State v. Moore., 3471.

Decision Date04 April 1944
Docket NumberNo. 3471.,3471.
Citation37 A.2d 15
PartiesSTATE v. MOORE.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Transferred from Superior Court, Grafton County; Blandin, Judge.

William S. Moore was convicted for failure to come to full stop when approaching intersection at a stop sign, and he appeals. Transferred on defendant's exceptions.

Judgment arrested.

Appeal from the Municipal Court of Lebanon. The complaint alleges that the defendant “did not come to a full stop” when approaching the intersection of Heater Road and route 120, in Lebanon, at a stop sign erected under the direction of the Highway Commissioner in accordance with sections 5, 6, and 7 of chapter 91 of the Public Laws, as amended by section 1 of chapter 117 of the Laws of 1935. Trial by jury and verdict of guilty.

According to the undisputed evidence, the regulations controlling traffic at this stop sign were posted on November 26, 1941, and a return thereof filed in compliance with the provisions of chapter 42 of the Laws of 1941. The record of the posting is as follows:

“In accordance with section 5, 6, and 7 of chapter 91 of the Public Laws, as amended by section 1 of chapter 117 of the Laws of 1937, section 1, chapter 25 of the Laws of 1937, and chapter 42 of the Laws of 1941, a stop state highway sign has been erected at the intersection of Etna Road, north side, and Heater Road, the same being a state highway in the town of Lebanon. All traffic approaching said state highway at the above-named intersection shall first come to a full stop except when otherwise directed by a police or traffic officer or by any lawful traffic regulation, sign, device or signal and shall yield the right of way to vehicles traveling on said state highway. Any person violating the provisions of such posted rules and regulations shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars and shall be liable for all damage occasioned thereby. Frederick E. Everett, Commissioner.”

The defendant introduced no evidence but, at the conclusion of the State's evidence, moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the evidence was at variance with the complaint, and because the complaint was insufficient to enable him to prepare his defense. This motion was denied and the defendant excepted. After the verdict and before the imposition of sentence, the defendant filed a written motion to arrest the judgment on the ground that the complaint was insufficient because it did not set out the offense plainly, fully, substantially, and formally (Art. 15, Bill of Rights); because it did not allege a violation of law that would support a conviction; because the evidence did not prove the charge as laid; because there was a variance between the charge and the evidence; because there was no allegation that the defendant was involved in traffic, or was any part or parcel of traffic, and because there was nothing in the complaint to indicate whether the defendant was traveling in a vehicle or was on foot.

This motion was denied and the defendant was allowed an exception. The defendant also excepted to the admission of certain evidence. Transferred by Blandin, J.

Hazen K. Sturtevant, Co. Sol., of Plymouth, for the State.

Joseph Moore, of Lebanon, for the defendant.

MARBLE, Chief Justice.

In the case of State v. Barrett, 42 N.H. 466, 470, it is stated in broad terms that an indictment which is bad on demurrer must be held insufficient on motion in arrest of judgment. Although a motion of this kind can be based only on matters of record, “the motion is not confined to the indictment alone” but “obtains if any part of the record is imperfect, repugnant, or vicious.” 3 Wharton, Crim.Pro. 10th Ed., § 1692. Thus, judgment will be arrested if the indictment does not charge an offense or if it contains allegations which make it evident that the grand jury in finding the indictment acted upon a law which had been repealed. United States v. Goodwin, C.C., 20 F. 237, 240. See Am.Law Inst., Code of Criminal Procedure, § 369.

The complaint under consideration charges the defendant with the violation of traffic regulations...

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8 cases
  • State v. Largo
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1970
    ...Sec. 524; State v. Stephenson, 69 Kan. 405, 76 P. 905 (1904); People v. Allen, 252 Mich. 553, 233 N.W. 412 (1930); State v. Moore, 93 N.H. 169, 37 A.2d 15 (1944); State v. Faulkner, 241 N.C. 609, 86 S.E.2d ...
  • Hickox v. J. B. Morin Agency, Inc., 6037
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • October 30, 1970
    ...treated it as though it were being directly challenged in a criminal trial. See State v. Piper, 73 N.H. 226, 60 A. 742; State v. Moore, 93 N.H. 169, 37 A.2d 15; State v. Harvey, 108 N.H. 139, 229 A.2d 176. However, the attack upon the validity of the complaint here was collateral and 'unles......
  • State v. Cook
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1950
    ...being placed in jeopardy by a trial thereon. State v. Sherburne, 58 N.H. 535; State v. Liptzer, 90 N.H. 395, 10 A.2d 232; State v. Moore, 93 N.H. 169, 37 A.2d 15; State v. Belmestieri, 93 N.H. 262, 40 A.2d 836. The Municipal Court of Keene had jurisdiction of the offense with which he was c......
  • State v. Duranleau
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • April 21, 1954
    ...that reason the verdict of guilty is set aside and the case remanded to the municipal court for further proceedings. See State v. Moore, 93 N.H. 169, 172, 37 A.2d 15. Case All concurred. ...
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