State v. Molz
| Decision Date | 07 March 1914 |
| Docket Number | 18,950 |
| Citation | 139 P. 376,91 Kan. 901 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee, v. ADAM MOLZ, Appellant |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Decided January, 1914.
Appeal from Kearny district court; GEORGE J. DOWNER, judge.
Judgment affirmed.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.
1. QUALIFICATION OF JURORS--Question of Fact--Judicial Discretion. The qualification of a juror, who has testified in regard thereto in court, is a question of fact and a matter of judicial discretion to be determined by the court, and its decision thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the court has made a mistake or has abused its discretion.
2. VENUE -- In Criminal Action -- Location of Crime -- Common Knowledge. Where the venue in a criminal action is established by evidence that the act charged was committed in a certain direction and distance from a town in the county from which the court and jury have common knowledge that the place is within the county, a verdict of guilty, approved by the court, will not on appeal be set aside by reason of the failure of formal proof of the venue.
3. SALES--Hay--False Scales--Competent Evidence. Under the facts of this case, evidence of the weight of the hay sold, as ascertained by weighing the same upon other scales, was competent to establish the true weight thereof.
E. R. Thorpe, of Lakin, Clad Hamilton, and Clay Hamilton, both of Topeka, for the appellant.
John S. Dawson, attorney-general, S. N. Hawkes, assistant attorney-general, and A. R. Hetzer, county attorney, for the appellee.
The appellant, Adam Molz, was convicted of violating section 9752 of the General Statutes of 1909 in giving false weights for certain hay sold. Several assignments of error are made, but only three or four are urged in appellant's brief. The principal objection urged is the retention of one Gillock as a juror over the objection of the appellant.
Gillock testified, among other things, on his examination that he had formed such an opinion in the case as would require some evidence to remove; that he did not believe he could go into the trial with as fair and unbiased an opinion as he would have if he had not heard of the case; that he thought he had an opinion based to a certain extent upon statements that had been made to him by parties who purported to know the facts; that notwithstanding what he had heard he thought he could sit as a juror in the trial of the case and be governed according to the law and the evidence and render a fair and impartial verdict.
Numerous authorities from this court are cited pro and con as to whether, under such evidence, the juror was qualified to sit in the trial of the case. Most of the cases cited by the appellant are homicide cases, which from their very nature excite a great deal of interest and discussion of the supposed facts in the county where the trial is had, being generally the county in which the crime is charged to have been committed, and people are apt to take opposite sides in such cases. The appellee also cities cases of like character in which it is held that as strong expressions as were given by the juror in this case are not sufficient to disqualify the juror.
After all that has been said and written on the subject, the question of the competency of a juror is a question of fact to be determined by the court, and unless it is evident that the court has made a mistake to the prejudice of the accused, its decision as to such qualification should not be reversed. In The State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 P. 489, one of the later cases of this character decided by this court, it was said:
"The finding of a trial court as to the qualification of a juror is reviewable like any other finding of fact based on evidence, and if, upon the evidence, the trial court decides that the juror is free from bias, prejudice or interest, and has no disqualifying opinion, its decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless disqualification appears as a matter of law or it is disclosed that there has been an abuse of the discretion with which the court is vested." (Syl. P 4.)
We think that it does not clearly appear from the answers of the juror that he was disqualified as a matter of law or that there was an abuse of the discretion of the court in overruling the challenge.
The evidence disclosed that the hay was all weighed on appellant's hay scales at his home, and was reweighed on scales belonging to other persons. It is contended that the court erred in overruling appellant's objection to the...
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State v. Hooper
...must be satisfied that the challenged juror is free from bias and prejudice." Morton v. State, 1 Kan. 468, 472. See, also, State v. Molz, 91 Kan. 901, 139 P. 376; State v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 280 (6th syl.), 147 828; State v. Tucker, 137 Kan. 84, 91, 19 P.2d 436. Applying these principles, it ......
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State v. Pratt
... ... in court is a question of fact and a matter of judicial ... discretion to be determined by the court, and its decision ... thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly ... appears that the court has made a mistake or abused its ... discretion. (The State v. Molz, 91 Kan. 901, 139 P ... 376; The State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404; 116 P. 489; ... see, also, Schmana v. Swift & Co., 113 Kan. 340, ... 214 P. 567, and cases there cited.) We think the court might ... have excused this juror without committing error (The ... State v. Miller, 29 Kan. 43), but the ... ...
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State v. Williams, 40618
...must be satisfied that the challenged juror is free from bias and prejudice.' Morton v. State, 1 Kan. 468, 472. See, also, State v. Molz, 91 Kan. 901, 139 P. 376; State v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 280 (6th syl.), 147 P. 828; State v. Tucker, 137 Kan. 84, 91, 19 P.2d We further stated that it is dif......
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State v. Springer, 38454
...must be satisfied that the challenged juror is free from bias and prejudice.' Morton v. State, 1 Kan. 468, 472. See, also, State v. Molz, 91 Kan. 901, 139 P. 376; State v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 280 (6th syl.), 147 P. 828; State v. Tucker, 137 Kan. 84, 91, 19 P.2d We have quoted at length from th......