Appeal
From Williamsburg County Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge
George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
PER
CURIAM:
Arthur
Moseley appeals his convictions and sentences for murder
attempted armed robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession
of a weapon during a violent crime. He contends the circuit
court erred in allowing him to represent himself when he
informed the court of his history of mental illness. He also
maintains his right to a speedy trial was violated when his
trial was held thirteen years after the commission of the
crime and eight years after his arrest. We affirm pursuant to
Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As
to whether the circuit court erred in allowing him to
represent himself when he informed the court of his history
of mental illness: State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27, 35
753 S.E.2d 545, 550 (2014) ("A South Carolina criminal
defendant has the constitutional right to represent himself
under both the federal and state constitutions.");
id. (holding any criminal defendant may waive his or
her right to counsel); id. ("So long as the
defendant makes his request prior to trial, the only proper
inquiry is that mandated by Faretta.[1]");
id. at 35-36, 753 S.E.2d at 550 ("Recognizing
that it may be to the defendant's detriment to be allowed
to proceed pro se, his knowing, intelligent and
voluntary decision 'must be honored out of that respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the
law.'" (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834));
id. at 36, 753 S.E.2d at 550 ("Under
Faretta, the trial judge has the responsibility to
make sure that the defendant is informed of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation, and that he makes a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to
counsel."); id. (declining "to impose a
higher competency standard upon an individual who wishes to
waive his right to an attorney and represent himself at trial
than that required for the waiver of other fundamental
constitutional rights afforded a criminal defendant, such as
the right against compulsory self-incrimination; the right to
trial by jury; and the right to confront one's
accusers"); id. ("A defendant who is
competent to stand trial is also competent to waive these
fundamental rights and plead guilty."); id.
("[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal
defendant the 'right to proceed without counsel
when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do
so.'" (emphasis added by court) (quoting
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807)).
2. As
to whether his right to a speedy trial was violated when his
trial was held thirteen years after the commission of the
crime and eight years after his arrest[2]: State v
Palmer, 415 S.C. 502, 518, 783 S.E.2d 823, 831 (Ct. App.
2016) ("A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to
a speedy trial."), cert. pending; State v.
Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 442, 735 S.E.2d 471, 482 (2012)
("A court's decision on whether to dismiss on speedy
trial grounds is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.");
id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court's decision is based upon an error of law or
upon factual findings that are without evidentiary
support." (quoting Fields v. J. Haynes Waters
Builders, Inc., 376 S.C. 545, 555, 658 S.E.2d 80, 85
(2008))); id. at 441, 735 S.E.2d at 481-82 (stating
"[a] speedy trial does not mean an immediate one; it
does not imply undue haste, for the [S]tate, too, is entitled
to a reasonable time in which to prepare its case; it simply
means a trial without unreasonable and unnecessary
delay" (alterations by court) (quoting Wheeler v.
State, 247 S.C. 393, 400, 147 S.E.2d 627, 630 (1966)));
id. at 440-41, 735 S.E.2d at 481 (noting the Supreme
Court has found the right to a speedy trial different from
other rights provided by the Constitution because
"'[d]elay is not an uncommon defense tactic' and
'deprivation of the right to a speedy trial does not per
se prejudice the accused's ability to defend
himself'" (alteration by court) (quoting Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972))); id. at
441, 735 S.E.2d at 481 ("Accordingly, '[t]he right
to a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is consistent
with delays and depends upon circumstances.'"
(alteration by court) (quoting Beavers v. Haubert,
198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905))); id. at 441, 735 S.E.2d at
482 (noting some factors courts should consider are "the
length of the delay, the reason for it, the defendant's
assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and any prejudice
he suffered"); id. ("[N]one of these
factors is 'either a necessary or sufficient condition to
the finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy
trial.'" (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at
533)); Palmer, 415 S.C. at 519, 783 S.E.2d at 832
("These four factors are related and must be considered
together with any other relevant circumstances.");
State v. Reaves, 414 S.C. 118, 129-30, 777 S.E.2d
213, 219 (2015) ("[T]he determination that a defendant
has been deprived of this right is not based on the passage
of a specific period of time, but instead is analyzed in
terms of the circumstances of each case, balancing the
conduct of the prosecution and the defense." (alteration
by court) (quoting State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527,
549, 647 S.E.2d 144, 155 (2008))), cert. denied, 136
S.Ct. 855 (2016); id. at 130, 777 S.E.2d at 219
("The length of the delay serves as a trigger mechanism
for the analysis of the other three factors. The delay begins
to be measured when a defendant is indicted, arrested, or
otherwise accused. . . . However, there is no length of delay
which is per se unconstitutional; the right to a speedy trial
may be violated where the delay is arbitrary or
unreasonable." (citations omitted)); id.
("Delays caused by the defendant should weigh against
him."); id. ("The third factor-assertion
of the right-recognizes that while a criminal defendant has
no responsibility to bring himself to trial, the extent to
which he exercises his right to a speedy trial is
significant. This consideration prevents a...