State v. Moseley, Appellate Case No. 2014-000199

• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM
• Decision Date: 24 August 2016
• Parties: The State, Respondent, v. Arthur Moseley, Appellant.
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2014-000199,Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-403

The State, Respondent,
v.
Arthur Moseley, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2014-000199
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-403

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Heard June 8, 2016
August 24, 2016

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

Appeal From Williamsburg County
Clifton Newman, Circuit Court Judge
George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge

AFFIRMED

Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III, of Columbia, and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of Sumter, for Respondent.

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PER CURIAM: Arthur Moseley appeals his convictions and sentences for murder, attempted armed robbery, criminal conspiracy, and possession of a weapon during a violent crime. He contends the circuit court erred in allowing him to represent himself when he informed the court of his history of mental illness. He also maintains his right to a speedy trial was violated when his trial was held thirteen years after the commission of the crime and eight years after his arrest. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:

1. As to whether the circuit court erred in allowing him to represent himself when he informed the court of his history of mental illness: State v. Barnes, 407 S.C. 27, 35, 753 S.E.2d 545, 550 (2014) ("A South Carolina criminal defendant has the constitutional right to represent himself under both the federal and state constitutions."); id. (holding any criminal defendant may waive his or her right to counsel); id. ("So long as the defendant makes his request prior to trial, the only proper inquiry is that mandated by Faretta.[¹]"); id. at 35-36, 753 S.E.2d at 550 ("Recognizing that it may be to the defendant's detriment to be allowed to proceed pro se, his knowing, intelligent and voluntary decision 'must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'" (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834)); id. at 36, 753 S.E.2d at 550 ("Under Faretta, the trial judge has the responsibility to make sure that the defendant is informed of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and that he makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel."); id. (declining "to impose a higher competency standard upon an individual who wishes to waive his right to an attorney and represent himself at trial than that required for the waiver of other fundamental constitutional rights afforded a criminal defendant, such as the right against compulsory self-incrimination; the right to trial by jury; and the right to confront one's accusers"); id. ("A defendant who is competent to stand trial is also competent to waive these fundamental rights and plead guilty."); id. ("[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantees every criminal defendant the 'right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.'" (emphasis added by court) (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807)).

2. As to whether his right to a speedy trial was violated when his trial was held thirteen years after the commission of the crime and eight years after his arrest²:

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State v. Palmer, 415 S.C. 502, 518, 783 S.E.2d 823, 831 (Ct. App. 2016) ("A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to a speedy trial."), cert. pending; State v. Langford, 400 S.C. 421, 442, 735 S.E.2d 471, 482 (2012) ("A court's decision on whether to dismiss on speedy trial grounds is reviewed for an abuse of discretion."); id. ("An abuse of discretion occurs...