State v. Mrozinski, 020821 MNCA, A20-0231
| Opinion Judge | SEGAL, Chief Judge |
| Party Name | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Chris A. Mrozinski, Appellant. |
| Attorney | Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesot... |
| Judge Panel | Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross, Judge. |
| Case Date | February 08, 2021 |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
St. Louis County District Court File No. 69DU-CR-17-347
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Mark S. Rubin, St. Louis County Attorney, Karl G. Sundquist, Assistant County Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Ross, Judge.
SEGAL, Chief Judge
Appellant was convicted of the crime of threats of violence for making threats against four individuals in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror or serious public inconvenience. Appellant asserts on this appeal that the district court erred in denying her pretrial challenge to the constitutionality of the threats-of-violence statute. Specifically, appellant contends that the reckless-disregard prong of the statute is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment, and violates her right to due process because it is void for vagueness and interferes with her ability to put on a complete defense. Because the reckless-disregard prong does not criminalize a "substantial amount of protected speech," uses terms that are defined or commonly understood, and did not prevent appellant from asserting any applicable defenses, we affirm.
FACTS
In January 2017, appellant Chris Mrozinski slid an envelope under the door to the Initial Intervention Unit of St. Louis County Children's Protection Services. On the outside of the envelope she had handwritten in large letters, "MISS ME YET?" The envelope contained a letter and four "toe tags," that also were in her handwriting. The letter said: JUST A LITTLE NOTE FOR ALL OF MY FRIENDS @ CPS...
DID YOU REALLY THINK YOUR LAME-A-S THREATS TO CONTINUE YOUR ILLEGAL COURTHOUSE BULLSH-T WOULD SCARE ME, YOU F-CKING C-NTS?!
MY CHILDREN WILL BE 16 SOMEDAY, AND YOU WON'T BE ABLE TO DO SH-T ABOUT IT.
CHILDHOOD IS NOT FOREVER. DEATH, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS.
SLEEP TIGHT, B-TCHES!
(PERHAPS I SHOULD SAY. . . SLEEP WITH ONE EYE OPEN?)
The toe tags were of the type used in morgues to identify bodies. Each toe tag was personalized with the names of three social workers and one assistant county attorney, all of whom had been involved in a prior child-protection proceeding that resulted in Mrozinski losing custody of her children. In the space on the tags labeled "case number," were handwritten numbers starting with "#1 of 9" up to "#4 of 9." Each toe tag also had individualized dates filled in for "date of birth," and "TBD" for the date of death, presumably meaning the date of death was "to be determined." In the box for "place of death," were various residential addresses, complete with cities and zip codes.[1] The envelope was turned over to the police for investigation.
Law enforcement interviewed the four individuals named on the toe tags. All four confirmed that they had been involved in the child-protection proceeding and stated that Mrozinski had blamed them for her children being taken from her. They all took some type of action, such as a change to their daily routine, as a safety precaution based on the materials contained in the envelope, and three of the individuals said they believed that Mrozinski was capable of carrying out the threats. In addition, the individuals reported having previously received threatening emails and messages from Mrozinski, and one reported that she had found suspicious mail near her house that contained the name of a fifth individual involved in the child-protection case and believed Mrozinksi was responsible.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged Mrozinski with four counts of threats of violence in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016), one for each of the individuals identified on the toe tags. Mrozinski moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the threats-of-violence statute (the statute) was unconstitutionally overbroad, void for vagueness, and violated her right to put on a complete defense. The district court denied the motion. Mrozinski waived her right to a jury trial and agreed to submit the case to the district court based on stipulated facts pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, in order to preserve her right to appeal the district court's pretrial ruling. The district court found Mrozinski guilty on all counts, stayed execution of a one-year jail sentence, and placed Mrozinski on unsupervised probation for one year. Mrozinski now appeals.
DECISION
Mrozinski's appeal challenges the constitutionality of the statute for overbreadth in violation of the First Amendment, and for violating her due-process rights on the grounds that the statute is void for vagueness and interfered with her right to put on a complete defense. The statute contains two prongs: one requiring that the individual act with the specific intent to terrorize another with a threat to commit a crime of violence, and the other requiring only that the individual act with "reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror." Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1; see also State v. Bjergum, 771 N.W.2d 53, 56-57 (Minn.App. 2009), review denied (Minn. Nov. 17, 2009). Mrozinksi limits her challenge to the reckless-disregard prong of the statute.
We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Hensel, 901 N.W.2d 166, 170 (Minn. 2017).
I.
The threats-of-violence statute is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
"Generally, Minnesota Statutes are presumed constitutional, but statutes allegedly restricting First Amendment rights are not so presumed." State v. Peterson, 936 N.W.2d 912, 917 (Minn.App. 2019) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2020). Statutes that regulate speech "must not be overly broad." State v. Crawley, 819 N.W.2d 94, 102 (Minn. 2012). But a statute is not substantially overbroad simply because "one can conceive of some impermissible applications." United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 303, 128 S.Ct. 1830, 1844 (2008) (quotation omitted). Additionally, statutes that are narrowly tailored to regulate unprotected categories of speech do not implicate the First Amendment and may not be invalidated as overbroad. Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 565 (Minn.App. 2006), review denied (Minn. Mar. 28, 2006).
We analyze constitutional challenges on the grounds of overbreadth utilizing a four-step framework that requires us to determine: (1) what is covered by the statute; (2) "whether the statute's 'reach is limited to unprotected categories of speech or expressive conduct'"; (3) if it extends beyond unprotected speech, whether "'a substantial amount' of protected speech is criminalized"; and (4) "whether the court is able to narrow the statute's construction or sever specific language to cure constitutional defects." Peterson, 936 N.W.2d at 917 (quoting In re Welfare of A.J.B., 929 N.W.2d 840, 847-48 (Minn. 2019)). The statute provides, in relevant part:
Whoever threatens, directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another or to cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, vehicle or facility of public transportation or otherwise to cause serious public inconvenience, or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror or inconvenience may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10, 000, or both. As used in this subdivision, "crime of violence" has the meaning given "violent crime" in section 609.1095, subdivision 1, paragraph (d).
Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1.
With regard to the first step, the statute by its terms covers actions that directly or indirectly convey a threat to commit a crime of violence for the purpose of causing terror or serious public inconvenience. The Supreme Court has observed that statutes prohibiting threats of violence generally do so to protect individuals "from the fear of violence" and "from the disruption that fear engenders." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 1548 (2003) (quotations omitted). The statute at issue here is consistent with this purpose.
Turning to the second step, Mrozinski argues that the statute criminalizes protected speech and that the district court thus erred in concluding that the statute covers only "true threats," which do not qualify as protected speech under the First Amendment. Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 565. A "true threat" is made when an individual "means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence." Black, 538 U.S. at 359, 123 S.Ct. at 1548. We need not resolve this issue, however, because even if there could be examples of unprotected speech covered by the statute, it does not criminalize a "substantial amount" of unprotected speech under the third step of the analysis.
Turning to the third step, Mrozinski contends that the reckless-disregard prong of the statute sweeps up within its ambit substantial amounts of protected speech because it does not require the defendant to have acted with the specific intent to cause terror or serious public inconvenience. Indeed, this court has previously concluded that this prong of the statute is a general-intent crime that does not require proof that the defendant acted with the specific purpose...
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