State v. Monroe, A--112

• Decision Date: 17 June 1959
• Docket Number: No. A--112,A--112
• Citation: 30 N.J. 160,152 A.2d 362
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles MONROE, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 160

30 N.J. 160

152 A.2d 362

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles MONROE, Defendant-Respondent.

No. A--112.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 21, 1959.

Decided June 17, 1959.

William C. Brudnick, Sp. Asst. Pros., Hackensack, for plaintiff-appellant (Guy W. Calissi, Bergen County Pros., Hackensack, attorney).

Thomas M. Maher, Hackensack, for defendant-respondent.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FRANCIS, J.

A complaint was filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Bergen County under N.J.S 2A:100--2, N.J.S.A., charging the defendant with desertion and non-support of his wife and minor children in necessitous circumstances. At the time of arraignment thereon, Monroe was advised by the court that he was entitled to counsel, to a reasonable time within which to prepare his defense, to have the matter considered by the grand jury and, if an indictment was returned, to a trial by jury. He was told also that, if he wished, such proceedings could be waived and the matter disposed of at once. After receiving this information, he executed a written waiver. The cause was then heard and the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 1 1/2 to 2 years in the State Prison.

On March 12, 1958 Monroe applied for a writ of Habeas corpus, contending that the sentence was void because the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court had no jurisdiction to hear the criminal offense charged under N.J.S. 2A:100--2, N.J.S.A. At that time he was also under a 3 to 5 year sentence for larceny, which term was to run consecutively with the one under attack. The writ was allowed and the Superior Court, Law Division, sustained the claim of lack of jurisdiction. As a consequence, an order was entered vacating the judgment of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and directing that the time served under that conviction be credited against the larceny sentence. The State applied directly to this court for certification and we granted it. 28 N.J. 37, 144 A.2d 907 (1958).

The issue presented here has been discussed in other cases but it has not actually been decided. State v. Bruneel, 14 N.J. 53, 100 A.2d 882 (1953); State v. Savastini, 14 N.J. 507, 103 A.2d 249 (1954).

N.J.S. 2A:100--2, N.J.S.A. is a part of the Crimes Act. Violation thereof is declared to be a misdemeanor and punishable by 'a fine of not more than $1,000, or by imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both.' N.J.S. 2A:85--7, N.J.S.A. The offense is a criminal one and is manifestly within the constitutional protection against prosecution without grand jury indictment and trial by jury. New Jersey Constitution (1947) Article I, paragraphs 8, 9 and 10; N.J.S 2A:4--30.5, N.J.S.A.; United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 42 S.Ct. 368, 66 L.Ed. 700 (1922).

The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is a tribunal of statutory origin and its jurisdiction is limited to the matters confided to it by the Legislature. Accordingly, to sustain the conviction in the present case it must appear affirmatively that the offense is within the ambit of that court's delegated authority. Jurisdiction over a crime not within the boundaries cannot be conferred by consent of the persons involved--as by waiver of indictment and trial by jury. State v. Bruneel, supra, 14 N.J. at page 58, 100 A.2d 882; In re Daniecki, 117 N.J.Eq. 527, 531, 177 A. 91 (Ch.1935), affirmed 119 N.J.Eq. 359, 183 A. 298 (E. & A. 1936); Richardson v. State Board, etc., 98 N.J.L. 690, 693, 121 A. 457 (Sup.Ct.1923), affirmed 99 N.J.L. 516, 123 A. 720 (E. & A.1924). Thus, recourse to the creating enactment must be had for the answer to a particular problem.

N.J.S. 2A:4--18, N.J.S.A. provides that the court 'shall also have jurisdiction concurrently with such other courts as may have jurisdiction over the matter, to hear and determine in a Summary manner disputes and Complaints:

'c. Involving violations of subtitle 12 (disorderly persons law) of this title (§ 2A:169--1 et seq.), and chapter 1 of Title 44, Poor (§ 44:1--1 et seq.), chapter 6 and chapter 17 of Title 9, Children (§ 9:6--1 et seq., and § 9:17--1 et seq.), and article 4 of chapter 5 of Title 30, Institutions and Agencies (§ 30:5--33 et seq.), of the Revised Statutes, Together with any other laws or future enactments covering similar complaints or offenses, where the gravamen of the complaint under such laws or enactments is the failure or neglect of 1 member of the family to satisfy or discharge his legal obligations to another member of the family.' (Emphasis added)

It is plain from this excerpt that jurisdiction over the crime of desertion and non-support of wife and minor children under N.J.S. 2A:100--2, N.J.S.A. is not conferred by express reference. But it is equally plain that such transgression may be described as an offense where the 'gravamen of the complaint * * * is the failure or neglect of one member of the family to satisfy or discharge his legal obligations to another member of the family.' State v. Bruneel, supra, 14 N.J. at page 58, 100 A.2d at page 884. Thus, the broad language of the statute may be said to draw that crime into the orbit or the court's jurisdiction if the phrases specifically dealing with the scope of the power to act bespeak such a grant. Here attention focuses upon the authorization to hear such cases in 'a summary manner' concurrently with such other courts as may have jurisdiction. So the extent of the grant is to hear infractions of N.J.S. 2A:100--2, N.J.S.A. in that manner. Obviously, if the design of the language was to prevent or to eliminate indictment and trial by jury, the act would be violative of the constitutional guaranties specified above.

A legislative enactment carries a strong presumption of conformity with the organic law, and mere doubts are not sufficient to negate the presumption. If the language under study admits of two interpretations, one rendering the statute invalid and the other valid, the construction sustaining constitutionality will be adopted. In re Village of Loch Arbour, 25 N.J. 258, 264, 265, 135 A.2d 663 (1957). The doctrine takes on added force when there is a strong societal objective to be served by a declaration of validity.

N.J.S. 2A:100--2 et seq., N.J.S.A. stem from the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act. The legislative scheme comprehends two proceedings, one covil and the other criminal, by means of a single complaint. Section 2 defines the crime involved in the present case. Under Section 3, at any time after a sworn complaint charging it is filed, 'and before trial,' the court having jurisdiction may enter a temporary support order and may enforce it by punishment for contempt. And on a plea of guilty before trial, at the trial or after conviction, instead of imposing the criminal sanction established for the misdemeanor offense, the court may execute a final order for future support and may place the husband or father on probation upon the posting of a bond with or without surety to guarantee compliance therewith. Section 4. Manifestly, therefore, the primary purpose is to assure an adequate and enforceable support order for the welfare of the dependents and to avert the need for public maintenance. State v. Savastini, supra, 14 N.J. at page 516, 103 A.2d 249; 2 Wharton, Criminal Law (12th ed. 1932), § 1850. The criminal charge provides the coercive pressure to that end. In Savastini this court declared that under N.J.S. 2A:4--18(c), N.J.S.A. Supra, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court has the authority to enforce the Uniform Desertion and Nonsupport Act, at least to the extent of entering support orders. No decision was rendered as to whether the criminal aspect can be entertained there. But Justice Brennan said:

'None can gainsay the desirability of having both proceedings cognizable in the same court (rather than the civil phase in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, and the criminal aspect in the County Court, which has general jurisdiction of criminal offenses). The nature and objectives of the uniform act make it highly undesirable that the prosecution of the criminal phase of a complaint proceed in one court while the civil phase is determined in another court. This fractionalization can only tend to cumbersome administration of the law and impair its effectiveness to accomplish its beneficent and socially desirable ends.' 14 N.J., at page 519, 103 A.2d at page 255. (Insertion ours)

Solution of the problem of the court's authority to act in this instance must depend upon the construction of the term 'summary.' A summary proceeding of the criminal law type is one where the controversy is disposed of in a prompt and simple manner, without the services of a jury and without indictment. Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Cent. ed. 1948) defines it as 'A form of trial in which the ancient established course of legal proceedings is disregarded, especially in the matter of trial by jury, and, in the case of the heavier crimes, presentment by a grand jury.' Blackstone distinguishes 'summary' from 'regular,' the latter designation signifying a trial according to the ordinary and formal course of the common law. Chase's Blackstone (3d ed. 1890), 991; and see, State v. Maier, 13 N.J. 235, 99 A.2d 21 (1953); Minard v. Dover, etc., Gas Co., 76 N.J.L. 132, 68 A. 910 (Sup.Ct.1908) ; Hankinson v. Trenton, 51 N.J.L. 495, 496, 17 A. 1083 (Sup.Ct.1889); Hoeberg v. Newton, 49 N.J.L. 617, 618, 9 A. 751 (Sup.Ct.1887); Doughty v. Conover,42 N.J.L. 193, 197 (Sup.Ct.1880); State ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 273 N.W. 233 (Sup.Ct.1937); People v. Rogers, 37 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Cty.Ct.1942); State v. Williams, 40 S.C. 373, 19 S.E. 5, 7 (Sup.Ct.1894); Caneperi v. State, 169 Tenn. 472, 89 S.W.2d 164 (Sup.Ct.1936); State ex rel. Daugherty v. Rose, 167 Tenn. 489, 71 S.W.2d 685 (Sup.Ct.1934); State ex rel. Mynatt v. King, 137 Tenn. 17, 191 S.W. 352 (Sup.Ct.1917); State ex rel. Timothy v. Howse, 134 Tenn. 67, 183 S.W. 510,...