State v. Morales

• Decision Date: 07 April 1982
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gualberto MORALES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division

Page 502

182 N.J.Super. 502

442 A.2d 1012

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gualberto MORALES, Defendant-Appellant.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted Nov. 24, 1981.

Decided Dec. 14, 1981.

As Corrected April 7, 1982.

Stanley C. Van Ness, Public Defender, for defendant-appellant (William Welaj, designated counsel, Somerville, of counsel and on the brief).

James R. Zazzali, Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent (Carol M. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges MATTHEWS, PRESSLER and PETRELLA.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PETRELLA, J. A. D.

Following a plea agreement defendant Gualberto Morales entered retraxit pleas of guilty on March 6, 1980 to charges of murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3) ¹ and aggravated sexual assault (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(1)) on an eight-year-old boy. He now appeals the sentence and the rulings on certain pretrial motions made before the pleas and decided adversely to his contentions. As part of the plea agreement a charge of kidnapping (N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1b(1)) was dismissed, and the State reserved the right to make a recommendation as to sentence. The State also was to recommend that the sentence on the aggravated sexual assault charge be concurrent with that on the murder charge.

While the presentence investigation was being undertaken defendant made allegations to the probation officer charged with responsibility to prepare the presentence report that he did not commit the crimes and had confessed only because he was beaten by the police. Because the voluntariness of defendant's pleas was placed in issue, the trial judge held additional hearings prior to sentencing and determined that there was no merit in defendant's claim of police brutality and that his statements were voluntary. The judge refused to set aside the defendant's pleas. There is no direct request on this appeal to vacate these pleas.

Defendant was sentenced on June 9, 1980 to life imprisonment on the murder charge, with a 25-year period of parole ineligibility, and to a concurrent term of 15 years for aggravated sexual assault.

Defendant appeals, raising the following issues:

1) The trial court erred in denying defense counsel's motion to "suppress" because the various statements obtained from defendant were the direct result of an unlawful detention.

a) At the time defendant was placed in custody, the police did not possess sufficient probable cause to arrest defendant.

b) The subsequent oral and written statements made by defendant to the police and to the news media were tainted by the illegal detention, mandating their exclusion from trial as being the "fruit of the poisonous tree."

2) Since the court imposed an extended term of life imprisonment without considering the relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, defendant is entitled to a resentencing.

The essential facts are that on October 15, 1979 the police received a report that an eight-year-old boy was missing in Paterson. The child's mother suggested that the police question defendant, who was the last person seen with her son. Defendant, then age 23, was questioned that day and he told the police officer that he had not seen the boy. However, at about 8:25 p. m. the next day defendant voluntarily went to police headquarters because he heard the police were looking for him, and he informed the police he had last seen the boy on Main Street at around 6:30 p. m. the previous evening when the child was on his way home.

On October 26 a police officer was told by a reliable informant that he had overheard defendant's brother tell another individual that his brother had killed the child. On November 1 detectives investigating the disappearance decided to again speak with defendant, and with the help of defendant's brother eventually found him working in a garage. After defendant asked that they speak at a different location, he agreed to go with them to the Detective Bureau. At the bureau he repeated the story that he gave on October 16, but added that after he saw the boy walking home he went to a supermarket on Main Street where he drank beer until about 8 p. m. with two individuals named Tito and Ralphy. Although defendant did not know where these men lived, he knew the places which they frequented and told the detectives he would return the next day to help find them.

On November 2 the owner of a local tavern told the officers he had seen defendant with a small boy on October 15 in the area of Straight Street and 21st Avenue sometime after 4:30 p. m. The officers then returned to the police station where they met defendant, who agreed to accompany them in their search for Ralphy and Tito. Two detectives sat in the front seat of the police vehicle while defendant and an officer who could speak fluent Spanish, defendant's native language, sat in the back. The vehicle had four doors which were all capable of being opened from the inside. Defendant was not at this time restrained in any way. Defendant was advised in Spanish of his constitutional rights under Miranda ² and told that someone had seen him and a young boy on October 15 in the vicinity of Straight Street and 21st Avenue.

Unable to locate Ralphy and Tito, the officers returned to Main Street and asked defendant to retrace his route home on the night of October 15. The officers noted that the route defendant claimed he used was circuitous and not the shortest way to his residence. It became clear to them that he was purposely avoiding the area of Straight Street and 21st Avenue, an industrial zone which included a freight yard. This apparently confirmed the detectives' belief that defendant was a suspect in the boy's disappearance. They then drove to the area they felt defendant was avoiding.

Upon searching the area two of the detectives discovered the body of the missing child while defendant remained in the vehicle with the third officer. They then brought defendant to the site where the body was located, at which point defendant blurted out in Spanish, "I didn't mean it, it wasn't in me. There was something wrong with my mind." Defendant was trembling and crying. He was taken from the scene and again given a Miranda warning in Spanish. Defendant indicated that he understood his rights. He began to cry again, dropped to his knees and gave an oral statement in which he admitted he strangled the child after he had discussed a sexual act with the victim.

Defendant was then transported to police headquarters and given a Miranda warning in Spanish for the third time. He signed a form indicating that he understood his rights and gave the police a signed, sworn confession. Defendant was taken downstairs at headquarters to be formally booked for the crimes. There were several newspaper and television reporters present at that time. While a video camera recorded the event, a reporter from a Spanish language television station asked defendant in Spanish if he committed the crime, how he did it and why. Defendant replied that he did it with his hands and that "it was something wrong with my mind."

Defendant argues that the voluntary statements given to the police were the product of an illegal detention and that there was no probable cause for his detention. The reasoning is that Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979), therefore requires a determination of...