State v. Mohi

• Decision Date: 15 June 1995
• Docket Number: Nos. 940028,940200 and 940201,s. 940028
• Citation: 267 Utah Adv.Rep. 7,901 P.2d 991
• Parties: STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Asipeli MOHI, Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Phillip Daniel LUNDQUIST, Defendant and Appellant. STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Daniel Rodrigo CHAIDES, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

Page 991

901 P.2d 991

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v.Asipeli MOHI, Defendant and Appellant.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v.Phillip Daniel LUNDQUIST, Defendant and Appellant.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v.Daniel Rodrigo CHAIDES, Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. 940028, 940200 and 940201.

Supreme Court of Utah.

June 15, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 14, 1995.

Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Carol Clawson, Julie George, J. Kevin Murphy, Asst. Attys.Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff.

Ronald J. Yengich, Hakeem Ishola, Salt Lake City, for Mohi.

Linda Anderson, Provo, for Lundquist.

Thomas H. Means, Provo, and Lee C. Rasmussen, Salt Lake City, for Chaides.

DURHAM, Justice:

This case is a consolidation of appeals of defendantsAsipeli Mohi, Phillip Daniel Lundquist, and Daniel Rodrigo Chaides from interlocutory orders of the Third Judicial District and Fourth Judicial Circuit Courts.Defendants challenge the constitutionality of portions of Utah's Juvenile Courts Act (the Act).¹ In all three cases, the trial courts below denied defendants' motions that the trial courts rule portions of the Act unconstitutional.Defendants ask this court to reverse the trial courts' findings and hold unconstitutional the portions of the Act that allow prosecutors discretion to file some charges against juveniles directly in adult circuit or district court while leaving other similarly accused offenders in juvenile court.SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25.

FACTS

Asipeli Mohi

The State alleges that on September 1, 1993, Asipeli Mohi(Mohi) intentionally or recklessly caused the death of Aaron Chapman with a firearm or facsimile thereof.Several witnesses have identified Mohi as the person who shot Chapman.A criminal information was filed against Mohi on September 8, 1993, pursuant to the direct-file provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6)(b).Mohi was born on January 3, 1976, and was thus approximately seventeen years and eight months of age at the time of the alleged crime, four months short of the age of majority.

Mohi has been represented by counsel since being charged.The direct-file statute under which Mohi was charged provided that when an information was filed in district or circuit court against a juvenile, the defendant or his or her guardian or representative could file a "recall motion" with the juvenile court within ten days of the original filing.SeeUtah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(10).Neither Mohi nor his counsel filed a recall motion.

Mohi was bound over to stand trial in district court.In November and December of 1993, Mohi filed amended motions and supporting memoranda asking the court to rule the direct-file provision of Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25 unconstitutional pursuant to article I, sections 7(due process) and 24 (uniform operation of laws) of the Utah Constitution.In January 1994, Judge Iwasaki entered findings of fact and conclusions of law upholding the constitutionality of the direct-file statutes.This court granted Mohi's petition for an interlocutory appeal from that order.

Phillip Daniel Lundquist and Daniel Rodrigo Chaides

Phillip Daniel Lundquist(Lundquist) and Daniel Rodrigo Chaides(Chaides) were jointly charged by criminal information, filed March 17, 1994, with one count each of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony; aggravated robbery, a first degree felony; and theft of a vehicle, a second degree felony.Lundquist alone was charged with a fourth count, theft of a firearm, a second degree felony.The information noted the State's intent to seek penalty enhancement on each of the aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery charges for use of a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm.

Lundquist and Chaides were initially held at a juvenile detention center.However, following a bond hearing in Fourth Judicial Circuit Court, both defendants were sent to the Utah County Jail rather than to the juvenile facility to await trial.On March 24, 1994, the circuit court heard arguments regarding the appropriate housing facility for juveniles charged as adults.After this hearing, defendants were returned to the Utah County Jail for further detention.

Lundquist and Chaides bring this appeal to challenge first the constitutionality of the amended direct-file statute and second the order placing them in the county jail rather than in a juvenile detention center.The direct-file provision used to charge Lundquist and Chaides differs from the earlier version of the statute used to charge Mohi in that the amended statute did not, in this instance, allow for a recall hearing regarding the propriety of adult jurisdiction.Lundquist and Chaides raise the same claims regarding the Act as Mohi does, with additional arguments that the amended statute deprives them of due process under both the state and federal constitutions by eliminating the chance for recall and that section 78-3a-25 violates the state constitutional provision requiring separation of powers.SeeUtah Const. art. V, § 1.Lundquist and Chaides also argue that the statute relied upon by the trial court to house them in the county jail rather than in juvenile detention while awaiting trial, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-30(9), is unconstitutionally vague for failing to clarify when it is proper for juveniles to be housed with adults.

ANALYSIS

I.Standard of Review

All issues in this case present questions of law.We therefore review the trial courts' conclusions for correctness.Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1148(Utah1994);State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936(Utah1994);State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269-70(Utah1993).While ruling on the constitutionality of a statute, we will resolve doubts in favor of constitutionality.Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920(Utah1993).

II.Uniform Operation of Laws

Defendants attack the direct-file provision of the Act under article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which states, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."Utah Const. art. I, § 24.Defendants contend that section 78-3a-25 of the Code violates this provision by creating a scheme that treats one class of persons charged with a particular crime differently than another class of persons charged with the same crime.Defendants define the different "classes" created by the statute as (1) those accused of serious felony offenses who remain subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and (2) those accused of identical offenses against whom the prosecutor files a criminal information in circuit or district court, or against whom a prosecutor obtains a criminal indictment.This arbitrary classification scheme is not reasonably related to any state interest, defendants argue, because the legislation is devoid of any reason for permitting identically situated juveniles to receive disparate treatment, resulting in one group that is eligible for rehabilitation in the juvenile system and another that faces the very different circumstances of the adult system.Defendants argue that no state interest is served by allowing such unreasonable disparity.

The State responds to these arguments first by claiming that defendants have not proven that the statute is applied in an uneven-handed way.Because the statute does not, according to the State, on its face create unreasonable classifications, defendants should have the burden of showing that the State actually afforded specific, like-situated juveniles different, more favorable treatment than that accorded these defendants.Because no such evidence was produced, the State contends, defendants' challenge must fail.Furthermore, the State claims that contrary to defendants' contentions, this court in State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390(Utah1989), already decided that the direct-file statute does not violate either the federal or state constitution.

We begin by clarifying the level of scrutiny used in deciding the constitutionality of the statutes in question under the stateconstitution.Defendants contend that the statute touches and concerns a "liberty" interest and therefore the legislature's actions must be reasonable in relation to the state's need to enact such statutes.The State contends, however, that being tried as a juvenile is not a constitutional right and therefore the legislature's actions in adopting the ordinance must be only rationally related to the state's interest in preserving the peace.

In State in re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 1076, 1079(Utah1985), we held that a juvenile's interest in his or her trial forum touched and concerned a "critical" interest."We agree that whether a juvenile is to be transferred to the adult system is a 'critically important' question and that a juvenile must be afforded appropriate procedural protections when that determination is made."Id.(quotingKent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1053, 16 L.Ed.2d 84(1966)).² In Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 637(Utah1989), we discussed at some length the level of scrutiny applied to legislation challenged under article I, section 24.There we held, "In scrutinizing a legislative measure under article I, § 24, we must determine whether the classification is reasonable, whether the objectives of the legislative action are legitimate, and whether there is a reasonable relationship between the classification and the legislative purposes."Id.(emphasis added)(citations omitted);accordMountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 890(Utah1988);Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671(Utah1984);see alsoLee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 577(Utah1993).The burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality, however, remains a heavy one.Blue Cross, 779 P.2d at 637;City of West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 767 P.2d 530, 537(Utah1988).Therefore, we will uphold the statute unless defendants demonstrate that the state's interest in protecting the public...