State v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 15 March 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2009–KK–2352.,2009–KK–2352.
• Citation: 59 So.3d 403
• Parties: STATE of Louisianav.Johnny MORGAN.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

59 So.3d 403

STATE of Louisiana

v.Johnny MORGAN.

No. 2009–KK–2352.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

March 15, 2011.

James D. Caldwell, Attorney General, Hillar Clement Moore, III, District Attorney, Lawrence Boyd McAlpine, Jr., Dylan Christopher Alge, Assistant District Attorneys, for Applicant.Mark David Plaisance, Baker; Smith & Chatagnier, Jason L. Chatagnier, for Respondent.KIMBALL, C.J.

[2009-2352 (La. 1] We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the court of appeal erred in granting the defendant's motion to suppress evidence after finding the defendant's unprovoked flight from an officer at 1:45 a.m. in a dimly lit, low-crime area did not justify a police officer's investigatory stop of the defendant. For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse the court of appeal and conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

At approximately 1:45 a.m. on April 14, 2008, Sergeant Greg Brown of the Baker Police Department was patrolling Groom Road in Baker, Louisiana. While traveling eastbound on Groom Road, Sergeant Brown observed the defendant, Johnny Morgan, in a dimly lit area walking toward him, traveling westbound on Groom Road. According to Sergeant Brown, it was cool outside, approximately 55 degrees, and the defendant was wearing a blue, hooded jacket and white cargo pants. Sergeant Brown testified that upon seeing the marked patrol unit, the defendant immediately turned and ran in the opposite direction. Sergeant Brown chased the defendant for several blocks before finally stopping him near McVea Street, which is around the [2009-2352 (La. 2] corner from Groom Road. Sergeant Brown then ordered the defendant to stand in front of his patrol unit. During the approximately one- or two-minute interview, the defendant appeared very nervous, looking down and away from the sergeant and repeatedly putting his hands in his pockets. Sergeant Brown also noted that although it was cool outside, the defendant was sweating. Because of the defendant's nervous behavior, Sergeant Brown shined his flashlight around the defendant's waist and saw a hollowed-out, blue ink pen, which was burned at one end and clipped to the defendant's right, front pants pocket. Based upon his training and experience with narcotics, Sergeant Brown immediately recognized the pen as a crack pipe, seized it, and placed the defendant under arrest. After giving the defendant a Miranda warning, Sergeant Brown conducted a search incident to the arrest and found crack cocaine in the defendant's right, rear pants pocket.

The defendant was charged by bill of information with one count of possession of illegal narcotics pursuant to La. R.S. 40:967(C) ¹ (Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Dangerous Substance: Cocaine) and one count of possession of illegal [2009-2352 (La. 3] drug paraphernalia pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1023(C).² The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the crack pipe and the crack cocaine, arguing they were seized during an illegal search and seizure because Sergeant Brown did not have reasonable suspicion that the defendant had committed a crime. Thus, the defendant claims Sergeant Brown violated his rights under the Louisiana and the United States Constitutions.

At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Sergeant Brown was the only witness who testified, establishing the aforementioned facts. On April 20, 2009, the trial judge denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress, finding the defendant's conduct was suspicious and Sergeant Brown had a right to stop him to find out what was going on. Defense counsel orally gave notice of his intent to seek writs and filed an application to the court of appeal on May 20, 2009. On September 29, 2009, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal granted the defendant's writ application, reversed the trial court's ruling, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The First Circuit, citing State v. Benjamin, 97–3065 (La.12/1/98); 722 So.2d 988, concluded that flight from a police officer alone, without something more, will not provide justification for a stop. Thereafter, the state filed a writ application with this Court, which was granted on November 12, 2010. State v. Morgan, No. 09–2352 (La.11/12/10); 49 So.3d 874.

DISCUSSION

Article I, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 as well as the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable [2009-2352 (La. 4] searches and seizures. Under these provisions, and as a general rule, a search warrant is required to conduct a constitutionally permissible search. Over time, however, the United States Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to the warrant requirement that justify warrantless searches in limited circumstances. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest. 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). To satisfy the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment, police officers conducting an investigatory stop must have a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity “may be afoot.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884).

Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7, 109 S.Ct. at 1585. In Terry, the Supreme Court held, “in determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. The Supreme Court further explained that officers are allowed to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that “might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 750–51, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citing [2009-2352 (La. 5] United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). Furthermore, a reviewing court must give due weight to factual inferences drawn by resident judges and local law enforcement officers. Id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).

Because reasonable suspicion is not readily defined, the Supreme Court has held that courts reviewing the legality of an investigatory stop must consider the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officers had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7–8, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883; Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S.Ct. at 695). When applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Supreme Court considers several factors particularly relevant, including the location and time of the stop, as well as the defendant's actions preceding the stop. Although an individual's presence in a “high-crime area,” alone, is insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, the Supreme Court has held that a location's characteristics are relevant in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). An individual's nervous, evasive behavior is also a pertinent factor in determining whether an officer had reasonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (citing United States v. Brignoni–Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2582, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6, 105 S.Ct. 308, 311, 83 L.Ed.2d 165 (1984); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8–9, 109 S.Ct. at 1586).

[2009-2352 (La. 6] In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court held that unprovoked flight by an individual in a high-crime area is sufficient to give police officers reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676. Although the Supreme Court refused to adopt a per-se rule regarding whether flight from police officers, alone, can justify an investigatory stop, it indicated that flight from a police officer plays a major role in the totality of the circumstances analysis. This is evident from the Supreme Court's declaration that:

Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.... Flight, by its very nature, is not “going about one's business”; in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing officers confronted with such flight to stop the fugitive and investigate further is quite consistent with the individual's right to go about his business or to stay put and remain silent in the face of police questioning.

Id. at 124–125, 120 S.Ct. at 676. Federal courts consistently refer to Wardlow as authority for finding reasonable suspicion based upon a defendant's unprovoked flight from a high-crime area.³ Additional factors considered by reviewing courts include the “lateness of the [2009-2352 (La. 7] hour,” ⁴ whether an area is dimly lit,⁵ and the nature of the defendant's flight.⁶

The Terry exception to the warrant requirement has been adopted by this Court and codified in Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 215.1.⁷...