State v. Moore
| Decision Date | 03 February 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 616A86,616A86 |
| Citation | 364 S.E.2d 648,321 N.C. 327 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | , 72 A.L.R.4th 851 STATE of North Carolina v. Billy Kevin MOORE. |
Lacy H. Thornburg, Atty. Gen., by Norma S. Harrell, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Elizabeth G. McCrodden, Associate Atty. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.
Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, Raleigh, for defendant-appellant.
The questions presented by this appeal are whether the hearing courts erred when they denied defendant's pre-trial motions for the appointment of a psychiatrist and fingerprint expert to assist in the preparation and presentation of his defense. We hold that the hearing courts erred with regard to both motions and order a new trial on this account.
On 7 January 1986, the Gaston County grand jury returned indictments charging defendant with first degree sexual offense, first degree burglary, and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. All of the charges arose out of an assault on G.G.. 1
On 19 February 1986, defendant filed a motion to suppress a statement in which he confessed to assaulting G.G.. On 4 March 1986 defendant filed a motion requesting the appointment of experts to facilitate the preparation and presentation of his defense. Defendant requested the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist him in preparing for the hearing on his motion to suppress. Defendant also requested the appointment of a fingerprint expert to evaluate the state's claim that defendant's palm print was found at the scene of the assault.
Defendant's motion for the appointment of expert witnesses was heard initially at the 10 March 1986 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Gaston County, Judge Claude S. Sitton presiding. The hearing court denied the motion. Defendant renewed his motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist on 20 June 1986. This renewed motion was heard and denied at the 23 June 1986 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Judge Robert M. Burroughs presiding.
Defendant's motion to suppress his confession was heard and denied at the 2 June 1986 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Gaston County, Judge Robert M. Burroughs presiding.
At trial, the state's evidence tended to show that late in the evening on 12 October 1985 G.G. was surprised by an intruder when she went out on her back porch to put laundry in the washing machine. The intruder, a white male, struck G.G. on the face, and she fell to the floor semiconscious. Because of her semiconscious state, G.G. could not identify her assailant. She was aware, however, that he "had his hands in [her] vagina."
Neighbors of G.G. testified that they saw defendant walking up and down the street in front of her home at a time near the attack. Based on information from these neighbors, T.G., the victim's husband, sought and found defendant on the afternoon after the attack. He turned defendant over to the police.
Detective Fred Crawford of the Gastonia City Police questioned defendant on two occasions regarding the attack on G.G.. On the first occasion defendant denied entering G.G.'s porch and attacking her. The second time Crawford questioned defendant, defendant confessed to beating G.G. with an object, pulling off her panties, and placing his fingers in her vagina.
Gastonia City Policeman R.L. Williams testified concerning his investigation at the scene of the assault. He lifted a partial palm print from a can of dog food found on the back porch. According to Williams, the print matched a palm print of defendant.
Defendant's evidence tended to show that defendant is mentally retarded and that due to his mental retardation he could not understand the implications of his pretrial statement. Dr. Kehlil S. Tanas, a forensic psychiatrist at Dorothea Dix Hospital, testified that defendant had a second or third grade vocabulary and would be "easily suggestible" by people in positions of authority over him. Defendant's family members and friends testified to defendant's limited intellectual ability and passive nature. They also declared defendant was easily led and wanted to please others.
Ruth Moore, defendant's stepmother, and Ray Moore, defendant's stepbrother, testified that they saw defendant the evening G.G. was attacked, as well as the morning after. On both occasions defendant was wearing a white t-shirt and dark blue pants. According to these witnesses, defendant's clothing showed no bloodstains the morning after G.G. was assaulted.
Defendant contends that the court committed reversible error when it denied his renewed motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in the preparation of his defense. We agree.
Before denying defendant's renewed motion for the appointment of a psychiatrist, Judge Burroughs had conducted an extensive hearing on defendant's earlier motion to suppress his confession. At this hearing Gastonia Police Department Detective Fred Crawford recounted the two occasions on which he questioned defendant. The first was on the afternoon after the assault on G.G., 12 October 1986, when defendant admitted to being in G.G.'s neighborhood on the evening of the assault, but denied entering her home or attacking her. Detective Crawford declared that he advised defendant of his rights by reading from a standard form containing Miranda warnings and a waiver of Miranda rights. The defendant signed the form and agreed to have his photograph taken. Detective Crawford took defendant home.
Detective Crawford next questioned defendant on 15 October 1986. He went to defendant's residence and, pursuant to a warrant, arrested him for the first degree rape of G.G.. Detective Crawford took defendant to the police station and reminded him of his rights by reading from the same standard form used three days previously. The colloquy between Detective Crawford and defendant, which was read in its entirety at the suppression hearing, went as follows:
Detective Crawford: Mr. Moore, we previously went over your rights and I would like to go over them with you again. Answer yes or no if you understand. You understand that you have a right to remain silent?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Detective Crawford: Anything you say can and will be used against you in court?
Defendant: Yes.
Detective Crawford: You have a right to talk to a lawyer for advice before I ask you any questions and have him with you during questioning?
Defendant: Yes.
Detective Crawford: If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed before any questioning if you wish?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Detective Crawford: If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering any time until you talk to a lawyer.
Defendant: Yes.
Detective Crawford: Do you understand each of these rights that I have just explained to you?
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Detective Crawford: Do you each of these rights that I have just explained to you? (sic)
Defendant: Yes, sir.
Detective Crawford: Mr. Moore, you previously stated that you cannot read. I have got to read this paragraph and I am going to read it for you. (sic) If you understand that, answer yes. The paragraph states: Do you understand this paragraph?
Defendant: Yes.
Detective Crawford: Okay, with that paragraph in mind, are you still willing to talk to me and answer questions I might ask you, knowing that you have the right to have a lawyer with you?
Defendant: Yes.
Detective Crawford: Are you willing to talk with me without a lawyer present at this time knowing full well you have the right to have one at this time?
Defendant: Yes.
Detective Crawford: Is this your signature there?
Defendant: Yes.
Defendant then made a statement in which he admitted assaulting G.G. on her back porch.
On cross-examination Detective Crawford acknowledged that he never explained the meaning of any of the words in the standard forms he read to defendant. Specifically, Detective Crawford did not explain the meaning of "coercion," and "pressure." Also, Detective Crawford did not inform the defendant about how to obtain the assistance of a court appointed lawyer.
At the conclusion of the state's evidence, the court asked Detective Crawford a series of questions concerning whether defendant appeared confused or incoherent, whether he ever asked for an explanation of his rights, and whether his answers were reasonable in light of the questions Detective Crawford asked. Detective Crawford testified that defendant did not appear confused or incoherent, that he never asked for an explanation, and that his answers were reasonable.
Defendant presented evidence from Dr. Tanas, a forensic psychiatrist who had examined defendant at Dorothea Dix Hospital for the sole purpose of determining whether defendant was competent to stand trial. Dr. Tanas testified that he had tested defendant and determined that defendant had an intelligence quotient ("IQ") of fifty-one, defendant's "mental age" was eight or nine years, and defendant had the vocabulary of an average fourth or fifth grader. Dr. Tanas declared that he did not believe defendant could understand the meaning of the word "coercion." He added that "with his subaverage intelligence and functions [defendant] would be easily led and easily influenced." Tanas testified that he believed defendant capable of proceeding to trial.
Defendant testified in his own behalf. He declared that on the morning of 12 October 1986 T.G., the husband of the victim, and two other men came to the site where defendant was working. T.G. asked defendant to accompany them to the G. home. En route, T.G. told defendant about the...
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