State v. Morris

• Decision Date: 21 June 1923
• Docket Number: No. 10.,10.
• Citation: 121 A. 290
• Parties: STATE v. MORRIS.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

121 A. 290

STATE

v. MORRIS.

No. 10.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 21, 1923.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to Court of Quarter Sessions, Camden County.

Charles E. Morris was convicted of willfully and maliciously causing to be set fire and burned a dwelling house and shop, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Argued February term, 1923, before GUMMERE, C. J., and SWAYZE and TRENCHARD, JJ.

Albert S. Woodruff, of Camden, for plaintiff in error.

Charles A. Wolverton, Prosecutor of the Pleas, and Albert E. Burling, both of Camden, for the State.

TRENCHARD, J. The plaintiff in error was indicted for statutory arson; the indictment being founded on section 123 of the Crimes Act, as amended by the Act of 1919 (P. L. p. 257), which reads as follows:

"Any person who shall willfully or maliciously burn, or cause to be burned, or aid, counsel, procure or consent to the burning of any dwelling house, whether it be his own or that of another, or any kitchen, shop, barn, stable, or other outhouse, that is a parcel thereof, or belonging or adjoining thereto, or any other building, by means whereof a dwelling house shall be burnt, whether it be his own or that of another, shall be guilty of arson," etc.

The indictment contained three counts. The first charged that the defendant, at the city of Camden, on the 23d day of July, 1922, "did willfully and maliciously set fire to and burn a certain dwelling house and shop, situate at No. 1203 Haddon avenue, in the city and county of Camden," etc. The second count charged that the defendant, at the same time and place, "did willfully and maliciously cause to be set Are and burned, a certain dwelling house and shop, situate at No. 1203 Haddon avenue, in the city and county of Camden," etc. The third count charged that the defendant, at the same time and place, "did willfully and maliciously aid, counsel, procure, and consent to the setting Are and burning a certain dwelling house and shop situate at No. 1203 Haddon avenue, in the city and county of Camden," etc.

The defendant was convicted on the second count only, and sentence was imposed thereon. He now prosecutes this writ of error and specifies causes for reversal pursuant to section 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act (2 Comp. St 1910, p. 1863).

The first reason specified for reversal is that the court refused to quash the second and third counts of the indictment on motion for that purpose preceding the plea.

Since the defendant was acquitted upon the third count, it is not perceived how he can now complain of the refusal to quash that count. But, however that may be, it is clear that the motion addressed to both counts was properly denied. The reason urged was to the effect that the counts were insufficient because indefinite. Not so. They each followed the language of the statute, and the rule is that an indictment for a statutory crime is sufficient if the offense be charged in the language of the statute. State v. Caporale, 85 N. J. Law, 495, 89 Atl. 1034; State v. Brand, 77 N. J. Law, 486, 72 Atl. 131.

Moreover a motion to quash an indictment although addressed to the discretion of the court since it precedes the plea of the defendant and the trial of the case, cannot be reviewed under section 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act because that section is confined to matters occurring at the trial. State v. Pisaniello, 88 N. J. Law, 262, 96 Atl. 89.

The next cause for reversal argued is that the defendant was refused a bill of particulars. But the course of (the trial showed that the granting of a bill of particulars would not have aided the defense made to the charge, and hence the denial of the motion will not justify a reversal. State v. Hatfield, 66 N. J. Law, 443, 49 Atl. 515. Moreover the refusal of a demand for a bill of particulars on an indictment made (as here) prior to the plea of the defendant and the trial of the case, will not be reviewed under section 136 of the Criminal Procedure Act, since that section, as we have pointed out, is confined to matters occurring at the trial.

The next cause for reversal specified and argued is "because, over objection on the part of the accused, the trial court permitted the state to introduce testimony indicating incendiarism but unconnected with the accused." As a cause for reversal this is insufficient. Under section 137 of the Criminal Procedure Act, where, as here, the plaintiff in error elects to take up the entire record with his writ of error, he must specify the causes in the record relied upon for relief or reversal with sufficient precision to apprise the court and counsel for the state of the injury of which he complains. State v. Herron, 77 N. J. Law, 523, 71 Atl. 274.

But upon examination we find the...