State v. Monje

Decision Date02 November 1982
Docket NumberNo. 81-300,81-300
Citation109 Wis.2d 138,325 N.W.2d 695
Parties, 25 A.L.R.4th 145 STATE of Wisconsin, Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, v. Jaime MONJE, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

Sally Wellman, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), with whom on the briefs was Bronson C. La Follette, Atty Gen., for plaintiff-respondent-petitioner.

Jack E. Schairer, Asst. State Public Defender, for defendant-appellant.

DAY, Justice.

This is a review of a decision of the court of appeals, published at 105 Wis.2d 66, 312 N.W.2d 827 (Ct.App.1981), reversing an order of the Circuit Court for Rock County, Hon. Edwin C. Dahlberg, Judge, denying defendant, Jaime Monje's (hereinafter Monje), post-conviction motion to set aside his conviction for robbery, 1 on the ground the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction because of the illegality of his arrest, i.e., he was arrested in South Beloit, Illinois, by a Beloit, Wisconsin, police officer on a Wisconsin warrant.

The principle issue raised on this review is: Does an illegal arrest made pursuant to a warrant issued for probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate deprive a trial court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant?

We conclude it does not. Accordingly we reverse the court of appeals.

Other issues not decided by the court of appeals including a procedural question that the parties were asked to address by this court will be discussed in the balance of this opinion.

Early on the morning of April 26, 1979, the victim of this crime, Louis Poliere, (hereinafter Poliere), was attacked on a Beloit street as he carried a bag of groceries from his car to his apartment. He claimed to have initially been struck from behind on the head with a rock. During the struggle which ensued, Poliere received numerous wounds to his head and face. The victim claimed his assailant had a knife. Approximately one hundred stitches were required to close all the wounds. Poliere claimed the attacker threatened to kill him unless he turned over his money. The attacker took a turquoise ring, a watch and an undetermined amount of cash from Poliere.

Following the attack, Poliere was interviewed by Detective Keith Hein of the Beloit Police Department and described his assailant. Another witness to the attack also described the assailant to police. Both descriptions fit that of the defendant. During the course of Detective Hein's investigation, he received a call from the South Beloit Police Department that an Elaine Van Sickle of South Beloit had some information on Poliere's assault.

Ms. Van Sickle informed Detective Hein that Monje came to her apartment in South Beloit early on the morning of April 26, 1979. At trial she testified that when he arrived his face was dirty and his trousers were covered with blood and mud. She also said he had a turquoise ring, an expensive watch, and approximately fifty-six dollars in cash.

On the basis of this information, Detective Hein requested a warrant for Monje's arrest. A warrant for the defendant's arrest on charges of robbery and attempted first-degree murder was issued by a Rock county judge on May 4, 1979.

Following the issuance of the warrant, Detective Hein proceeded to South Beloit to look for Monje at a couple of addresses Monje had given police in the course of previous investigations. He obtained the assistance of a South Beloit police officer. While riding in a South Beloit police car, Hein observed Monje talking to several people in a parking lot. Hein got out of the car and approached Monje. He asked Monje to come with him to the South Beloit police station. The arrest warrant was executed either in the parking lot or at the police station. Hein made the arrest. For purposes of this review, we assume the defendant's arrest in Illinois was illegal.

Following the arrest, Monje was read his Miranda 2 rights in English and Spanish and was also advised of his extradition rights. Monje signed a form waiving extradition before Detective Hein but later claimed that he did not understand the waiver. 3 In the trial court and court of appeals, Monje claimed his rights under the Uniform Extradition Act were violated when he was returned to Wisconsin.

The defendant, Monje, was brought back to Beloit. Prior to the preliminary examination, a special appearance was entered on defendant's behalf and a motion to dismiss was made on the ground that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant because he had been illegally arrested. The motion was denied. Defendant renewed his motion at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. The motion was denied and he was bound over for trial. he was charged with attempted first-degree murder and armed robbery. He raised the jurisdictional issue again by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was dismissed. A jury found the defendant guilty of robbery but not guilty of attempted first-degree murder. Defendant raised the jurisdictional issue again in a post-conviction motion pursuant to SEC. 974.02, STATS4. The motion was denied. Defendant appealed from the order denying his post-conviction motion for acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial.

The first issue is, does a trial court have personal jurisdiction over a criminal defendant who is brought before the court as the result of an illegal arrest made pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause and issued by an impartial judge.

As a preliminary matter, this court must consider whether there are any constitutional impediments to the state proceeding with a trial following Monje's illegal arrest and removal to Wisconsin. Defendant claimed at the trial court and court of appeals levels that the violation of his due process rights under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was sufficient to require that the complaint against him be dismissed. However, this court has recognized that there is nothing in the constitution which prohibits a person from being tried even though the extradition process is totally ignored in removing him from an asylum state. State ex rel. Niederer v. Cady, 72 Wis.2d 311, 316, 240 N.W.2d 626 (1976). The right protected by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is that of "... a sovereign state to protect its citizens from an unreasonable or unjustified removal to another state." 72 Wis.2d at 323, 240 N.W.2d 626. Thus, even if we assume that Monje did not voluntarily waive his right to extradition, his involuntary removal would not present a constitutional bar to his being tried.

In considering the constitutional implication of an illegal arrest upon a subsequent trial, the United States Supreme Court in Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541, reh. denied, 343 U.S. 937, 72 S.Ct. 768, 96 L.Ed. 1344 (1952), stated that "the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction,' " and went on to hold that "[t]here is nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against his will." 342 U.S. at 522, 72 S.Ct. at 511. Frisbie involved the forcible seizure of a criminal defendant in Chicago by police officers who transported him to Michigan where he was tried and convicted of murder. In the instant case, assuming that the arrest in South Beloit was illegal, the Wisconsin court was not thereby deprived of jurisdiction on any constitutional ground. The supreme court's holding in Frisbie has been reiterated in several recent cases. 5

In Walberg v. State, 73 Wis.2d 448, 243 N.W.2d 190 (1976), this court noted that "due process is satisfied following an illegal arrest when the accused is bound over following a preliminary hearing involving a finding of probable cause, has been arraigned by the circuit court, and has received a fair trial." 73 Wis.2d at 459, 243 N.W.2d 190. These requirements have been met. As both the United States Supreme Court and this court have held, there is nothing in the United States Constitution which would require that Monje's conviction be set aside or that he be given a new trial because of the illegality of his arrest.

Although no constitutional violation has occurred, there remains the question of whether, under Wisconsin law, the trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant brought before it by an illegal arrest. In Walberg, the court repeated its longstanding rule 6 that personal jurisdiction is dependent upon the defendant's physical presence before the court pursuant to a "properly issued warrant, a lawful arrest or a voluntary appearance." 73 Wis.2d at 458, 243 N.W.2d 190. In the instant case, the defendant does not claim the arrest warrant was issued without probable cause or by other than a neutral and detached magistrate. Defendant's only claim is that, by virtue of his unlawful arrest, the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over him. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that where an arrest warrant is issued on probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate, the fact that the defendant is brought before the trial court as a result of an unlawful arrest does not deprive the trial court of personal jurisdiction.

In Walberg, the court stated that "... personal jurisdiction is dependent upon the defendant's physical presence before the court pursuant to a properly issued warrant, a lawful arrest or a voluntary appearance." 73 Wis. at 458, 243 N.W.2d 190. (Emphasis added.)

The defendant would have us interpret the above as though it read "... a properly issued warrant and a lawful arrest or a voluntary appearance."

However, it is more properly interpreted to read "... a properly issued warrant or a lawful arrest or a voluntary appearance." To read it otherwise would make the statement incorrect since it purports to state all of...

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