State v. Morgan
| Decision Date | 29 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | A19-1902 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Quanteze Damar MORGAN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Keith M. Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.
This case involves the sentence that appellant Quanteze Damar Morgan received for a 2019 domestic assault conviction. Morgan asks us to determine whether the district court used the proper criminal history score in sentencing. Morgan's criminal history includes a 2005 petty misdemeanor for possession of marijuana and a 2007 fifth-degree controlled substance conviction. The precise issue presented on appeal is whether Morgan's 2007 conviction should be counted as a gross misdemeanor or as a felony when calculating his criminal history score. Convictions for possession of certain controlled substances are gross misdemeanors if, among other things, the defendant "has not been previously convicted of a violation of" chapter 152, the chapter covering controlled substance offenses. Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a) (2020). Morgan argues that his 2005 petty misdemeanor is not a previous conviction of a violation of chapter 152. Accordingly, he argues that his 2007 fifth-degree controlled substance conviction should be classified as a gross misdemeanor in his criminal history score, rather than a felony. The district court disagreed, concluding that Morgan's petty misdemeanor was a prior conviction under the statute and so his 2007 conviction was properly counted as a felony in his criminal history score. The court of appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that Morgan's 2005 petty misdemeanor qualifies as a prior conviction under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), we affirm.
This case arises in the context of Morgan's sentencing for felony domestic assault in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 4 (2020), an offense to which Morgan pleaded guilty in 2019. Prior to the domestic assault matter, Morgan had two relevant drug offenses. First, in 2005, the State charged Morgan with misdemeanor possession of marijuana in a motor vehicle under Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 3 (2020). Under a plea agreement, Morgan pleaded guilty to an amended charge of petty misdemeanor possession of a small amount of marijuana under Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 4(a). Second, in 2007, Morgan was convicted of fifth-degree possession of cocaine under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2(1) (2020). Morgan now disputes how the prior drug offenses are counted in determining the criminal history score for sentencing on the current domestic assault charge.
As part of the sentencing process for the domestic assault, the district court ordered a presentence investigation report, which included a sentencing worksheet. The probation officer calculated Morgan's criminal history score as 4.5 under the sentencing guidelines, which included one-half of a felony point for Morgan's 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine. Morgan challenged the calculation, arguing that the 2007 conviction should not be classified as a felony for sentencing purposes, because his guilty plea to the 2005 petty misdemeanor did not bar the 2007 conviction from being classified as a gross misdemeanor.1 Morgan relied on section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), as amended by the 2016 Drug Sentencing Reform Act, which classifies a fifth-degree drug offense as a gross misdemeanor rather than a felony if, among other things, the offender "has not been previously convicted of a violation of this chapter or a similar offense in another jurisdiction." He argued that the statute uses the terms "conviction," "violation," and "offense" interchangeably, and he contended that petty misdemeanors are not offenses. Because a petty misdemeanor is not an "offense," Morgan argued, it cannot be a "conviction."
The district court denied Morgan's motion to reduce his criminal history score, concluding that his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine was properly classified as a felony. The court reasoned that section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), does not limit previous convictions to crimes; it includes any violation of chapter 152, and a petty misdemeanor for possessing a small amount of marijuana is a violation of chapter 152. The court sentenced Morgan to 24 months in prison based on a criminal history score of 4, which was "middle of the box."2
Morgan appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. State v. Morgan , 953 N.W.2d 729, 735 (Minn. App. 2020). The court concluded that section 152.025, subdivision 4(a), is unambiguous. Id. at 733. It rejected Morgan's dictionary-based argument that a person may only be "convicted" of a "crime." Id. The court instead looked to the statutory definition of "conviction" in Minn. Stat. § 609.02, subd. 5 (2020). Morgan , 953 N.W.2d at 733. Because Morgan pleaded guilty to a petty misdemeanor violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.027, subd. 4(a), the court held that he was " ‘previously convicted of a violation’ of chapter 152." Id. at 734. Therefore, his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine was not a first-time possession offense that qualified for classification as a gross misdemeanor under section 152.025, subdivision 4(a). Id.
We granted Morgan's petition for review on the issue of whether the phrase "convicted of a violation of this chapter" in Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), includes a petty misdemeanor.
Morgan argues that, for purposes of determining his criminal history for sentencing, his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine should be classified as a gross misdemeanor, not a felony, under Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a), because his 2005 petty misdemeanor did not qualify as a previous conviction of a violation of chapter 152. The State argues, as a threshold matter, that Morgan's appeal must be dismissed as moot because even if Morgan prevails, his criminal history score will stay the same. On the merits, the State argues that the phrase "previously convicted of a violation of this chapter" unambiguously includes a petty misdemeanor. Before addressing the statutory interpretation issue, we must first resolve the justiciability issue.
The State argues that this matter is moot because even if Morgan prevails, his criminal history score for sentencing purposes will not change. The district court concluded that Morgan's criminal history score was 4.5, which the court rounded down to 4 for sentencing purposes. See Minn. Sent. Guideline 2.B.1.i ("If the sum of the [felony point total] results in a partial point, the point value must be rounded down to the nearest whole number."). If Morgan prevails in this appeal, his criminal history score will be reduced from 4.5 to 4. Accordingly, the applicable presumptive sentencing range will not change even if Morgan prevails, and so, the State argues, this appeal is moot.3
An appeal is moot if "a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible." State ex rel. Young v. Schnell , 956 N.W.2d 652, 662 (Minn. 2021). But "[t]he standard for finding that the issues involved in a criminal appeal are moot is very stringent." State ex rel. Djonne v. Schoen , 299 Minn. 131, 217 N.W.2d 508, 510 (1974).
That "stringent" standard is not met here. Id. If, after deciding the merits, we were to remand Morgan's case to the district court for resentencing, the district court could consider Morgan's criminal history—including the number of prior felony-level offenses—and impose a sentence that is less than Morgan's initial middle-of-the-box sentence. Therefore, Morgan could—in theory—obtain some relief. See Young , 956 N.W.2d at 662. The possibility of a shorter sentence in the present case is sufficient for us to conclude that Morgan's appeal is not moot. See Djonne , 217 N.W.2d at 510. Accordingly, we will decide the merits of Morgan's appeal.
Morgan argues that his 2007 conviction of fifth-degree possession of cocaine should be classified as a gross misdemeanor when calculating his criminal history score. Fifth-degree possession of a controlled substance is a felony, but if the defendant "has not been previously convicted of a violation of this chapter [chapter 152] or a similar offense in another jurisdiction," and other requirements are met, the fifth-degree offense is a gross misdemeanor.4
Minn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 4(a). The parties disagree about whether Morgan, because of his 2005 petty misdemeanor, has been "previously convicted of a violation" of chapter 152. This statutory interpretation issue is one of first impression, and one that we review de novo. State v. Serbus , 957 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2021).
When interpreting a statute, we seek to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020) ; Serbus , 957 N.W.2d at 87. We first determine whether the statutory language is ambiguous, that is, whether the statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Serbus , 957 N.W.2d at 88. If a word is defined in a statute, that definition controls. State v. Sanschagrin , 952 N.W.2d 620, 625 (Minn. 2020). But if no statutory definition resolves the question, we will look to ordinary meaning or technical and special usage of words to determine if the statutory language is ambiguous. See Minn. Stat. § 645.08(1) (2020) (). If the statute is not ambiguous, the inquiry stops there, and we apply the plain meaning of the statute. Serbus , 957 N.W.2d at...
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