state claims that the defendant violated the terms of her probation by refusing treatment for alcohol abuse.

II

The first question is whether the sentencing judge imposed any conditions of probation at all. At trial, the court admitted as a full exhibit the docket sheet in the underlying criminal case. On that docket sheet, the clerk had written: "3 mos E/S 2 yrs CPO 1 yr E/S 2 yrs COP Alcohol eval & treatment as deemed nec." Unidentified initials appear next to these words and, in the lower right hand corner, the document is signed by the sentencing judge. A copy of a page from the actual docket on the day of the plea and sentencing, containing the same information, also was admitted as an exhibit. The state claims that the docket sheet is a "judgment file" and, as such, is conclusive evidence of the judgment. See Varanelli v. Luddy, 130 Conn. 74, 78-79, 32 A.2d 61 (1943).

The docket sheet is not a judgment file. "There is a distinction between the judgment of the court, such notations as in the present case appear ... in the docket of the court, and the judgment-file. The judgment is the determination or sentence of the law speaking through the court, pronounced or made known in some appropriate way, orally or in writing or partly in each. The notations ... in the docket are the entries made when a While there is no time within which a judgment file must be prepared; State v. Lindsay, supra, 243, 146 A. 290; it does not appear that the state ever caused or requested such a document to be prepared as it could have done. Practice Book § 944. 4 A judgment file was not offered in evidence, and the court takes judicial notice that no such document is in the court's file. See State v. Lenihan, 151 Conn. 552, 554, 200 A.2d 476 (1964) (court may take judicial notice of court file).

                judgment is rendered in order to [42 Conn.Supp. 577] preserve accurately and put upon immediate public record the acts of the court.   The judgment-file consists of the writing out of the judgment for record, giving a history of the various steps in the action leading up to it, and it is prepared and signed at a time subsequent to the rendition of the judgment.  Bulkeley's Appeal, 76 Conn. 454, 457, 57 Atl. 112 [1904];  Sisk v. Meagher, 82 Conn. 376, 73 Atl. 785 [1909];  Hull v. Thoms, 82 Conn. 386, 391, 73 Atl. 793 [1909];  Brown v. Cray, 88 Conn. 141, 146, 89 Atl. 1123 [1914];  Goldberg v. Krayeske, 102 Conn. 137, 143, 128 Atl. 27 [1925].  The notations made by the clerk ... in the docket need no particular authentication but, appearing as made by him in the appropriate place, may be presumed to be accurate.   Such entries, duly authenticated, may stand as adequate evidence of a judgment.  Buckley v. Spirt, 108 Conn. 733, 143 Atl. 844 [1928].  But it is the judgment-file, signed by the judge or clerk of the court, which is the proper evidence of the rendition of the judgment and its terms.  Brown v. Cray, supra.   When such a judgment-file has been prepared, whether or not entries made upon the original papers or in the docket at the time the judgment was rendered are signed is not of consequence.   Such entries having been made, the formal judgment-file may thereafter be prepared from them and signed by the clerk or any assistant clerk having authority to act in his stead."  State v. Lindsay, 109 Conn. 239, 242-43, 146 A. 290 (1929).   It is the formal nature of a judgment file, as contrasted with less formal docket entries, that contributes to the conclusive effect given it.   See, e.g., Practice Book Forms 107.1 through 107.17
                

The docket sheet and docket entries are admissible evidence of the judgment rendered. Buckley v. Spirt, supra, 108 Conn. at 733-34, 143 A. 844; Smith v. Brockett, 69 Conn. 492, 502, 38 A. 57 (1897); Gillespie v. Gallant, 1 Conn.Cir. 594, 596, 24 Conn.Sup. 357, 190 A.2d 607 (1963); 30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence § 979 (1967); cf. General Statutes § 51-52; Practice Book § 395. Such docket entries, however, even if deemed presumptively correct; Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, 15 Conn.App. 752, 757, 546 A.2d 340 (1988); DiSimone v. Vitello, 6 Conn.App. 390, 393, 505 A.2d 745 (1986); are not conclusive evidence of the judgment. At best, the docket sheet signed by the sentencing judge "is prima facie the judgment of the court, and is evidence of what the court has decided." Stafford Higgins Industries, Inc. v. Norwalk, supra. That is, it is "evidence which, if credited, is sufficient to establish the facts which it is adduced to prove." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Berchtold v. Maggi, 191 Conn. 266, 270, 464 A.2d 1 (1983).

"The final judgment in a criminal case ordinarily is the imposition of sentence." State v. Herring, 209 Conn. 52, 55, 547 A.2d 6 (1988). Ordinarily, the sentence is imposed orally by the trial judge. State v. Lindsay, supra, 109 Conn. at 243, 146 A. 290. "The judicial authority shall impose the sentence in the presence and hearing of the defendant, unless the defendant shall have waived his right to be present." (Emphasis added.) Practice Book § 919(5). Here, a certified transcript of the sentencing was admitted as a full exhibit. Such a transcript is "prima facie a correct statement of the testimony and proceedings" before the court. General Statutes § 52-161. 5 That transcript reflects Since the docket sheet and the transcript are deemed prima facie correct, and since those two documents are conflicting, the court must make a principled choice between them. "Sentences in criminal cases should reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious misapprehensions by those who must execute them." United States v. Daugherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363, 46 S.Ct. 156, 157, 70 L.Ed. 309 (1926). 7 "A high degree of exactitude is required in the pronouncement of the sentence. The sentence should be definite and certain. Sentencing should clearly reveal the intention of the court and conform to the statutory limitations." State v. Turbeville, 235 Kan. 993, 1003, 686 P.2d 138 (1984); see United States v. Naas, 755 F.2d 1133, 1136 (5th Cir.1985); Brooks v. United States, 223 F.2d 393, 395 (10th Cir.1955); Walters v. State, 259 Ark. 447, 448, 533 S.W.2d 517 (1976); Merritt v. Commonwealth, 47 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Ky.1969); State v. Sturgis, 110 Me. 96, 99, 85 A. 474 (1912); Richmond v. State, 484 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Mo.1972); Anthony v. Kaiser, 350 Mo. 748, 752, 169 S.W.2d 47 (1943); In re Swink, 243 N.C. 86, 91, 89 S.E.2d 792 (1955); Hudson v. Youell, 178 Va. 525, 533, 17 S.E.2d 403 (1941), aff'd, 179 Va. 442, 19 S.E.2d 705, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 630, 63 This is not a case where there is an ambiguity between the oral pronouncement of the sentence and the docket papers. In such a circumstance it may be proper to look to the clerk's writing and the entire record to resolve the ambiguity. See United States v. Moyles, 724 F.2d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Purcell, 715 F.2d 561, 563 (11th Cir.1983); David v. United States, 579 A.2d 1172, 1176 (D.C.1990). In such cases, however, it has been held that "[a]mbiguity or doubts relative to a sentence should be resolved in favor of the accused." State v. DeAngelis, 257 S.C. 44, 50, 183 S.E.2d 906 (1971); accord United States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir.1970); Gaddis v. United States, 280 F.2d 334, 336 (6th Cir.1960); Downey v. United States, 91 F.2d 223, 226 (D.C.Cir.1937); Aderhold v. McCarthy, 65 F.2d 452, 453 (5th Cir.1933); Cross v. Huff, 208 Ga. 392, 396, 67 S.E.2d 124 (1951). Here, however, there is no ambiguity. The sentencing judge imposed no condition on the defendant's probation.

                that the sentencing judge imposed the suspended sentences indicated in the docket sheet and a two year
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4 cases
  • State v. Smith
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • May 1, 2001
    ...had not been explicitly included in court-ordered terms of probation; due process does not require hearing); State v. Mobley, 42 Conn. Sup. 574, 591-95, 634 A.2d 305, aff'd, 33 Conn. App. 103, 105, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994) (adopting as well reaso......
  • State v. Lockhart
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • September 26, 2000
    ...correct in asserting that any ambiguities concerning conditions of his probation must be resolved in his favor; see State v. Mobley, 42 Conn. Sup. 574, 580-82, 634 A.2d 305, aff'd, 33 Conn. App. 103, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994); the revocation court......
  • Bridgeport Water Pollution Control Authority v. Professional Services Group, Inc., No. CV-03-0399294 (CT 12/16/2004)
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • December 16, 2004
    ...December 16, 2004MEMORANDUM OF DECISION LEVIN, JUDGE. Regarding the nature and function of a "judgment file," see State v. Mobley, 42 Conn.Sup. 574, 576-77, 634 A.2d 305, aff'd, 33 Conn.App. 103, 105, 633 A.2d 726 (1993), cert. denied, 228 Conn. 917, 636 A.2d 849 (1994). The substantive iss......
  • State v. Mobley
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • January 7, 1994
    ...memorandum of decision the trial court analyzed the defendant's first four claims consistently with the law. State v. Mobley, 42 Conn.Sup. 574, 634 A.2d 305 (1993). As to the first four arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt the trial court's well reasoned decision as a statement of the ......

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