State v. Moore

• Citation: 969 So.2d 169
• Decision Date: 21 July 2006
• Docket Number: No. CR-04-0805.,CR-04-0805.
• Parties: STATE of Alabama v. Daniel Wade MOORE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

969 So.2d 169

STATE of Alabama v. Daniel Wade MOORE.

No. CR-04-0805.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

July 21, 2006.

Troy King, atty. gen., and Corey L. Maze, Beth Slate Poe, and Donald G. Valenska II, asst. attys. gen., for appellant.

James Timothy Kyle, Decatur; and Sherman B. Powell, Jr., Decatur, for appellee.

McMILLAN, Presiding Judge.

The State of Alabama appeals the circuit court's dismissal of the capital-murder indictment returned against Daniel Wade Moore by a Morgan County grand jury.

In November 2000, Moore was indicted for murdering Karen Croft Tipton during the course of a robbery. He was reindicted in May 2002 for five counts of capital murder for murdering Tipton during the course of committing a rape, a sexual abuse, a kidnapping, a robbery, and a burglary. Moore was convicted of four counts of capital murder. The jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The circuit court chose not to follow the jury's recommendation but instead sentenced Moore to death.

Moore moved for a new trial alleging that the State had violated the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), by failing to disclose exculpatory evidence. The circuit court granted Moore's motion and scheduled the case for retrial.

The State filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in this Court attacking the circuit court's ruling granting Moore a new trial. See Rule 21(a), Ala.R.App.P. A majority of this Court requested that the respondent answer the allegations contained in the State's mandamus petition. Judge Thompson filed a response that stated, in part:

"Because of the violations of the discovery order, the undersigned seriously considered dismissing the case with prejudice. However, the Court feels that justice would not be served to do so, that the victim is entitled to her day in court and the defendant is entitled to a fair trial. A dismissal of the case would serve no purpose other than to warn the prosecution that the courts in this State will not tolerate violations of its discovery orders. Whether or not the violations were intentional or simply the result of neglect, the Court cannot say. The bottom line is that they did in fact occur and that the only possible way to correct these violations requires that this case be tried again at the earliest possible date."

(C.R. 916-17.) We then denied the extraordinary petition. State v. Moore, 897 So.2d 1248 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) (table). A similar mandamus petition was filed in the Alabama Supreme Court. That court also denied relief. State v. Moore, (No. 1030218, November 6, 2003).

Moore then moved that the circuit court dismiss the capital-murder indictment. He alleged that he could not receive a fair retrial because of the prosecutor's many Brady violations. Fifteen months after the motion was filed the circuit court dismissed the capital-murder charges and ordered that Moore be immediately released from the Morgan County jail. The State appealed pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R.Crim.P., and moved that we stay enforcement of the circuit court's order directing Moore's immediate release from custody. We granted the State's motion pursuant to Rule 15.7(d), Ala.R.Crim.P.

The State presented the following evidence at Moore's trial: On March 12, 1999, Karen Tipton's nude body was discovered in her house in Decatur. Tipton had been beaten in the head and stabbed over 20 times in her neck and chest. Various items had been taken from the house including jewelry, a video camera, and Tipton's purse.

The investigation focused on Moore after he confessed to his uncle that he had been in the Tipton house during the murder. He claimed that he was on the second floor when one of his accomplices grabbed Tipton, cut her throat, and stabbed her.

Evidence was also presented indicating that Moore had worked for the security company that had installed Tipton's security system and that he had been in the Tipton house. The State also presented evidence indicating that on the night of Tipton's murder Moore had purchased a large quantity of cocaine with cash and a new video camcorder.

Two hairs not belonging to Tipton had been discovered near Tipton's body. Forensic tests excluded 99.8% of the population as the source of the hairs. Moore was in the .2% of the population that could not be excluded.

Moore's defense was that he did not commit the murder. His entire strategy consisted of casting doubt on the State's evidence and shifting the blame to other individuals who, he said, had the means, motive, and opportunity to kill Tipton.

I.

The State argues that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the State from retrying Moore for capital murder. It further asserts that the circuit court's order dismissing the charges is erroneous because, the State argues, the court applied the incorrect legal standard and ignored Alabama precedent.

The circuit court issued a lengthy order dismissing Moore's capital-murder indictment after finding that the prosecutor's intentional misconduct barred Moore's retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The circuit court made the following findings of fact concerning the prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence to Moore:

"During the discovery phase of this trial, counsel for the Defendant made repeated requests for copies of statements and other documents in the possession of agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Court ordered the prosecutor and the investigators to provide the Defendant's attorney with copies of all documents in their possession of whatever kind relating to the murder of Karen Croft Tipton. Repeatedly, Investigator Mike Pettey[¹] and Prosecutors, Don Valeska and William Dill, denied the very existence of any reports or documents prepared or generated by agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Court believed those representations made by the prosecution and took no further action to require the prosecution to produce the requested documents. This was done over the strenuous objections of counsel for the Defendant.

"After the Defendant was tried and convicted, Don Valeska produced to the Court a copy of a five page document that was faxed to him from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Court then learned that Mr. Valeska had actual knowledge of this document prior to his fervent denial that any such documents or reports existed. It was based on this fact that the Court granted the Defendant's Motion for New Trial.

"The Court later learned that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had, in fact, collected 245 pages of documents in an internal document, which was released to the Defendant's attorneys after the trial and conviction of the Defendant.

"During the trial of Daniel Wade Moore, the trial court sustained objections from the prosecution, which prevented counsel for the Defendant from asking Sarah Joyce Holden about conversations she had with the victim prior to her murder. After a new trial was granted, the trial court allowed counsel for the Defendant to conduct several depositions. One of the depositions taken was of Sarah Joyce Holden. Sarah Joyce Holden was a friend of the victim. In the days just prior to her murder, the victim told Ms. Holden that her burglar alarm system had been malfunctioning and that she, the victim, had disconnected said system so that she could sleep. Ms. Holden was interviewed by Investigator Mike Pettey following the murder of the victim, at which time she conveyed this information about the alarm system. Ms. Holden was also interviewed by prosecutors Don Valeska and William Dill prior to the trial of the Defendant. Ms. Holden prepared a written statement containing the aforementioned information.

"At no time prior to the trial of the Defendant was the defense provided with the information given by Sarah Joyce Holden nor was the defense provided with a copy of her written statement containing the same information. Additionally, the prosecution consistently denied the existence of this written statement.

"Pamela Brown Smith testified that she resided on Chula Vista Drive, S.W., Decatur, Alabama, prior to the death of Karen Tipton. She further testified that it was her custom and habit to leave her house around 2:40 p.m. to pick up her daughter at school and she routinely returned to her home at 3:30 p.m. This required her to pass the Tipton residence on her way to and returning from her children's school. She further testified that on March 12, 1999, the day of Karen Tipton's murder, the victim was standing at her mailbox getting her mail at or about 3:30 p.m., and that she was wearing jeans and a light colored shirt. Ms. Tipton's automobile, a white sports utility vehicle, was in the driveway at that time. Ms. Brown also stated that she saw a paving crew in the driveway next door, and they were near Chapel Hill Road completing the work they had been doing. She was also aware of the fact that the Tiptons had their driveway paved the previous day.

"Pamela Brown Smith called the Decatur Police Department to report the fact that she had seen Karen Tipton alive in her driveway at her mailbox at 3:30 p.m. on the day of her death. Ms. Smith asked to speak to the person in charge of the Tipton investigation. She recalls that the person she spoke to was male. She gave them her name, her address, and the information she had. She was told that they would get back in contact with her, but they never did.

"The defense was never provided with any information regarding Pamela Brown Smith or the statement she made to the person at Decatur Police Department regarding the time of the victim's death. All of the information provided by Pamela Brown Smith is consistent with other testimony provided by witnesses during the trial, including the type of clothing Karen Tipton was wearing prior to her murder and the progress and location of the paving crew.

"Pamela...