State v. Montgomery

• Decision Date: 21 December 2017
• Docket Number: Docket No. 45003
• Citation: 408 P.3d 38,163 Idaho 40
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Daniel MONTGOMERY, Defendant-Appellant

163 Idaho 40
408 P.3d 38

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
Daniel MONTGOMERY, Defendant-Appellant

Docket No. 45003

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 2017 Term.

Filed: December 21, 2017

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Elizabeth A. Allred argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Jessica Lorello argued.

BRODY, Justice.

163 Idaho 42

Daniel Montgomery appeals from his conviction for unlawful discharge of a firearm at an occupied vehicle. Montgomery contends the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to present the testimony of two undisclosed rebuttal witnesses in violation of the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6). Montgomery also asserts that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by arguing during closing that certain witnesses lied, resulting in a violation of Montgomery’s right to a fair trial. We affirm the judgment of conviction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 18, 2014, a white Jeep Cherokee turned onto the street where Montgomery lived, jumped a curb, and struck a trash can. The Jeep reached the end of the cul-de-sac, turned around, and headed toward Montgomery’s home. Montgomery was working on a car in his driveway with his daughter when he heard screeching tires and the impact. Montgomery entered the street as the Jeep approached, with his handgun drawn.

Montgomery pointed his gun at the driver through the windshield, forcing him to stop. The driver of the Jeep got out and he and Montgomery briefly spoke, while Montgomery kept his gun pointed at him. The driver got back in the vehicle, shut the door, and the Jeep slowly moved forward. Once the Jeep began to accelerate, it made contact with Montgomery, who moved out of the way. Montgomery fired two rounds into the engine of the Jeep as it moved passed him and another three rounds at the back of the Jeep. The driver and his passenger drove away unharmed. A neighbor’s home security camera recorded the confrontation.

The State charged Montgomery with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of unlawful discharge of a firearm into an occupied vehicle. At the preliminary hearing, one count of aggravated assault was dismissed because of insufficient evidence. Prior to trial, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6), Montgomery made a discovery request asking

408 P.3d 41

163 Idaho 43

for the names of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the prosecuting attorney as witnesses at trial. The State disclosed twenty-five potential witnesses.

At trial, Montgomery testified on his own behalf. He essentially testified that he acted in self-defense or defense of others, explaining that he had to seek medical attention from a local medical center the day after the incident and was diagnosed with multiple contusions and a displaced hip from the impact of the vehicle. To rebut Montgomery’s testimony, the State called as a witness the booking deputy who processed Montgomery the night he was arrested. Montgomery objected and requested that the district court exclude the witness’s testimony as a discovery sanction because the State did not disclose him as a potential witness as required by Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6). The district court overruled Montgomery’s objection, and the booking deputy was allowed to testify that Montgomery told him in response to standard intake questioning that he was in good health and did not have any injuries.

Montgomery also testified at trial, to the best of his knowledge, that all five bullets he fired at the vehicle were recovered. He based his knowledge on the police reports. The State called an investigating officer to rebut this testimony. Montgomery objected to this testimony on the same grounds he raised for the booking deputy. The district court overruled the objection, and the investigating officer was allowed to testify that he examined the Jeep’s flat tire and found two holes and a significant dent in the rim, along with two deformed slugs inside the tire. There is no dispute that Montgomery received a copy of the investigating officer’s report as part of discovery, but the investigating officer’s name was not on the State’s witness list provided during discovery.

The jury acquitted Montgomery of the aggravated assault charge, but found him guilty of unlawfully discharging his firearm into an occupied vehicle. Montgomery timely filed a notice of appeal. Montgomery’s appeal was initially heard by the Idaho Court of Appeals, which upheld the conviction on the ground that the district court acted consistently with the applicable legal standards. Montgomery filed a petition for review, which we granted.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6) requires the disclosure of rebuttal witnesses.

Montgomery claims the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the booking deputy and investigating officer to testify in rebuttal. He argues the district court’s decision was not in accordance with applicable legal standards since the scope of the required disclosures in Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6) does not contain any exception for rebuttal witnesses. Montgomery contends the Court’s historical justification for excluding rebuttal witnesses from disclosure is no longer valid because of statutory changes in Idaho Code section 19-1302, the statute which governs criminal informations, and that our cases excepting rebuttal witnesses from disclosure since the amendment of section 19-1302 should be overruled. We agree with Montgomery’s reading of Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6), but hold that the district court’s decision to allow the rebuttal witnesses to testify does not constitute grounds for reversing Montgomery’s judgment of conviction.

Montgomery sent the State a written discovery request asking for the names and contact information for all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the State as witnesses at trial. Montgomery’s request tracked the requirements of Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6), which states:

On written request of the defendant, the prosecuting attorney must furnish to the defendant a written list of the names and addresses of all persons having knowledge of relevant facts who may be called by the state as witnesses at the trial , together with any record of prior felony convictions of any of them, that is within the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting attorney must also furnish, on written request, the statements made by the prosecution witnesses or prospective prosecution witnesses to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting attorney’s

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163 Idaho 44

agents or to any official involved in the investigation of the case unless a protective order is issue as provided in subsection (1) of this rule.

I.C.R. 16(b)(6) (emphasis added). The State disclosed twenty-five potential witnesses, but did not include the booking deputy or investigating officer.

When the State called the booking deputy and investigating officer to testify in rebuttal, Montgomery objected based on a footnote in State v. Wilson , 158 Idaho 585, 589 n.2, 349 P.3d 439, 443 n.2 (Ct. App. 2015), which pointed out that Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(6) contained no language excepting rebuttal witnesses from the disclosure requirement and questioned the precedential value of our case law which did not address the language of the rule. The district court did exactly what it was required to do—it applied our existing case law, stating:

The prior precedent established by previous rulings of the Supreme Court and continuing beyond the amendment to Idaho Code Section 19-1302 stands for the proposition that rebuttal witnesses do not have to be disclosed, and those cases have not been overruled, which includes State versus Jones , 125 Idaho 477 [873 P.2d 122 (1994) ], and State versus Lopez , 107 Idaho 726 [692 P.2d 370 (1984) ].

Today we clarify the requirements of Rule 16(b)(6) and overrule the authority relied upon by the district court to the extent it conflicts with this decision.

Before taking up the particulars of Rule 16(b)(6), we need to address the standards of construction we use when interpreting court rules. Previously, we have explained that when interpreting court rules we apply the same standards of construction that we use when interpreting statutes. See, e.g. , Miller v. Haller , 129 Idaho 345, 350, 924 P.2d 607, 612 (1996). This statement is overly broad.

The Court clarified the standard to be used when interpreting statutes in Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. , 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011). The Court explained that the interpretation of a statute...