State v. Moncayo
| Decision Date | 20 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | A-1-CA-37911 |
| Parties | STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Florencio K. MONCAYO, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, John J. Woykovsky, Assistant Attorney General, Albuquerque, NM, for Appellee
Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Charles D. Agoos, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellant
{1} Defendant Florencio K. Moncayo appeals his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, claiming that the presence of a residue, which cannot be measured or used, is insufficient either to establish possession of a controlled substance, or to establish Defendant's knowledge that the residue was a controlled substance. Defendant also contends that his convictions for both possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia violate double jeopardy. Finding no merit in Defendant's claims, we affirm.
{2} In the early morning hours on January 21, 2018, police responded to a report that someone was "trying to kick the door in" at an apartment. The officers encountered Defendant at the scene, apparently agitated and yelling loudly. After placing Defendant under arrest for disorderly conduct, the officers found a clear glass pipe containing a white crystalline residue in Defendant's left front pocket. The substance in the pipe was subsequently tested and identified as methamphetamine. The glass pipe was admitted into evidence as a state's exhibit. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of both possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a fourth degree felony under NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-23(A), (E) (2011, as amended 2021), and possession of drug paraphernalia, then a misdemeanor under NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-25.1 (2001, as amended 2022).1
{3} We first consider Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for possession of a controlled substance. To convict a defendant of possession of a controlled substance both possession and knowledge of possession of a controlled substance must be established. Section 30-31-23(A) ; UJI 14-3102 NMRA. In this case, the jury was instructed that to find Defendant guilty they must find beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) "[D]efendant had methamphetamine in his possession"; (2) "[D]efendant knew it was methamphetamine"; and (3) "This happened in New Mexico on or about January 21, 2018." We measure the sufficiency of the evidence against the law as stated in the jury instructions. Goodman v. OS Rest. Servs., LLC , 2020-NMCA-019, ¶ 16, 461 P.3d 906 . Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish both the element of possession and the element of knowledge.
A. Standard of Review
{4} When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge, we must determine "whether substantial evidence of either a direct or circumstantial nature exists to support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to every element essential to a conviction." State v. Sutphin , 1988-NMSC-031, ¶ 21, 107 N.M. 126, 753 P.2d 1314. "A reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, resolving all conflicts therein and indulging all permissible inferences therefrom in favor of the verdict." Id. "This [C]ourt does not weigh the evidence and may not substitute its judgment for that of the fact[-]finder so long as there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict." Id. When a sufficiency of the evidence claim requires construction of a statute, as Defendant's claim does here, our review is de novo. See State v. Maldonado , 2005-NMCA-072, ¶ 9, 137 N.M. 699, 114 P.3d 379 ().
B. There Is No Error in This Court's Decisions Holding That a Trace Amount of a Controlled Substance Is Sufficient to Support a Conviction for Possession nor Have Those Decisions Become "So Unworkable as to Be Intolerable"
{5} Defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence of a trace amount of a controlled substance found inside a glass pipe to support a conviction for possession of methamphetamine. Defendant acknowledges this Court's longstanding precedent holding that our Legislature intended possession of any amount of a controlled substance to violate Section 30-31-23(E), so long as the substance can be identified. See State v. Grijalva , 1973-NMCA-061, ¶¶ 15, 17, 85 N.M. 127, 509 P.2d 894 ; see also State v. Wood , 1994-NMCA-060, ¶ 9, 117 N.M. 682, 875 P.2d 1113 ().
{6} Defendant contends Grijalva and Wood were implicitly abrogated by our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Office of the Public Defender ex rel. Muqqddin , 2012-NMSC-029, 285 P.3d 622, or alternatively, Grijalva and Wood should be overturned based on "the recent analytical modifications to statutory construction." Defendant alleges our Supreme Court adopted in Muqqddin Defendant contends, in the alternative, Wood and Grijalva should be overturned because these cases have become "so unworkable as to be intolerable."
{7} Defendant has a high bar to clear in seeking to overturn longstanding precedent. Defendant must show an obvious error in a prior decision or a special justification before we will depart from precedent. See Herrera v. Quality Pontiac , 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 15, 134 N.M. 43, 73 P.3d 181 (); see also State v. Radosevich , 2018-NMSC-028, ¶ 21, 419 P.3d 176 . A party asking this Court to overturn a decision must generally show either obvious error or that (1) the decision "is so unworkable as to be intolerable"; (2) reversing the decision would not "create an undue hardship" as a result of reliance on the previous decision; (3) the law surrounding the prior decision has "developed to such an extent as to leave the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine"; or (4) "the facts have changed in the interval from the old rule to reconsideration so as to have robbed the old rule of justification." Herrera , 2003-NMSC-018, ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{8} We address first Defendant's claim that Wood and Grijalva were wrongly decided in light of what Defendant claims is a sea change in statutory analysis adopted by our Supreme Court in Muqqddin Defendant argues that our Supreme Court's opinion in Muqqddin abrogates the plain meaning analysis employed by this Court in Wood and Grijalva , requiring that our courts ignore the plain meaning of the words and instead turn to an analysis of the policy underpinning the statute. According to Defendant, this Court in Wood and Grijalva wrongly applied what Defendant describes as the defunct plain meaning rule to conclude that the statutory language was clear and unambiguous and, having so concluded, relied exclusively on the language of the statute, overlooking what Defendant claims is legislative intent to punish only possession of a useable or measureable amount of a controlled substance. Defendant further contends that our possession of drug paraphernalia statute (which, at the time of this offense, made possession of drug paraphernalia a misdemeanor) was intended by the Legislature to be the proper statutory vehicle for prosecuting possession of a residue of a controlled substance found inside an item of drug paraphernalia.
{9} First, we are not persuaded by Defendant's argument that Muqqddin represents a change from the well-established principles of statutory construction applied by this Court in Grijalva and Wood . Our Supreme Court, at the outset of its opinion in Muqqddin , summarized the principles of statutory construction that the Court went on to apply as follows: 2012-NMSC-029, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
{10} Although acknowledging that policy must play a role, Muqqddin did not abrogate the plain meaning rule. That rule provides that if a state statute is free from ambiguity and the meaning of statutory language is plain, it must be applied as written. State ex rel. Helman v. Gallegos , 1994-NMSC-023, ¶ 2, 117 N.M. 346, 871 P.2d 1352. Our Supreme Court in Muqqddin adopted and applied the guidance on statutory construction provided by the Court's opinion in Helman , noting that Helman refused to abrogate the plain meaning rule, instead holding that the rule continues to apply where there is no ambiguity in a statute, but admonishing our courts to " ‘exercise...
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