State v. Montoya

Decision Date21 August 2014
Docket NumberNo. 33,592.,33,592.
Citation333 P.3d 935
PartiesSTATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Vincent MONTOYA, Defendant–Petitioner.
CourtNew Mexico Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jorge A. Alvarado, Chief Public Defender, William A. O'Connell, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

Gary K. King, Attorney General, Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

{1} Once again, we are tasked with unraveling the confusing interplay between an accused's Sixth Amendment right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” and our rape shield law designed to protect a victim's privacy. U.S. Const. amend. VI, NMSA 1978, Section 30–9–16 (1993). Here, the alleged victim, the accused's girlfriend, was the sole material witness against him for the crime of kidnapping with the intent to commit a sexual offense. On cross-examination, the accused wanted to ask her particular questions about their sexual relationship to demonstrate a certain pattern of conduct and understanding between the two and thereby refute the accusation that he intended to have sex with her without her consent. The State objected to the line of questioning and the district court agreed, relying on New Mexico's rape shield law.

{2} Because we determine that the accused was denied an opportunity to fully confront his accuser and because this error could have affected the jury's verdict, we reverse and remand for a new trial. In so doing, we again examine the competing policies between our rape shield law and the immutable right of the accused to confront his or her accuser.

BACKGROUND

{3} On February 12, 2012, a jury convicted Defendant Vincent Montoya of kidnapping with the intent to inflict a sexual offense upon his girlfriend (Victim). Defendant was also convicted of two other crimes not relevant to this appeal. The factual underpinnings leading to the incident are not in dispute.

{4} On Super Bowl Sunday in 2007, Victim and Defendant were at Defendant's grandmother's home, where Defendant lived. At the time of the incident, Defendant was seventeen and Victim was fifteen. The two had been in a relationship for two years. Defendant and Victim began arguing after Defendant received a phone call from another girl.

{5} During the argument, Defendant indicated to Victim that he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her, and at some point, the two ended up in Defendant's bedroom on his bed. On the bed, Defendant got on top of Victim and tried to remove her pants, breaking the zipper while doing so. Victim did not want to engage in intercourse with Defendant and told him “no” more than once on this occasion. Victim pushed and kicked Defendant until he stopped, ending his sexual advances. Victim testified that Defendant would have been able to force himself upon her if he had wanted to.

{6} The two continued to argue. Victim kicked Defendant again, and after Defendant got off of Victim, he bit her on her upper thigh. Victim left the bedroom, despite Defendant'swish that she stay. In the living room, Defendant pushed Victim over a table, causing her to fall, hit her head, and hurt her back. Victim testified that she sustained a bruise on her leg from the bite, as well as a hurt back, a bump on her head and scratches from being pushed over the table. The event ended when Victim's parents arrived to pick her up, realized something was wrong, and called the police.

{7} Of importance to this appeal, a grand jury indicted Defendant on the charge of kidnapping with the intent to inflict a sexual offense, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 30–4–1(A)(4) (2003) (“Kidnapping is the unlawful taking, restraining, transporting or confining of a person, by force, intimidation or deception, with intent ... to inflict ... a sexual offense on the victim.” (emphasis added)). Defendant was also indicted for attempted criminal sexual penetration, contrary to NMSA 1978, Sections 30–28–1 (1963) (“Attempt to commit a felony consists of an overt act in furtherance of and with intent to commit a felony and tending but failing to effect its commission.” (emphasis added)) and 30–9–11(A), (E) (2003, amended 2009) 1 (“Criminal sexual penetration is the unlawful and intentional causing of a person to engage in sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse.... Criminal sexual penetration in the third degree consists of all criminal sexual penetration perpetrated through the use of force or coercion.”).

{8} The pivotal issue in the case centered on Defendant's intent, specifically whether Defendant, in restraining Victim, intended to commit a sexual offense against her (criminal sexual penetration) or whether he merely intended to have consensual intercourse with his girlfriend. Defendant acknowledged his desire for consensual sex but denied any intent to have intercourse with Victim against her will. Thus, when the two went into the bedroom and Defendant straddled Victim on the bed, Defendant insisted that he did not have the requisite specific intent to commit a sexual offense against her.

{9} Before trial, Defendant filed a motion under Rule 11–412 NMRA2, New Mexico's rape shield rule, to elicit evidence directly from Victim by way of cross-examination regarding their prior sexual conduct, specifically, their previous acts of engaging in intercourse after an argument as a method to resolve disputes, something he called “make-up sex.” In his motion and at the following hearing, Defendant explained his reasoning. He wanted to ask Victim whether the two of them had a long-standing sexual relationship and whether she and Defendant had engaged in sexual relations “after an argument in order to make up.” As an offer of proof, Defendant represented that Victim would testify that she believed Defendant was trying to have ‘make-up sex’ with her and that they had engaged in make-up sex in the past.”

{10} The district court held a pre-trial hearing, which functioned as an in camera hearing pursuant to Rule 11–412(C)(2). At the end of the hearing, the court denied Defendant's motion, finding that [t]he alleged victim's past sexual conduct is inflammatory and prejudicial in nature and is not outweighed by its probative value.” Significantly, the court recognized in its order that Defendant's confrontation rights are implicated by the material the defense seeks to introduce but that material may be elicited by other legally proper means than through the alleged victim.”

{11} At trial, Victim provided the critical testimony in support of the State's case. Victim had a difficult time recalling the details of the incident between her and Defendant. During cross-examination, Victim testified that she and Defendant had been in a relationship for two years, though pursuant to the district court's order, she did not expressly say it was a sexual relationship. On further cross-examination, Victim affirmatively answered defense counsel's questions, acknowledging that (1) if Defendant had wanted to he could have overpowered her by his size and strength to force her to have sexual intercourse with him, (2) she felt that Defendant was trying to get her to consent to let him have sexual intercourse with her and that she was not “terrified he was going to penetrate” her, and (3) she did not feel that Defendant would have sexual intercourse with her unless she consented.

{12} Defendant elected not to testify at trial and provided no witnesses to testify on his behalf. Ultimately, the jury acquitted Defendant of attempted criminal sexual penetration, but convicted him of kidnapping with the intent to inflict a sexual offense and two other crimes not relevant to this appeal. Charged as a youthful offender, Defendant was sentenced as an adult to a term of nearly eleven years in prison, seven of which were suspended on the condition that Defendant complete five years of supervised probation. SeeNMSA 1978, § 32A–2–20(B)(1) (2009) (giving the court the authority to impose an adult sentence on a youthful offender if the court finds the child is not amenable to treatment). On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction. State v. Montoya, 2013–NMCA–076, ¶¶ 1, 39, ––– N.M. ––––, 306 P.3d 470.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{13} We must clarify the proper standard of review for analyzing cases implicating both the rape shield rule and the Confrontation Clause. In reviewing this case below, the Court of Appeals noted that [o]ur Supreme Court has sent confusing signals regarding the standard of review for cases involving both the rape shield rule and the Confrontation Clause,” sometimes appearing to vacillate between de novo review of the constitutional issues and the more deferential abuse of discretion under the rape shield rule. Montoya, 2013–NMCA–076, ¶ 9, ––– N.M. ––––, 306 P.3d 470. That may be, but we attempt to clarify.

{14} As we will highlight in this opinion, when a defendant makes a claim that the rape shield law bars evidence implicating his or her confrontation rights, a district court must first identify a theory of relevance implicating a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation and then weigh whether evidence elicited under that theory would be more prejudicial than probative. See United States v. Powell, 226 F.3d 1181, 1198 (10th Cir.2000) (“Evidence adduced by cross-examination concerning prior sexual intercourse may be required to be admitted by Confrontation Clause rights where relevant and probative on a central issue of sexual offense charges.”).

{15} It is well settled that our appellate courts generally review evidentiary matters for an abuse of discretion. State v. Woodward, 1995–NMSC–074, ¶ 6, 121 N.M. 1, 908 P.2d 231 (“The standard of review of evidentiary issues is well established. On review we defer to the trial judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence and we will not reverse absent a clear abuse of discretion.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), reversed on other grounds...

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  • State v. Sloan
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • October 31, 2019
    ...constitutional right was violated is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. See State v. Montoya , 2014-NMSC-032, ¶ 16, 333 P.3d 935 ; see also State v. Boyse , 2013-NMSC-024, ¶ 8, 303 P.3d 830 (" ‘We review [questions] of statutory and constitutional interpretation de novo.’ " ......
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    ...of admissibility under the Confrontation Clause are questions of law, which we review de novo.” State v. Montoya , 2014–NMSC–032, ¶ 16, 333 P.3d 935 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).1. Defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to object to violation of his r......
  • State v. Maxwell
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    ...¶ 59, 121 N.M. 1, 908 P.2d 231 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated by State v. Montoya , 2014–NMSC–032, ¶ 15, 333 P.3d 935. Since the district court's evidentiary rulings were made within its sound discretion, we conclude that there is no cumulative error requiring re......
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