State v. Mrozinski

Citation971 N.W.2d 233
Decision Date09 March 2022
Docket NumberA20-0231
Parties STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Chris A. MROZINSKI, Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Kimberly J. Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Tyler J. Kenefick, Assistant County Attorney, Hibbing, Minnesota, for respondent.

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant State Public Defender, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant.

Cicely R. Miltich, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison.

OPINION

CHUTICH, Justice.

This case involves a facial challenge to a part of the Minnesota threats of violence statute, Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (2020), under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The State charged appellant Chris A. Mrozinski with four counts of threats of violence under section 609.713, subdivision 1. Mrozinski moved to dismiss, claiming that the part of section 609.713, subdivision 1 that applies to threats of violence made "in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror" was unconstitutionally overbroad. The district court denied her motion and found her guilty of all four counts in a stipulated-facts court trial. The court of appeals affirmed. Because we conclude that Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1, does not violate the First Amendment, we affirm.

FACTS

In January 2017, Mrozinski slid an envelope under the door of the Initial Intervention Unit of St. Louis County Children's Protection Services. She had handwritten "MISS ME YET?" on the outside of the envelope, which contained a letter and four toe tags, like ones used to identify bodies in a morgue. The letter read:

JUST A LITTLE NOTE FOR ALL MY FRIENDS @ CPS ...
DID YOU REALLY THINK YOUR LAME-ASS THREATS TO CONTINUE YOUR ILLEGAL COURTHOUSE BULLSHIT WOULD SCARE ME, YOU FUCKING CUNTS?!
MY CHILDREN WILL BE 16 SOMEDAY, AND YOU WON'T BE ABLE TO DO SHIT ABOUT IT. CHILDHOOD IS NOT FOREVER. DEATH, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS.
SLEEP TIGHT, BITCHES!
(PERHAPS I SHOULD SAY ... SLEEP WITH ONE EYE OPEN?)

Each of the four toe tags contained the handwritten name of a different person associated with Mrozinski's child protection matter that resulted in Mrozinski losing custody of her children. In the space on the tags labeled "case number" were handwritten numbers starting with "#1 of 9" going up to "#4 of 9." Each toe tag also included a handwritten address for "place of death," a date for "date of birth," "TBD" for "date of death," and insulting names in the other spaces. Some of the birthdays and addresses were accurate, but some were not. All four people named on the toe tags reported making changes to their daily routines and taking safety precautions accordingly. Three of the persons named said that they believed that Mrozinski was capable of carrying out her threats.

Mrozinski was charged with four counts of threats of violence, one for each person named in the toe tags, under Minnesota Statutes section 609.713, subdivision 1 (the Statute). She moved to dismiss, arguing that the prohibition in the Statute of threats of violence made "in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror" was, among other claims, facially invalid under the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, finding that the Statute did not facially violate the First Amendment. In a stipulated-facts court trial, the district court found Mrozinski guilty on all counts, finding that Mrozinski made true threats in "reckless disregard" of the terror they might cause. The district court stayed execution of a 1-year jail sentence and placed her on unsupervised probation for 1 year.

The court of appeals affirmed in a nonprecedential opinion. State v. Mrozinski , No. A20-0231, 2021 WL 416739 (Minn. App. Feb. 8, 2021). The court concluded that even if the Statute prohibited some protected speech, it did not sweep in a substantial amount of protected speech and was therefore not facially overbroad under the First Amendment. Id. at *5–11. We granted Mrozinski's petition for review.1

ANALYSIS

Mrozinski asserts a facial challenge to the constitutionality of part of the Minnesota threats of violence statute on First Amendment overbreadth grounds.2

We review questions of law, including the constitutionality of statutes, de novo. State v. Jorgenson , 946 N.W.2d 596, 601 (Minn. 2020). We presume that statutes are constitutional and strike them down "only if absolutely necessary." Id. In the context of First Amendment challenges, however, the "State bears the burden of showing that a content-based restriction on speech" is constitutional. State v. Melchert-Dinkel , 844 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 2014). Defendants have standing to challenge a statute as unconstitutionally overbroad even when it is not unconstitutional as applied in their case "because prior restraint of free speech poses a greater harm to society than does the possibility that some unprotected speech will go unpunished." Jorgenson , 946 N.W.2d at 601. Accordingly, Mrozinski may bring an overbreadth challenge regardless of whether her conduct could have been constitutionally punished.

The First Amendment prohibits the government from "abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const. amend. I ; see also Melchert-Dinkel , 844 N.W.2d at 18 (noting that the First Amendment "applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment"). The First Amendment establishes that the government "has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley , 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Yet certain types of speech have traditionally been excluded from protection under the First Amendment; Congress and the states can constitutionally prohibit these categories of speech. In re Welfare of A.J.B. , 929 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Minn. 2019). "Exceptions to First Amendment protections generally fall into several delineated categories," which include obscenity, defamation, fighting words, child pornography, and true threats. Id. ; United States v. Alvarez , 567 U.S. 709, 717, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 (2012).

Statutes are overbroad when they prohibit more than just unprotected speech and sweep in a substantial proportion of protected speech and expressive conduct in comparison with unprotected speech and conduct. A.J.B. , 929 N.W.2d at 847. A challenger asserting overbreadth must establish that "a substantial number of [a statute's] applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." United States v. Stevens , 559 U.S. 460, 473, 130 S.Ct. 1577, 176 L.Ed.2d 435 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).

We use a four-step process to analyze questions of overbreadth under the First Amendment. A.J.B. , 929 N.W.2d at 847–48. Because it is not possible to know whether a statute sweeps in too much protected speech without first knowing what it covers, our first step is to construe the statute. Id. Construing the statute includes noting in what ways the statute covers broad or narrow conduct and any limiting factors. See id. at 849–50 (discussing language and elements that broaden or limit the reach of the statute).

In the second step, we determine whether the statute's reach is "limited to unprotected categories of speech or expressive conduct." Id. at 847 ; State v. Hensel , 901 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Minn. 2017). When necessary, we clarify any confusion in the traditional categories of unprotected speech so that the scope of each category is clear enough to address the parties’ arguments. See A.J.B. , 929 N.W.2d at 852 (explaining the scope of the "speech integral to criminal conduct" exception). When the statute covers only unprotected speech, we typically end our analysis and uphold the statute. Id. at 847.

When our analysis shows that the statute covers more than just unprotected speech, however, we move to the third step and determine whether the statute prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech in comparison with unprotected speech. Id. ("If we conclude that the statute is not limited to unprotected speech or expressive conduct, we turn to the core overbreadth inquiry ...."). This step involves revisiting the language of the statute and identifying whether it sweeps in only a little or a substantial amount of protected speech. Id. at 853 (returning to the language of the statute and discussing its wide breadth).

We address the fourth and last step only when the statute prohibits a substantial amount of protected speech. Id. at 848. At this stage, we determine whether we can save the statute by narrowly construing or severing language to avoid the constitutional problem. Id. When we cannot do so, we strike the statute down. Id.

I.

We begin with the Statute. The Minnesota threats of violence statute makes it a crime for a person to "threaten[ ], directly or indirectly, to commit any crime of violence with purpose to terrorize another ... or in a reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror. " Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (emphasis added). Section 609.713, subdivision 1, defines "crime of violence" by adopting the definition found in another statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.1095, subd. 1(d) (2020).

Mrozinski does not challenge the part of the Statute that prohibits threats of violence made with the purpose to terrorize another. This is because, as we explain more fully below, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a threat of violence made with the intent to intimidate is a true threat that may be prohibited under the First Amendment. See Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343, 360, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 155 L.Ed.2d 535 (2003). Rather, Mrozinski challenges that part of the Statute under which she was convicted, which punishes threats of violence made in reckless disregard of the risk of causing terror.

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4 cases
  • Evenstad v. Kasparek
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • December 27, 2022
    ... ... Hennepin County Sheriff's Department, Deputy Lisa ... Kasparek, Deputy Jeffrey Marshall, the State of Minnesota, ... and the County of Hennepin as Defendants in this action ... alleging violations of “his First Amendment rights to ... unjustifiable risk that her words or conduct will cause ... extreme fear.” See State v. Mrozinski , 971 ... N.W.2d 233, 238-39 (Minn. 2022) ...          Here, ... the Court finds that given the available facts and the ... ...
  • Evenstad v. Kasparek
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • December 27, 2022
    ... ... Hennepin County Sheriff's Department, Deputy Lisa ... Kasparek, Deputy Jeffrey Marshall, the State of Minnesota, ... and the County of Hennepin as Defendants in this action ... alleging violations of “his First Amendment rights to ... unjustifiable risk that her words or conduct will cause ... extreme fear.” See State v. Mrozinski , 971 ... N.W.2d 233, 238-39 (Minn. 2022) ...          Here, ... the Court finds that given the available facts and the ... ...
  • Isensee v. State
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 2022
    ...does not establish that his threat created a reasonable apprehension that he would follow through with or act on his threat. Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d at 240. Isensee testified that only the bartender heard him say he would "kill everyone" and that he did not "think [the bartender] was afraid [......
  • Isensee v. State
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 2022
    ...does not establish that his threat created a reasonable apprehension that he would follow through with or act on his threat. Mrozinski, 971 N.W.2d at 240. Isensee testified that only the bartender heard him say he would "kill everyone" and that he did not "think [the bartender] was afraid [......

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