State v. Mudgett

• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: FULLERTON, J.
• Citation: State v. Mudgett, 21 Wash. 99, 57 P. 351 (Wash. 1899)
• Decision Date: 22 April 1899
• Parties: STATE ex rel. OLMSTED, Mayor, v. MUDGETT, County Treasurer.

57 P. 351

21 Wash. 99

STATE ex rel. OLMSTED, Mayor, v. MUDGETT, County Treasurer.

Supreme Court of Washington

April 22, 1899

Appeal from superior court, Spokane county; William E. Richardson Judge.

Mandamus by the state of Washington, on the relation of E. D. Olmsted individually and as mayor of the city of Spokane, against George Mudgett, as treasurer of Spokane county, state of Washington, to compel collection of special assessments. From order overruling demurrer to alternative writ, and directing peremptory writ, respondent appeals. Affirmed.

John A. Pierce, for appellant.

A. G Avery, for respondent.

FULLERTON J.

This is a proceeding in mandamus instituted by the relator in the superior court of Spokane county against George Mudgett, as county treasurer of that county, to compel him, as such treasurer, to collect a special assessment levied to pay the costs and expenses incurred in making a street improvement in the city of Spokane, and charged against certain real property therein, found to be specially benefited by the improvement. In answer to the alternative writ served upon him, the county treasurer demurred on the ground 'that neither the affidavit, application, nor writ state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.' The lower court overruled the demurrer, and, upon the treasurer refusing to plead further, ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate issue. From that order the treasurer appeals to this court.

The contention of appellant here is that the act of March 10 1897 (Laws 1897, p. 77), in so far as it authorizes the legislative body of a city of the first class to certify its assessments for street improvements to the county treasurer for collection, and directs the county treasurer to collect the same, is unconstitutional and void, for the reason that it provides no method for reimbursing the county for the cost the county will be compelled to expend in collecting such assessments. The particular provision of the state constitution pointed out by the appellant as being violated by the act in question is section 2, art 7. He argues that the effect of the act is to compel the general taxpayer of the county, whose property is not benefited by the special improvement, to bear the cost of collecting these assessments, and thus taxation is rendered unequal and ununiform, within the meaning of the section cited. We are unable to agree with the appellant in his construction of this provision of the constitution. This section was...