State v. Montano

• Decision Date: 11 June 2020
• Docket Number: NO. S-1-SC-37021,NO. S-1-SC-37098,S-1-SC-37021,S-1-SC-37098
• Citation: 468 P.3d 838
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Roy D. MONTANO, Defendant-Respondent, State of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. William Daniel Martinez, Defendant-Petitioner.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

468 P.3d 838

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.Roy D. MONTANO, Defendant-Respondent,State of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.William Daniel Martinez, Defendant-Petitioner.

NO. S-1-SC-37021

NO. S-1-SC-37098

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: June 11, 2020

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} These consolidated cases give us the opportunity to define "uniformed law enforcement officer" and "appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle" under NMSA 1978, Section 30-22-1.1(A) (2003), which defines the crime of aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer.¹ Violation of Section 30-22-1.1 is a fourth-degree felony that "consists of a person willfully and carelessly driving his vehicle in a manner that endangers the life of another person after being given a visual or audible signal to stop, whether by hand, voice, emergency light, flashing light, siren or other signal, by a uniformed law enforcement officer in an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle in pursuit in accordance with the provisions of the Law Enforcement Safe Pursuit Act." (Emphasis added.)

{2} We granted certiorari (1) in State v. Montano , 2018-NMCA-047, 423 P.3d 1, to review the reasoning of Montano and consider whether the law enforcement officer was "uniformed" under Section 30-22-1.1(A) and (2) in State v. Martinez , A-1-CA-35111, 2018 WL 2999944, mem. op. (May 14, 2018) (nonprecedential), to review the Montano reasoning and consider whether the law enforcement officers in Martinez and Montano were each in an "appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle" under Section 30-22-1.1(A). We affirm the Court of Appeals determination of what constitutes a "uniformed law enforcement officer" and reject its determination of what constitutes an "appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle" and therefore conclude that the officer in Montano was not a "uniformed law enforcement officer" and that neither the officer in Montano nor the officer in Martinez was in an "appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle."

I. BACKGROUND

A. State v. Montano

{3} After an automobile pursuit, Curry County Sheriff's Deputy Glenn Russ arrested Defendant Roy Montano. The State charged Defendant Montano with one count of aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, § 30-22-1.1, and one count each of driving with a revoked license, NMSA 1978, § 66-5-39.1 (2013), driving with an expired motor vehicle registration, NMSA 1978, § 66-3-19 (1995), and driving with no insurance, NMSA 1978, § 66-5-205(B) (2013).

{4} In his statement of probable cause, Deputy Russ wrote that he began to follow Defendant Montano after seeing a Hispanic male he initially believed to be an individual he knew to have had "a warrant in the past" get into a four-door Saturn and begin driving. Deputy Russ stated that his purpose in following this individual was to verify the driver's identity. After catching up to the Saturn and running the license plate, Deputy Russ learned that the plate was expired. Deputy Russ wrote that he then activated the emergency lights on his vehicle "to [e]ffect a traffic stop for the violation and positively identify the driver." Deputy Russ stated that the vehicle did not stop, ran multiple stop signs, and drove in a manner that posed a safety risk to the public before sliding through an intersection, striking a curb, and coming to rest on an easement.

{5} Defendant Montano waived his right to a jury trial. At the bench trial the evidence included testimony from Deputy Russ that he worked as an "investigator" with the Curry County Sheriff's office and wore the clothing required of investigators: "a dress shirt with tie, dress slacks, and dress shoes." Deputy Russ wore his badge displayed on the breast pocket of his shirt, but there was no testimony describing the badge itself, its wording, or the size of the wording. Deputy Russ drove a Ford Expedition that had no decals, striping, insignia, or lettering anywhere on the vehicle. However, the vehicle was equipped with wigwag headlights, red and blue flashing lights mounted in the front grill and the top rear window, flashing brake lights, and a siren. The vehicle also had a government license plate. The district court took judicial notice that the vehicle "was not a marked vehicle."

{6} At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Defendant Montano moved for a directed verdict on the aggravated fleeing charge, asserting that the State failed to prove that Deputy Russ was uniformed or in an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle, as required by Section 30-22-1.1(A), when Deputy Russ attempted to stop him. The district court ruled that displaying a badge was sufficient to be considered in uniform and that Deputy Russ's vehicle was "appropriately marked" because motorists understand that they are required to pull over and stop when they see emergency lights. The district court therefore denied Defendant Montano's motion, found Defendant Montano guilty of aggravated fleeing, and imposed the maximum sentence of eighteen months imprisonment. Montano appealed to the Court of Appeals.

{7} The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant Montano's conviction. Montano , 2018-NMCA-047, ¶ 1, 423 P.3d 1. The Court of Appeals concluded that Deputy Russ's vehicle was an "appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle" as required by Section 30-22-1.1(A) but that the clothes that Deputy Russ was wearing "did not constitute a uniform" and therefore did not comply with the statute. Montano , 2018-NMCA-047, ¶ 1, 423 P.3d 1. We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Court of Appeals conclusion that Deputy Russ was not uniformed at the time of the stop as required by Section 30-22-1.1(A).

B. State v. Martinez

{8} Defendant William Daniel Martinez was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant and charged with one count of aggravated fleeing from a law enforcement officer, § 30-22-1.1. The affidavit in support of the arrest warrant states that on July 14, 2014, San Juan County Sheriff's Deputy Andrew Gilbert received information alleging that Defendant Martinez, who had several active felony and misdemeanor warrants, was at a residence in Farmington. When Deputy Gilbert arrived in that area, he observed a car matching the description of the vehicle Defendant Martinez allegedly drove that was pulling out of a trailer park. Deputy Gilbert recognized Defendant Martinez as the driver through several previous contacts with him. Apparently recognizing that Deputy Gilbert was driving behind him, Defendant Martinez ran a stop sign and made several evasive maneuvers. Deputy Gilbert initiated the emergency equipment on his "unmarked patrol vehicle" and pursued Defendant Martinez who ran additional stop signs, swerved to avoid hitting pedestrians, and on several occasions slid into intersections and drove down oncoming traffic lanes. Deputy Gilbert eventually abandoned the pursuit. Defendant Martinez was subsequently arrested pursuant to the arrest warrant.

{9} Prior to trial, Defendant Martinez filed a motion to dismiss the criminal information, asserting that that Deputy Gilbert "was in an unmarked vehicle, no more conspicuous than any other lay vehicle" when he attempted to stop Defendant Martinez. Defendant Martinez contended that Deputy Gilbert was therefore not in an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle as required by Section 30-22-1.1(A).

{10} After an evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Defendant Martinez's motion and dismissed the criminal information without prejudice. The district court found that the following facts were undisputed. Deputy Gilbert was on duty "driving a tan colored Ford Explorer law enforcement vehicle." The vehicle was specifically furnished for covert operations intended to evade detection. "By design, the vehicle bore no insignias, stripes, decals, labels, seals, symbols or other pictorial signs or lettering indicating its identity as a law enforcement vehicle." The vehicle was also equipped with "red and blue LED lights located within the grill area that were visible through the grill even when not activated." In addition, the vehicle had a siren with speakers located inside the grill as well as "an antenna that is not common to civilian vehicles."

{11} Under these facts the district court made the following conclusions of law. "To be marked, much less ‘appropriately marked,’ requires at minimum some type of readily observable insignia or lettering that conveys the identity or ownership of the vehicle." In addition, "[t]he red and blue lights and the siren speakers located within the grill area of the vehicle were signaling devices, not identifying marks. To the extent the State argues these signaling devices satisfy" the requirement of Section 30-22-1.1(A) "that the pursuing law enforcement vehicle be appropriately marked," the district court disagreed. Specifically, the district court stated that Section 30-22-1.1(A) requires a signal to stop by means of "emergency light, flashing light, siren or other signal" made by an officer driving "an appropriately marked law enforcement vehicle." The district court continued, "If the lights and siren themselves constituted the required marking, it would render the requirement that the vehicle be appropriately marked a mere surplusage in the statute which statutory construction does not favor." The district court ruled that in the absence of "evidence that Deputy Gilbert's vehicle was marked at all, the State cannot make a prima facie showing of all elements of the crime of aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer ... as a matter of law." The State appealed.

{12} Relying on the reasoning in Montano , 2018-NMCA-047, ¶¶ 35-47, 423 P.3d 1, the Court of Appeals summarily reversed the district court. Martinez , A-1-CA-35111, mem. op. ¶¶ 1-2. Defendant Martinez filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which this Court granted, seeking review of the Court of Appeals conclusion that Deputy Gilbert was driving an "appropriately marked law...