State v. Mouzon

Decision Date04 February 1997
Docket NumberNo. 24623,24623
Citation485 S.E.2d 918,326 S.C. 199
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE, Petitioner, v. Rodney MOUZON, Respondent. . Heard

Assistant Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of S.C. Office of Appellate Defense, Columbia, for Respondent.

TOAL, Justice.

We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing Rodney Mouzon's convictions for conspiracy to distribute crack

cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. We affirm.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Richard Perry ("Victim") drove to the Mt. Zion area of Lexington County in order to purchase drugs. As he entered the neighborhood, three individuals approached his car and offered to sell him crack cocaine. Rodney Mouzon was standing some distance away from Victim's vehicle. There was testimony that the deal did not go through, that there was an argument between the parties, that Victim's car door slammed, and that Victim tried to leave the area. He drove at a fast pace down the road, but had to turn around when he realized it was a dead-end. Someone yelled that Victim was trying to "jack," meaning that he was trying to run away with the drugs. Everyone scattered, trying to find bottles and other objects to throw at the car. Mouzon ran behind his house to a location where he kept a gun, and he returned to the spot where he was previously standing. As Victim drove past the individuals who had approached him, two shots were fired, one of which struck Victim in his back. One witness, who was himself throwing a bottle at the car, heard a shot, looked up, and saw Mouzon "coming back down with the revolver in his hand." 1 Victim was able to drive himself to a hospital, but died the following day as a result of bleeding caused by the gunshot.

Rodney Mouzon was indicted for murder, conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. Mouzon went to trial. He was acquitted on the murder charge, but convicted on the latter two offenses. He was sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment and fined $50,000 for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, and sentenced to five years, consecutive, for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.

Mouzon appealed his convictions. The Court of Appeals reversed the conspiracy and firearm convictions. State v. Mouzon, 321 S.C. 27, 467 S.E.2d 122 (Ct.App.1995). This Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari on the following questions:

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the trial court improperly denied Mouzon his right to the last argument?

2. Did the Court of Appeals err in determining the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal based upon insufficient evidence of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine?

LAW/ANALYSIS
A. LAST ARGUMENT

The State argues the Court of Appeals erred in not finding harmless error in the ruling of the trial court that Mouzon's request for a jury view of the scene was evidence that deprived him of the last argument. We disagree.

Mouzon filed a pre-trial motion for a jury view of the neighborhood in which the crimes allegedly occurred. During the course of the trial, the jury was taken to view the neighborhood. The Court considered the jury view as an admission of evidence and, accordingly, declined to allow Mouzon to present the final closing argument. This was error.

S.C.Code Ann. § 14-7-1320 (1976) provides:

The jury in any case may, at the request of either party, be taken to view the place or premises in question or any property, matter or thing relating to the controversy between the parties when it appears to the court that such view is necessary to a just decision ....

A viewing of the scene of the crime is not regarded as evidence. Gossett v. State, 300 S.C. 473, 388 S.E.2d 804 (1990). It is not a taking of testimony. State v. Plath, 281 S.C. 1, 313 S.E.2d 619, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1265 In a criminal prosecution, where a defendant introduces no testimony, he is entitled to the final closing argument to the jury. See State v. Crowe, 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077, 93 S.Ct. 691, 34 L.Ed.2d 666 (1972). Because the jury view was not evidence, and because Mouzon presented no other testimony, he was entitled to the last closing argument.

                104 S.Ct. 3560, 82 L.Ed.2d 862 (1984).   Its purpose is simply enable the jurors to better understand the evidence that has been presented to them in the court room.  Jacks v. Townsend, 228 S.C. 26, 88 S.E.2d 776 (1955).  Thus, the trial court erred in considering the jury view as evidence
                

The State argues that this error, Mouzon's inability to argue last, was harmless Although the right to open and close the argument to the jury has been described as "a substantial right, the denial of which is reversible error," see State v. Rodgers, 269 S.C. 22, 24-25, 235 S.E.2d 808, 809 (1977), we find that such an error is still subject harmless error analysis. The United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) distinguished between two types of errors: (1) trial errors which are subject to harmless error analysis, and (2) structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by harmless error standards. The former occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury," and "may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 307-08, 111 S.Ct. at 1264, 113 L.Ed.2d at 330. Structural defects affect the "entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end." Id. at 309, 111 S.Ct. at 1265, 113 L.Ed.2d at 331. There is a strong presumption any error can be categorized as a trial error, which may be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented. State v. Jefferies, 316 S.C. 13, 446 S.E.2d 427 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1115, 115 S.Ct. 911, 130 L.Ed.2d 793 (1995). Moreover, a constitutional error does not automatically require reversal, but may be subject to harmless error analysis. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 306, 111 S.Ct. at 1263, 113 L.Ed.2d at 329.

The error here, the denial to the defendant of the right to argue last, falls in the trial error, rather than the structural defect, category. It is not the kind of error that would affect the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end. See Jefferies, 316 S.C. 13, 446 S.E.2d 427 (citing examples of structural defects such as burden-shifting in definition of reasonable doubt; total lack of counsel; biased judge; a certain improper reasonable doubt charge.) Therefore, we may apply harmless error analysis to the present error.

Application of harmless error analysis leads to the conclusion that the error here was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State argues that Mouzon's closing argument was focussed on contesting the murder charge; Mouzon devoted only two lines at the conclusion of his argument to contesting the charge of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Thus, because Mouzon was acquitted on the murder charge, and because he gave so little attention to the conspiracy charge, he was not prejudiced by the fact that the State got the last argument. Moreover, the State posits that the solicitor did not specifically respond to Mouzon's argument concerning the conspiracy charge. These arguments lack persuasiveness. Firstly, the State's argument really supports Mouzon's position that he was prejudiced. Mouzon focussed on the murder charge and was acquitted of murder; he did not focus on the conspiracy charge and was convicted. In its closing argument, the State devoted a significant amount of attention to the issues of drug dealing and conspiracy. If Mouzon had been allowed to argue last, then he could have more adequately addressed the issue of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Thus, it cannot be concluded that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of might have contributed to

the conviction. See Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 927, 113 S.Ct. 1302, 122 L.Ed.2d 691 (1993).

B. CONSPIRACY TO DISTRIBUTE CRACK COCAINE

The State argues the Court of Appeals erred when it determined that the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal based upon insufficient evidence of conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. We disagree.

Mouzon was indicted under S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B) (1996) for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. Under the statute,

A person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, delivers, purchases, or otherwise aids, abets, attempts, or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • State v. Lee-Grigg
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • April 16, 2007
    ...(2007) (Pleicones, J. concurring in a separate opinion (citing Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992))); State v. Mouzon, 326 S.C. 199, 485 S.E.2d 918 (1997); State v. Jefferies, 316 S.C. 13, 21, 446 S.E.2d 427, 431-32 (1994); Taylor v. State, 312 S.C. 179, 181, 439 S.E.2d 820......
  • Whelchel v. Bazzle
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • December 18, 2006
    ...a strategic move in representation, which may only be done by not offering defense evidence. (App. p. 597). See State v. Mouzon, 326 S.C. 199, 203, 485 S.E.2d 918, 921 (1997). Although counsel did not call an expert witness to discredit Clarissa Whelchel's testimony, he was able to get the ......
  • United States v. Furlow
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)
    • June 27, 2019
    ...identical statute). And those courts also treat conspiracy under section 44-53-375(B) as a distinct offense. See State v. Mouzon , 326 S.C. 199, 485 S.E.2d 918, 919, 922 (1997) (describing indictment and conviction for crime of "conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine"); cf. Harden v. State ......
  • State v. Beaty, Appellate Case No. 2015-000718
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
    • April 25, 2018
    ...tried, if any codefendant introduces evidence, the State is entitled to the reply argument. Id. at 300–01.6 See also State v. Mouzon , 326 S.C. 199, 485 S.E.2d 918 (1997) ; State v. Crowe , 258 S.C. 258, 188 S.E.2d 379 (1972).In State v. Garlington , 90 S.C. 138, 144–45, 72 S.E. 564, 566 (1......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT