State v. Moore
| Decision Date | 26 June 1989 |
| Citation | 774 S.W.2d 590 |
| Parties | STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Debbie Sue MOORE, Appellee. 774 S.W.2d 590 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. & Reporter, Kathy M. Principe, and Kymberly Lynn Anne Hattaway, Asst. Attys. Gen., Nashville, for appellant.
George E. Penn, II, Banks, Penn and Routh, Knoxville, for appellee.
Appellee, Debbie Sue Moore, pled guilty to three of eighty-four counts of a presentment returned against her in Knox County, Tennessee. The presentment, returned on September 8, 1986, charged her with various counts of forgery, passing forged checks, receiving and concealing stolen property, and petit larceny. The State agreed not to prosecute the remaining counts of the presentment, and appellee was permitted to reserve a certified question of law for appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(i), Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. In the reserved question, appellee insisted that the charges should be dismissed because of violation by the State of the provisions of Article III of the Interstate Compact on Detainers, the Compact and administrative provisions related to it being codified in this State as T.C.A. Secs. 40-31-101 through 108.
The trial judge overruled the motion and sentenced appellee to concurrent terms of eight years on each of the three counts to which she had entered guilty pleas. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that there had been a violation by the State of the Interstate Compact. The Court of Criminal Appeals and appellee have relied heavily on the previous decision of this Court in Nelms v. State, 532 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn.1976). We are of the opinion that the Nelms case, supra, is not controlling. We further are of the opinion that under the circumstances of this case, no violation of the Compact has been shown.
During the World's Fair held in Knoxville, Tennessee, in the summer of 1982, appellee and others came into possession of a series of stolen payroll checks of the City of Knoxville. Appellee proceeded to forge and pass twenty-six of these instruments. She was at the time of her trial in February 1987 about thirty-two years of age. In addition to the Tennessee charges, appellee was wanted on similar charges in at least five other states.
In October 1984, appellee was incarcerated in Florida on a series of charges similar to those involved in Tennessee and other states. In January 1985, she filed a plea of nolo contendere to six of the Florida charges. She was convicted and sentenced on those six counts and was held by the Department of Corrections in Florida until June 26, 1986, when she was released from custody in Florida permanently and delivered to the custody of the State of Indiana. She had been tried and convicted in Indiana on similar charges in the latter part of 1985. It was from Indiana, not Florida that Tennessee finally obtained custody of the appellee in October 1986.
Some four years earlier, under date of October 7, 1982, a warrant for the arrest of appellee had been issued out of the General Sessions Court of Knox County, Tennessee, pursuant to an affidavit of complaint filed on that same day by a Knoxville police officer. The affidavit of complaint charged that appellee had transferred a stolen and forged document, a City of Knoxville payroll check, dated August 20, 1982, the offense having occurred at a local grocery store in Knox County. The arrest warrant was never served, and no further action was taken on the Tennessee charges until May 1985. When Tennessee officials learned that appellee was incarcerated in Florida, under date of May 17, 1985, they sent a certified copy of the outstanding arrest warrant with a cover letter to the Department of Corrections of Florida in Tallahassee, requesting that the warrant be placed as a detainer against appellee. The letter from an investigator in the Office of the Knox County District Attorney General was marked received in Florida on May 20, 1985, with a notation "Interstate Compact."
Prior to receipt of the Tennessee request for detainer, Florida corrections officials had received similar requests from four other states, the first of these being from the State of Indiana.
Florida corrections officials sent to the appellee Form I under the Interstate Compact to notify her of the pending charges in Tennessee and of her rights under the Interstate Compact.
On August 21, 1985, appellee executed Detainer Form II, requesting a final disposition of the charges against her in Tennessee. On that same date the superintendent of the correctional institution executed Detainer Form III, a certificate of inmate status, and Detainer Form IV, which was an offer to deliver temporary custody to Tennessee.
On that same date appellee and the Florida officials also executed similar forms for charges pending against her in four other states: Indiana, Pennsylvania, Kansas and Connecticut.
Under date of September 5, 1985, the Florida officials sent to the state of Indiana the detainer forms executed by appellee with respect to charges pending there. The detainer forms executed by her and by the Florida correctional officials relative to the charges pending in the other states, including Tennessee, were not sent to the officials in those states until several months after the appellee had been sent to Indiana, tried and sentenced there, and returned to Florida. She was delivered to Indiana officials for trial on November 9, 1985, and was returned to Florida on December 30, 1985, after her trial and sentence in Indiana.
It was not until May 23, 1986, that Florida officials mailed forms II, III and IV to the other four states, including Tennessee. In a cover letter it was explained that appellee's Florida sentence expired on May 26, 1986, at which time she would be delivered to the Indiana Department of Corrections to serve her sentence in that state. 1 In the cover letter it was stated that the Florida administrator of the Interstate Compact had only received these executed forms on the date of the letter, May 23, 1986. Apparently prison officials had held them since their execution on August 21, 1985.
The letter to the Tennessee officials was sent by certified, return receipt mail as required by Article III(b) of the Compact. It was received in Tennessee on June 2, 1986.
Appellee, however, left the custody of the State of Florida permanently on June 26, 1986, only twenty-four days after Tennessee had, for the first time, been apprised of the fact that appellee had requested disposition of the Tennessee charges pursuant to the Compact. No detainer had at that time been lodged by Tennessee with Indiana officials, although the State of Indiana was notified by the State of Florida of the detainers which had been lodged from Tennessee and several other states.
On September 8, 1986, as previously stated, a presentment against appellee was returned by the Knox County Grand Jury. It was duly sent to the State of Indiana, and on September 24, 1986, the Knox County District Attorney General's Office sent a letter to Indiana authorities requesting their help in expediting the return of appellee to this jurisdiction for trial. The letter requested that the prison superintendent ask appellee to sign a new Form II so that she might be returned to Tennessee by October 8, 1986, when her case was set for trial. The state also sent Form V, a request for temporary custody and Form VI, evidence of an agent's authority to act and to receive custody of appellee. Promptly, on September 29, Indiana officials informed the Tennessee authorities that appellee would not sign new detainer forms, and that she insisted that the 180 day period for disposition of the Tennessee charges had already expired.
Tennessee obtained custody of appellee from Indiana under Article IV of the Compact, which allows the receiving state to initiate proceedings and requires that trial be commenced within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving state. There is no claim that Tennessee violated the terms of Article IV if they govern the present case. The original trial date was rescheduled, counsel was appointed for appellee, and the charges were disposed of in February 1987, subject to appellee's motion to dismiss for failure of the state to comply with Article III.
The Court of Criminal Appeals was of the opinion that the 180 day period for disposition of the Tennessee charges following the request by the prisoner commenced on the day she signed Form II, August 21, 1985. The court concluded that by the time Tennessee authorities were notified of her execution of this document, the time within which the state might try her "had already expired."
We respectfully disagree with the Court of Criminal Appeals. In our opinion the time within which Tennessee was required to proceed under Article III did not commence until June 2, 1986, the date on which Tennessee received notice that appellee had requested prompt disposition of the charges. Twenty-four days of that time expired before the prisoner permanently left the custody of Florida, the sending state. Thereafter the sending state was not in position to deliver her custody to Tennessee, and, in our opinion, the efficacy of her Form II expired at that time. Tennessee promptly attempted to obtain custody of appellee from Indiana, to which state she had been delivered. Tennessee officials did comply with the provisions of Article IV and timely disposed of the charges under that Article.
There is no conflict in this disposition of the case and the decision of the Court in Nelms v. State, 532 S.W.2d 923 (Tenn.1976). In that case the prisoner, who was being held in Iowa, had been indicted in Tennessee. A copy of the indictment was furnished to Iowa authorities. They promptly notified Tennessee of the executed request by the prisoner for disposition of the Tennessee charges. From and...
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