State v. Motyka
| Decision Date | 12 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 1383-E,1383-E |
| Citation | 298 A.2d 793,111 R.I. 38 |
| Parties | STATE v. Andrew MOTYKA. x. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an indictment wherein the defendant, Andrew Motyka, is charged under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 11-41-2, with larceny, inasmuch as he did receive stolen goods, knowing them to have been stolen. After a trial to a jury in the Superior Court, the defendant was found guilty. The defendant's motion for a new trial was denied. The case is here on the defendant's bill of exceptions.
On December 26, 1967, three officers of the Rhode Island State Police conducted a lawful search of the premises located at 176-178 Railroad Street in Central Falls. Two garages on the premises were rented to defendant. During the search the police found several tires reported stolen from a Plainville, Massachusetts, service station.
At his trial, defendant testified that he had leased the garages for the past four years only to store merchandise. During that time, defendant testified, he had subleased portions to various individuals. At the time of the search, a boat and a truck were being stored on the premises. An open doorway existed between the garages, which provided free passage between the stalls. The defendant denied any knowledge of the presence of the stolen tires in the garages.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial justice instructed the jury: The defendant excepted to that portion of the charge, and only that exception is being pressed on his appeal to this court.
Section 11-41-2 of the General Laws, under which defendant is charged, provides, in partinent part: '* * * the possession of any * * * stolen property shall be evidence of guilty knowledge by the person having such possession that such property was stolen * * *.' The defendant does not challenge the validity of the presumption of guilty knowledge which we have said is created under this statute. State v. Kurowski, 100 R.I. 25, 210 A.2d 873 (1965); State v. O'Neill, 53 R.I. 497, 499, 167 A. 263, 264 (1933). Instead, he asks us to interpret the meaning of the word 'possession' as used in the statute.
Recently, in State v. Gilman, R.I., 291 A.2d 425 (1972), a case involving possession of narcotics, we held '* * * the word ...
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State v. Roddy
...inference that Gilbert and Jane had "joint constructive possession" of the LSD, the PCP, and the marijuana. In State v. Motyka, 111 R.I. 38, 40-41, 298 A.2d 793, 794 (1973), we said that "(c)onstructive possession arises where an individual has dominion or control over an object although it......
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State v. Carillo, 1820-E
...and an intentional control of an object known by defendant to be a firearm. While we agree with defendant that State v. Motyka, 111 R.I. 38, 298 A.2d 793 (1973), and State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 215, 291 A.2d 425, 430 (1972), enunciated these as the essential elements of an illegal posses......
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State v. Jenison
...it is not within his immediate physical possession. In re Caldarone, 115 R.I. 316, 326, 345 A.2d 871, 876 (1975); State v. Motyka, 111 R.I. 38, 40-41, 298 A.2d 793, 794 (1973). Proof of constructive possession of a controlled substance requires a showing that defendant knew of the presence ......
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Caldarone, In re
...favorable to the state. They contend that the evidence does not meet the standards set forth by this court in State v. Motyka, 111 R.I. 38, 40-41, 298 A.2d 793, 794 (1973); State v. Fortes, 110 R.I. 406, 408-10, 293 A.2d 506, 508-09 (1973); and State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 215, 291 A.2d 4......