State v. Moore

• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: AVERY, J., (after stating the facts as above.)
• Citation: State v. Moore, 104 N.C. 714, 10 S.E. 143 (N.C. 1889)
• Decision Date: 28 October 1889
• Parties: STATE v. MOORE.

10 S.E. 143

104 N.C. 714

STATE v. MOORE.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 28, 1889

This was an indictment originating before the court of a justice of the peace, and tried on appeal in the superior court of Northampton, before BOYKIN, J., for a violation of chapter 81, Laws 1887, as amended by chapter 321 of the Laws of 1889 in selling cotton contrary to the provision of said chapters. The jury impaneled in said superior court returned a special verdict as follows: "We find that the defendant John E Moore, at and in the county of Northampton, on the 25th day of September, 1889, received and purchased of James J. Martin and James Flythe, trading as Flythe & Martin, thirteen pounds of seed cotton, for which he paid said Flythe & Martin three cents per pound; that said sale was not reduced to writing and no record was made of it, as required by section 2, c 81, Laws 1887, and that thirteen pounds of cotton is less than what is required to make a bale of cotton; that if, upon this state of facts, the court is of opinion that the defendant has violated the law, then we find the defendant guilty as charged; otherwise we find him not guilty." The court thereupon directed an entry of "not guilty" to be made. From the ruling of the court the solicitor on behalf of the state appeals.

Section 1, c. 81, Laws 1887, declares that it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, deliver, or receive for a price, etc., any cotton in the seed, when the quantity is less than what is usually baled, except as hereinafter provided. Section 2 requires that every such sale of seed cotton shall be in writing, signed by all the parties thereto, and witnessed by two witnesses, in a form laid down in said section; and, further, said receipt shall be delivered, with a fee of 25 cents, to the nearest justice of the peace, whose duty it shall be to docket the same on his civil docket for the inspection of all persons. Section 3 of the same act provides that any person, buying or receiving seed cotton contrary to the provisions of this act, etc., shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $50, or imprisonment not exceeding 30 days, etc., provided that this act shall only apply to the counties of Anson and Richmond. Chapter 321, Laws 1889, provided that section 3, c. 81, Laws 1887, shall be amended by inserting the word "Northampton" after words "counties of Anson" and before the words "and Richmond." The attorney general for the state contends that under the police power the general assembly had the right to make it a criminal offense to sell cotton in one of the three counties named without complying with the regulations mentioned in the act. The defendant insists that the legislature had not the power to pass the acts under which the indictment is drawn, because --First, it is in violation of sections 7 and 31 of article 1 of the constitution, which are as follows: "Sec. 7. (1) No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or privileges from the community, but in consideration of public services." "Sec. 31. Perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the genius of a free state, and ought not to be allowed." Second. If the law is not in violation of the constitution of the state, it is in conflict with, and is prohibited by, the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

Laws 1887, c. 81, as amended by Laws 1889, c. 321, requiring that any person who shall buy or sell cotton in the seed in quantity less than that usually baled shall reduce such sale to writing, and deliver the same to the nearest justice of the peace, to docket the same for the inspection of all persons, is not unconstitutional, as depriving persons of liberty or property without due process of law.

The Attorney General and W. H. Day, for the State.

R. B. Peebles, for appellee.

AVERY J., (after stating the facts as above.)

The police power of the state is the authority vested in the legislature by the constitution to enact all such wholesome and reasonable laws not in conflict with the fundamental law, the constitution of the state and of the United States, together with laws made in pursuance of it, as they may deem conducive to the public good. Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84. The question being whether the law-making branch of the state government has exceeded the limit of its powers, as defined in that instrument, it is the duty of the courts to resolve every doubt in favor of the validity of the law, and to presume that it was passed in good faith to remedy, by regulating the manner of selling cotton, some evil not reached or corrected by legislative provision. Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. St. 265, 7 A. 913. We see nothing in the terms of the act that confers on any individual or class of persons peculiar privileges or immunities, or that imposes restrictions on any person or class of persons, in the disposition of their property or in making purchases from others. Every citizen of North Carolina, who may buy or sell cotton in the counties of Anson, Northampton, or Richmond, is equally amenable to the penalties mentioned in the act, and liable to indictment if he fail to see that a written assignment or bill of sale, in the prescribed form, is executed, witnessed, and delivered to the nearest justice of the peace. The statute, then, comes within the definition of a public local law. Such laws, if they operate uniformly, and subject all persons who come within the defined locality and violate their provisions to indictment in the same way, and to the same punishment, are not repugnant to the constitution of North Carolina. State v. Muse, 4 Dev. & B. 319; State v. Chambers, 93 N.C. 600. But the objection that the prohibition is restricted to particular counties is met by a decision of our court that is more directly in point. In State v. Joyner, 81 N.C. 534, this court held a statute constitutional that made it indictable for any person except a manufacturer to sell intoxicating liquors in the county of Northampton, and declared the manufacturer guilty of a misdemeanor if he sold less than a quart, because it did not discriminate in favor of or against any citizen in the state. In the case of State v. Stovall, 103 N.C. 416, 8 S.E. Rep. 900, a provision in the act incorporating an agricultural society, that it should be unlawful for any person to sell, or offer for sale, any liquor, tobacco, or other refreshments within one half mile of the grounds of said society during the week of their annual fair, except persons doing regular business within the prohibited territory, was held consistent with both sections 7, 31, art. 1, of the constitution. In the case of Intendant v. Sorrell, 1 Jones, (N. C.) 51, an ordinance requiring oats to be weighed by the public weighmaster before being offered for sale in the city of Raleigh, and imposing a penalty for its violation, was held constitutional. It was declared by the court to be a law to regulate trade as distinguished from one in restraint of it, like the grant in a city charter of the authority to prescribe rules governing the sale of articles of food in the markets. The courts can take judicial notice of the fact that, owing to the nature of cotton, as a growing crop, and the usual methods adopted in gathering and ginning, it is peculiarly exposed to theft until it is baled. It seems that section 1006 of the Code, forbidding the sale of cotton in the seed or lint cotton in quantities less than a bale, between the hours of sunset and sunrise, was intended to protect planters of cotton by withdrawing the temptation offered to dishonest men, to take from their fields, storehouses, and gin-houses a valuable product, that it is so difficult to identify and reclaim, and sell it to dealers under the cover of darkness. It is the duty of the courts to assume that the legislature enacts laws with a view to the public benefit. We must presume that the provision of the Code, referred to, was, in the opinion of the general assembly, insufficient to afford adequate protection to the producers of a great staple in the three counties mentioned in the law under which the bill of indictment is drawn, and therefore persons who disposed of small quantities of loose cotton, even in daylight, were required to execute a receipt that might prove valuable in tracing the movements of a thief. We can see how it might have been passed with a view to afford necessary protection to property, and, when it proposed upon its face to mete out the same punishment for a violation of its provisions to seller and buyer, we cannot go behind the manifest meaning of the act, according to all legal rules of construction, and hunt for a hidden intent under the guise of regulating trade to restrict the rights of any class of persons to enjoy the fruits of their own labor. Powell v. Com., 114 Pa. St. 276, 7 A. 913; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 5 S.Ct. 730. A statute declaring it unlawful within certain counties to transport or move, after sunset and before sunrise, any cotton in the seed, has been declared constitutional and valid as an exercise of the police power by the appellate court of Alabama. Davis v. State, 68 Ala. 58. ...