State v. Morato
| Decision Date | 29 November 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 21363.,21363. |
| Parties | STATE of South Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Pedro MORATO, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Mark Barnett, Attorney General, Gary Campbell, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, SD, Attorneys for plaintiff and appellee.
Donald M. McCarty of McCann and Ribstein, Brookings, SD, Attorney for defendant and appellant.
[¶ 1.] The defendant, Pedro Morato, appeals his convictions on three counts of aggravated assault, contending that the circuit court erred in admitting his incriminating statements and in not suppressing a jack handle taken from his vehicle without a search warrant. We affirm these rulings, but reverse and remand for resentencing, as only one offense was committed, not three.
[¶ 2.] At 4:00 a.m. on April 17, 1999, Officer Bradley Deaver of the Brookings Police Department was dispatched to the local emergency room. Taylor Roberts was being treated there for what appeared to be a severe beating. Roberts had cuts and abrasions on his face. His left eye was swollen shut. He had a deep wound on his forehead. According to the medical personnel, Roberts had a "blow out fracture of the left orbit with [a] buckle fracture of the left lateral sinus wall." Deaver thought Roberts' injuries had been caused by a blunt object.
[¶ 3.] Deaver attempted an interview, but Roberts could not remember much of what occurred. He told Deaver that he had been walking through Normandy Village, a Brookings trailer court, on his way to a friend's home when a white Chevy S-10 pickup pulled up alongside him. He recognized Keith Whitehead and recalled that Whitehead stepped from the vehicle and confronted him. After that, all he could remember was being on the ground, having been beaten.
[¶ 4.] Deaver returned to the police department and discussed the case with Officer Even. Even recalled that earlier he had seen Keith Whitehead speaking with an individual in a white "low-rider" pickup with Florida license plates. Another officer had run a license plate check on the white pickup. Deaver obtained the license plate number from the police dispatch log and ran another check on the vehicle: the white pickup truck was registered to Pedro Morato. Officer Even told Deaver that Keith Whitehead was living at 920 Southland Lane. Deaver had a patrol officer drive by the residence to see whether the white pickup with Florida license plates was parked there. It was.
[¶ 5.] Deaver and another officer drove to the apartment complex and looked through the truck window. They spotted a jack handle lying on the floor of the pickup. The two officers proceeded to Whitehead's apartment. A female answered the door. She told the officers that Keith was home and invited them in. As he walked into the apartment, Deaver saw a man sleeping in an easy chair. He asked the man who owned the pickup. The man, later identified as Morato, responded that it was his vehicle. Keith Whitehead came out of the bedroom, and the officers asked both men to accompany them outside. Morato was escorted to Deaver's patrol car while Whitehead was taken to another patrol car.
[¶ 6.] Once Deaver and Morato were seated in the car, Deaver started a tape recorder. In the initial moments of the recording the following exchange took place:
In addition to commenting on his intoxicated state, Morato said that he did not remember anything of an altercation the night before. Morato did not say that he wished to leave the car or that he refused to talk; instead, his comments indicated only an inability to talk at that time because he was "drunk or halfway drunk."
[¶ 7.] Deaver noticed an odor of alcoholic beverage on Morato and saw that his eyes were slightly bloodshot. Morato had no difficulty walking from the apartment to the car, however. Deaver later described Morato's speech as "slightly slurred," but explained that he did not know whether this was attributable to Morato's alcohol consumption or his unfamiliar accent. Deaver exited the vehicle for a few minutes leaving Morato alone in the car.
[¶ 8.] When Deaver returned, the following conversation took place:
At this point Morato explained that he used "the bar" to hit the victim because the victim took a swing at him: "I had to defend myself." After this admission Morato was told he was no longer free to leave. Deaver read Morato the Miranda warnings and Morato invoked his right to counsel. Deaver told Morato that he needed to remove the jack handle from the pickup and requested Morato's permission to obtain it. Morato responded that he had the keys in his pocket and indicated which key would unlock the vehicle.
[¶ 9.] Morato was charged with three counts of aggravated assault. He moved to suppress, and after a hearing the circuit court denied the motion as it pertained to the pre-arrest statements and the admission of the jack handle. However, the court did suppress a written statement executed by Morato after his arrest.1 The case was tried to the court on stipulated evidence. Morato was found guilty on all three counts of aggravated assault. He appeals, presenting six issues for review.2 These issues challenge only two rulings. Therefore, we will address Morato's arguments in light of these two decisions. First, did the court err in admitting Morato's pre-arrest statements? Second, should the court have suppressed the jack handle removed from Morato's truck without a search warrant?
617 N.W.2d at 488 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996)).
[¶ 11.] There are two constitutional safeguards against involuntary confessions. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, ___, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2330, 147 L.Ed.2d 405, 413 (2000). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits involuntary confessions, and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination requires Miranda warnings for custodial interrogations. Id., 530 U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. at 2330, 147 L.Ed.2d at 413. In addressing a Due Process voluntariness challenge, the circumstances surrounding an interrogation are factual questions meriting deferential review. Stanga, 2000 SD 129, ¶ 8, 617 N.W.2d at 488 (citations omitted). The crucial determination of voluntariness is, on the other hand, "a legal question, requiring independent judicial review." Id. (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 115-16, 106 S.Ct. 445, 452-53, 88 L.Ed.2d 405, 414-15 (1985)).
559 N.W.2d at 551 (citing State v. Kaiser, 504 N.W.2d 96, 101 (S.D.1993); State v. Dickey, 459 N.W.2d 445, 448 (S.D.1990)) (internal quotations omitted).
[¶ 13.] To discern if a defendant's will was overborne or if police tactics deprived a defendant of the ability to choose, we examine the duration of detention; the defendant's age, educational background, and prior experience with law enforcement; whether the defendant received advice on constitutional rights; and whether the interrogators used repeated or prolonged questioning, or physical deprivation of such things as food or sleep. State v. Darby, 1996 SD 127, ¶ 28, 556 N.W.2d 311, 319. The presence or absence of any one of these factors alone is not dispositive as we review voluntariness in the totality, considering all the circumstances surrounding the defendant's encounter with law enforcement. See Smith, 1998 SD 6, ¶ 8,
573 N.W.2d at 517 (citations omitted).
[¶ 14.] Deaver arrived at the apartment where Morato was staying sometime after 6:00 a.m. on April 17, 1999. The interview was given outside the apartment in...
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