State v. Morrey

• Decision Date: 19 February 1901
• Citation: 23 Utah 273,64 P. 764
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: THE STATE OF UTAH, Respondent, v. H. P. MORREY, Appellant

64 P. 764

23 Utah 273

THE STATE OF UTAH, Respondent, v. H. P. MORREY, Appellant

Supreme Court of Utah

February 19, 1901

Appeal from the Seventh District Court, San Pete County.-- Hon Jacob Johnson, Judge.

Defendant was prosecuted and convicted of the crime of rape and appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try the cause, the information having been filed by the district attorney instead of the county attorney.

REVERSED ON AUTHORITY OF STATE v. BEDDO, 22 UTAH 432.

W. K Reid, Esq., and Messrs. Rawlins, Thurman, Hurd, & Wedgewood for appellants.

Hon. M A. Breeden, Attorney-General, and W. R. White, Esq., Assistant Attorney-General, for the State.

BARTCH, J. Baskin, J., and Hart, District Judge, concur.

OPINION

BARTCH, J.

The defendant was charged with and prosecuted for the crime of rape, and convicted of the crime of adultery. Upon being sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary for eighteen months, he appealed to this court. The appellant contends that the court had no jurisdiction to try the case, and that, therefore, the conviction and judgment are void. The record shows this contention to be well founded. The information, under which the prisoner was convicted, was filed by the district attorney, under the act approved March 9, 1899, Sess. Laws 1899, c. 56, p. 77.

In State v. Beddo, 63 P. 96, the validity of that act was drawn in question, and upon careful consideration, we held, that in so far as it was amendatory and, inter alia, designed to confer power upon the several district attorneys to file informations in criminal prosecutions, the act was void, as being an attempt to amend an existing law in a manner inhibited by the Constitution; and that a conviction and sentence as a result of a prosecution, under an information so filed, were without force or effect and void.

Upon further examination herein of the same question, we see no reason, nor have we any disposition to depart from or modify the doctrine of that case, or to limit its scope and effect. Such is our conclusion, notwithstanding the statement, of counsel for the prosecution, that "many criminals of the lowest order" must be released under that decision. It would seem needless to say that if such be a fact, it can have no weight with a court in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute. Nor does such fact furnish any reason whatever for upholding an...