State v. Motley
| Decision Date | 12 July 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 44528,44528 |
| Citation | 430 P.2d 264,199 Kan. 335 |
| Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Clarence E. MOTLEY, Appellant. |
| Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under the provisions of K.S.A. 60-421, when the accused in a criminal proceeding takes the witness stand in his own behalf, evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible for the sole purpose of impairing his credibility unless he has first introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility.
2. The record of trial in a criminal action, wherein the defendant was convicted of the crimes of burglary in the second degree and grand larceny, is examined, and it is held, that under the facts and circumstances it was prejudicial error for the trial court to permit the defendant to be cross-examined concerning a prior, unrelated criminal conviction for the sole purpose of impairing his credibility.
Phillip S. Frick, Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.
R. K. Hollingsworth, Deputy County Atty., argued the cause, and Robert C. Londerholm, Atty. Gen., and Keith Sanborn, County Atty., were with him on the brief, for appellee.
After being convicted by a jury of second degree burglary (K.S.A. 21-520) and grand larceny (K.S.A. 21-524), the defendant, Clarence E. Motley, has appealed from the judgment and sentence imposed by the Sedgwick county district court.
Early on the morning of May 8, 1965, the Continental Grill located at 1200 West Douglas in Wichita was burglarized and the sum of fifty dollars taken therefrom. Defendant was arrested and charged with the crimes. Subsequently, he, with his attorney, Paul Gray, waived preliminary hearing, and was bound over to district court for trial. An information was duly filed and trial was held, with John E. Pyles representing the defendant. Following the jury's verdict, defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was overruled. Evidence being introduced that the defendant had a prior felony conviction, the district court, on October 21, 1965, sentenced him to the state penitentiary under the terms of the habitual criminal statute (K.S.A. 21-107a).
Through his present court-appointed counsel defendant raises several specifications of error, his principal complaint being that contrary to the provisions of K.S.A. 60-421 the trial court permitted, over objection, cross-examination of him about his prior conviction.
The admission of such evidence came about in this manner: State's case against the defendant consisted mainly of an oral confession given shortly after his arrest and a written confession given by him two days later. The defendant took the stand in his own defense. On direct examination he not only denied committing the crimes but also denied the contents of both the oral and written statements. Defendant testified that although a statement was written by him, it was done at the direction of a detective, it was not his own words, he did not understand what he wrote, he gave the confession because the officers kept 'hounding me' and he was 'nervous and scared.'
Defendant's cross-examination began as follows:
'
'A. W. C. Koons.
'A. Judge Bryant.' (Emphasis supplied.)
It is conceded that the defendant had not introduced evidence tending to support his credibility prior to his cross-examination.
The state attempts to justify its questioning of the defendant about his prior, unrelated conviction on the basis that it was relevant to rebut his testimony that because of his ignorance and lack of knowledge concerning police procedures following a person's arrest he was tricked into giving a false confession. At oral argument the state further attempted to buttress its position by urging the testimony had bearing on the weight and credibility to the given by the jury to the confession. As authority, the state points to K.S.A. 60-455, and specifically that portion thereof permitting the admission of evidence that a person committed a separate, independent crime on a former occasion 'when relevant to prove some other material fact' as to the crime for which he is being tried.
We have said that the rule of evidence stated in K.S.A. 60-455 generally proscribing the admission of evidence of unrelated offenses is to be strictly enforced, and to justify any departure therefrom, the evidence must be relevant within the meaning of one or more of the exceptions set forth in the statute itself. (State v. Wright, 194 Kan. 271, 398 P.2d 339.) Such evidence, if relevant, may be admitted with proper limiting instructions in the state's case in chief (State v. Taylor, 198 Kan. 290, 424 P.2d 612, and cases therein cited) as well as in the cross-examination of the accused himself (State v. McCorvey, 199 Kan. --, 428 P.2d 762.)
The state's argument that the evidence was admissible under one of the exceptions of K.S.A. 60-455 is, in our opinion, patently untenable. The avowed purpose of the prosecution in posing the question was 'it shows the man's credibility,' which, of course, is not encompassed within any of the statutory exceptions. To say now as an afterthought that the purpose of showing the prior conviction went to the weight and credibility of defendant's confession rather than the credibility of the defendant himself as a witness is a pure matter of semantics. Were we to accept the state's argument, any time an accused denied his previous confession of guilt because of alleged coercion by law enforcement officers, the floodgates would be opened for cross-examination on prior criminal convictions on the hollow premise that they were relevant to show his familiarity and experience with police interrogational practices as bearing on the weight and credibility to be given his confession. Such procedure,...
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