State v. Morgan

Citation153 Ohio St.3d 196,103 N.E.3d 784,2017 Ohio 7565
Decision Date13 September 2017
Docket NumberNo. 2015-0924,2015-0924
Parties The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MORGAN, Appellant.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. Gilbert, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Charlyn Bohland, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

Kennedy, J.

I. Introduction

{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal, we consider whether the Tenth District Court of Appeals correctly held that a juvenile court's failure, during an amenability hearing, to appoint a guardian ad litem ("GAL") pursuant to R.C. 2151.281(A)(1) and Juv.R. 4(B)(1) to protect the interests of a juvenile whose parents are deceased was not plain error.

{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we hold that when a juvenile whose parents are deceased appears at an amenability hearing, the juvenile is not required to ask for the appointment of a GAL; a GAL must be appointed as mandated by R.C. 2151.281(A)(1) and Juv.R. 4(B)(1). We further hold that the juvenile court's failure to appoint a GAL in a delinquency proceeding is subject to criminal plain-error review. However, because the evidence presented failed to prove that the error affected the outcome of the proceeding, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals, albeit on different grounds.

II. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} Appellant, Raymond Morgan, was 16 years old when he went on a two-day crime spree during which three victims were shot. The state filed three separate delinquency complaints against Morgan in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations and Juvenile Branch. The first complaint alleged that on February 8, 2012, Morgan and an accomplice committed felonious assaults against two separate victims, shooting one in the back and the second in the leg. The second complaint alleged that on February 9, 2012, Morgan committed aggravated robbery, robbery, felonious assault, and kidnapping. During this incident, Morgan was joined by two accomplices, one of whom was Morgan's brother. The victim was shot in the leg by one of the accomplices.

The third complaint alleged that Morgan had received stolen property on February 8, 2012. The state moved to transfer all three cases to the general division of the court of common pleas for criminal prosecution.

{¶ 4} Morgan's father was deceased, but Morgan's mother was present at a preliminary hearing on March 5, 2012, when the state asked that a gun specification under R.C. 2941.145 be added to each count. On June 14, 2012, Morgan's mother attended a probable-cause hearing, at which the state requested a continuance. At that hearing, Morgan's attorney informed the court that Morgan wanted him removed as his attorney. Morgan's attorney stated that Morgan was frustrated with the "pace of the case and being in the Detention Center." Morgan stated that he wanted his attorney discharged because the attorney was not trying to help him get home. The judge responded, "Because he's not gonna let you go home?" Morgan stated: "He's not trying to help me go home. It's—it's everybody story against mines [sic]." The judge then asked Morgan if he had anything to add. Morgan gave a nonverbal response. The judge then explained that Morgan's counsel was "one of the pretty good lawyers" and in the years that the attorney had appeared before the judge he had never acted less than zealously for his clients. The judge further explained that although there is a lot of process in this case, it inured to Morgan's benefit. The judge noted that he thought that Morgan was receiving adequate representation. Finally, the judge stated that appointing new counsel would require that counsel to get up to speed, which was contrary to Morgan's complaint that the process was too slow. The judge refused to dismiss Morgan's attorney and then continued the hearing as requested by the state.

{¶ 5} On August 9, 2012, Morgan's mother was again in attendance at the rescheduled probable-cause hearing. Morgan stipulated that there was probable cause that he had committed all the charged offenses. The judge ordered a social and mental-health examination of Morgan and scheduled an amenability hearing.

{¶ 6} On August 24, 2012, Barbra A. Bergman, Ph.D., conducted an evaluation of Morgan. Dr. Bergman interviewed Morgan's mother, who provided background information for the report. After that interview, Morgan's mother died.

{¶ 7} On October 24, 2012, the court held the amenability hearing. The state argued that based on the factors in R.C. 2152.12(D), Morgan should be bound over to the adult court because (1) three victims suffered physical harm and the fourth victim suffered economic harm, (2) Morgan committed the acts as part of a gang or organized criminal activity, that is, the offenses were committed in the same general area with the same codefendants, (3) a firearm was used to facilitate these crimes and Morgan was at the least complicit in its use, (4) Morgan had prior offenses, one of which had been held open by the court, and (5) Morgan had a history of bad behavior in school. Moreover, the state argued that Morgan was emotionally, physically, and psychologically mature enough for transfer to adult court.

{¶ 8} Morgan's attorney opposed the bindover, citing the court-ordered psychological report of Dr. Bergman. Counsel argued that (1) Dr. Bergman's report indicated that Morgan had a high degree of amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile-justice system, (2) no resources available in the juvenile-justice system had previously been used to rehabilitate Morgan because he had not had significant contact with that system, and (3) Morgan's propensity for future violence was low. Moreover, Morgan exhibited remorse for the criminal acts in which he had participated, and he had behaved himself while being held in detention.

{¶ 9} Morgan's counsel also informed the court of the recent death of Morgan's mother, but neither Morgan nor his counsel requested the appointment of a GAL. Counsel indicated to the court, however, that a godchild of Morgan's mother, who described herself as Morgan's godsister, was in the courtroom. Counsel stated that the woman had "taken over the role of mom since [the mother's] recent death."

{¶ 10} The judge stated that he had reviewed the amenability packet, which included a presentence-investigation report and the results of the social and mental-health examination. He also stated that he had weighed the factors for and against transfer, pursuant to R.C. 2152.12(D) and (E). The judge concluded that of the nine possible factors in favor of bindover listed in R.C. 2152.12(D), four existed in Morgan's case: three of the victims suffered significant physical harm, Morgan committed the offenses charged as part of an organized criminal activity, he had a firearm and used it in the commission of the offenses, and he was mature enough to be bound over. The judge also found that none of the eight factors listed in R.C. 2152.12(E) weighing against transfer existed.

{¶ 11} Having significantly discounted Dr. Bergman's "conclusions and recommendation," the judge held that Morgan was not amenable to care and rehabilitation in the juvenile system and that for the "safety of the community," Morgan was to be transferred to adult court.

{¶ 12} In common pleas court, the state charged Morgan with 13 criminal counts, including one count of burglary, three counts of theft, three counts of felonious assault, one count of attempted aggravated burglary, one count of attempted aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated robbery, two counts of robbery, and one count of tampering with evidence. Each count included a firearm specification. Morgan pleaded guilty to one count of burglary, two counts of felonious assault, and one count of aggravated robbery, each including the firearm specification. The court imposed an 18–year aggregate prison sentence.

{¶ 13} On appeal to the Tenth District, Morgan raised the following assignment of error, among others: "The juvenile court committed plain error when it failed to appoint a guardian ad litem for Raymond Morgan's amenability hearing, in violation of Juv.R. 4(B)(1) and R.C. 2151.281(A)(1)." (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 14} The court of appeals held that the juvenile court erred in failing to appoint a GAL, but after concluding that the failure was not a rare, exceptional case in which it was not necessary to show prejudice, it held that Morgan was unable to demonstrate prejudice and thereby overruled Morgan's first assignment of error. 10th Dist. Franklin No. 13AP-620, 2014-Ohio-5661, 2014 WL 7274036, ¶ 29. However, because the trial court did commit a sentencing error, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in part, affirmed Morgan's convictions, and remanded for resentencing. Id . at ¶ 62.

{¶ 15} We accepted two of four propositions of law asserted by Morgan for review: (1) a juvenile does not need to request a GAL in the absence of his parents, guardian, or legal custodian at a juvenile-court hearing and (2) a juvenile does not need to show prejudice to support a reversal on appeal when the juvenile court fails to appoint a GAL when required by law.

{¶ 16} Morgan presents the court with alternative resolutions to his second proposition of law: if the court agrees with the appellate court that the plain-error standard of review applies, then the court must "presume prejudice" in the failure to appoint a GAL, but if the court finds that plain-error analysis does not apply, then a structural-error analysis must be used.

{¶ 17} The state argues that although Morgan's arguments are phrased as "alternatives," his arguments are one and the same. The state asserts that even if his arguments are alternative ones, they fail because "there is no such thing as a presumptively prejudicial error in plain error review" and the failure to appoint a GAL fails to "satisfy the strict criteria...

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