State v. Mrs. Antonio Donaluzzi

• Citation: 109 A. 57,94 Vt. 142
• Parties: STATE v. MRS. ANTONIO DONALUZZI
• Decision Date: 07 February 1920
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Vermont

109 A. 57

94 Vt. 142

STATE v. MRS. ANTONIO DONALUZZI

Supreme Court of Vermont

February 7, 1920

January Term, 1920.

COMPLAINT for illegally selling and furnishing intoxicating liquor. Plea, not guilty. Trial by jury in the Barre City Court, Erwin M. Harvey, Acting Judge. Verdict, guilty. Judgment on the verdict. The respondent excepted. The opinion states the case.

Judgment that there is no error in the proceedings and that the respondent take nothing by her exceptions. Let execution be done.

Richard A. Hoar for the respondent.

Earle R. Davis, State's Attorney, for the State.

Present WATSON, C. J., POWERS, TAYLOR, MILES, and SLACK, JJ.

OPINION

TAYLOR

This is a complaint charging that the respondent, at Northfield in the county of Washington, on the first day of June, 1919, "not then and there being a licensee, and not then and there having a license to sell intoxicating liquor, did sell and furnish intoxicating liquor without authority, contrary to the form of the statute," etc. The respondent was convicted on a jury trial, followed by judgment and sentence. She brings the case here on two exceptions.

The transaction on which the State relied for a conviction was had with one Benjamin L. Davis. He was called as a witness by the State and testified in his direct examination in substance that one Sunday night, on or about June 1, 1919, he called at Donaluzzi's house and procured a quart bottle of wine; that when he went into the house he saw the respondent and no one else there; that he asked her if she had anything to drink--if she had any wine; that the respondent told him to go out and split a stick of wood which he did; that when he came back there was a bottle of wine on the table; that he took the wine, left fifty cents on the table, and went out; that the respondent was not in the room on his return and he had no further talk with her on that occasion. Against the objection that it was irrelevant and immaterial, the State was then permitted to show by the witness a transaction with the respondent nearly identical in character and circumstances, occurring some three or four weeks before the time in question. The exception taken to the admission of this evidence is the first one relied upon.

This complaint, as the respondent contends, charges but one offence. It lacks the continuendo "at divers times" authorized by G. L. 6595, and so the provision as to distinct offences found in G. L. 6596 does not apply. The respondent insists that it was error to admit evidence of sales on other occasions, "especially without putting the State to an election as to what occasion it relied upon for a conviction." But the exception raises no question as to election of offences; besides, it sufficiently appears that the State relied for a conviction solely upon the transaction first testified to. While on a proper complaint a trial and conviction may be had for several distinct offences of the character here involved, the general rule that the charge upon which a respondent is being tried cannot be supported by proof of his having committed other offences applies as well to offences under the statute relating to traffic in intoxicating liquor as to other crimes or misdemeanors. Ordinarily, proof that a person has been guilty of some other crime furnishes no evidence that he is guilty of the one for which he is being tried. The proof of the other crime under such circumstances is irrelevant and so not admissible. But it does not follow that the court erred in receiving the testimony excepted to. There are certain well established exceptions to the rule not to be lost sight of. Evidence which legitimately tends to support the charge for which the respondent is being tried is not to be excluded on the ground that it tends to show another offence. State v. Kelley, 65 Vt. 531, 27 A. 203, 36 A. S. R. 884. When evidence offered by the prosecution in a criminal action tends to prove a relevant or essential fact, and is competent for that purpose, the circumstance that it also tends to prove an independent offence does not render such evidence inadmissible. Note, 62 L. R. A. 198, and cases cited. It is competent for the prosecution to put in evidence all relevant facts and circumstances which tend to establish any of the constitutive elements of the crime of which the respondent is accused in the case on trial, even though such facts and circumstances tend to prove that he has committed other crimes. 8 R. C. L. 199.

The question in one form or another has frequently been before the Court. Some of the cases, classified according to the reason assigned for holding such evidence admissible notwithstanding the general rule, are as follows: As showing intent, purpose, or motive: State v. Sargood, 80 Vt. 412, 68 A. 51, 130 A. S. R. 992; State v. Louanis, 79 Vt. 463, 65 A. 532, 9 Ann. Cas. 194; State v. Sargood, 77 Vt. 80, 58 A. 971; State v. Eastwood, 73 Vt. 205, 50 A. 1077; State v. Valwell, 66 Vt. 558, 29 A. 1018; State v. Kelley, supra. As showing a common plan, scheme, or system: State v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162, 62 A. 37; State v. Barr, 78 Vt. 97, 62 A. 43; State v. Marshall, 77 Vt. 262, 59 A. 916; State v. Smalley, 50 Vt. 736. As tending to illustrate, characterize, or explain the act in question: State v. Grace, 86 Vt. 470, 86 A. 162; State v. Krinski, supra; State v. Bean, 77 Vt. 384, 60 A. 807; State v. Marshall, supra; State v. Leonard, 72 Vt. 102, 47 A. 395; State v. Hallock, 70 Vt. 159, 40 A. 51; State v. Ward, 61 Vt. 153, 17 A. 483; State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 33; State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202, 24 A. R. 124. To show how the business under investigation was conducted and the respondent's connection therewith: State v. Hirsch, 91 Vt. 330, 100 A. 877; State v. Marshall, supra; State v. Smalley, supra.

But it is not merely a question whether the instant case falls within this or that general classification. Where evidence tending to prove another offence is offered, the same considerations arise with respect to its admissibility as upon the offer of other testimony. The controlling question is: Is the evidence relevant--does it tend to prove any fact material to the issues in the case? Note, 105 A. S. R. 980. If the evidence is admissible on other general grounds, it is no objection to its admission that it discloses other offences, even though they are indictable. People v Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 96 N.E. 1077, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1206. The special difficulty disappears if the evidence is considered strictly upon the ground of its relevancy to the issues on trial, regardless of the fact that it may incidentally show the commission of some other offence. It should be observed in this connection, however, that the evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove the commission of the act complained of--the corpus delicti. But, speaking generally, such evidence is admissible in a proper case as a means of identifying the respondent as the perpetrator of the crime; or to show motive, intent, or guilty knowledge on his part, when an issue; or as tending to illustrate, characterize, or explain the act, when capable of more than one construction. Kahn v. State, 182 Ind. 1, 105 N.E. 385. Among the cases within the exception are those where the act, standing as an isolated instance, might be claimed to be an innocent act, or the result of accident, mistake or inadvertence. Familiar illustrations are to be found in cases of passing counterfeit money, forgery, receiving stolen property, obtaining money under...