State v. Muir
| Decision Date | 01 August 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 17440,17440 |
| Citation | 777 P.2d 1238,116 Idaho 565 |
| Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Thane R. MUIR, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Terry S. Ratliff, Mountain Home for defendant-appellant.
Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff-respondent.
Thane Muir appeals from his judgment of conviction for the crime of possession of a controlled substance, heroin. I.C. § 37-2732. Muir entered a guilty plea to the charge after the district court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of his vehicle. We vacate the judgment.
Late in the evening of January 10, 1986, three deputy sheriffs of the Elmore County Sheriff's office observed Muir and William Pierson engaged in what the officers later described as suspicious conduct. Both individuals were seen outside of a Mountain Home motel in the vicinity of the motel's vending machine. The officers initially suspected that the two were involved in illegal drug activity and for approximately the next hour carried out intermittent surveillance. The two were observed later at a gas station and then followed in Mountain Home as they drove to a second motel, a truck stop, and ultimately a third motel. At this last motel, the officers checked with the night manager and determined that the two suspects were not currently residing at the motel. During this time one of the officers observed the two suspects near a vending machine on the premises. The officers decided to obtain identification from the two. When the officers approached, Muir and Pierson were already seated in their vehicle. Through the windows of the vehicle, the officers observed what were identified as jewelers' files lying on the vehicle's seat. The officers identified themselves and asked Muir and Pierson to exit the vehicle and provide identification. The two complied. The officers also observed, when the door of the vehicle was opened, what was suspected to be the handles of bolt cutters protruding out from under the seat. Two of the officers proceeded to question Muir and Pierson while a third officer wrote down information from their drivers' licenses.
Disputed interpretations exist for what transpired next. At some time during the questioning of Muir and Pierson, the officers indicated that both individuals would need to go to the sheriff's office for further questioning. Muir testified that at this time he said that he wanted to secure his vehicle before leaving with the officers. He asserts he then attempted to lock the vehicle but was stopped by the officers from closing the door and told to stay away from the vehicle. The officers supplied a different version. One stated that Muir and Pierson while being questioned outside the vehicle remarked that they were cold and asked to sit back in the vehicle. Another officer, the one writing down information from Muir's and Pierson's drivers licenses, instead, claimed that he looked up from his work and saw Muir suddenly inexplicably standing between the open vehicle door and the vehicle. The concern by this officer of Muir's proximity to the interior of the vehicle led him to request the other officers check the vehicle for weapons.
What followed is not disputed. A brief search of the vehicle was carried out. The officers looked around the passenger compartment and under the seats. The search confirmed the existence of the bolt cutters and yielded a small knife concealed under the driver's seat. After the search, Muir and Pierson were taken by the officers to the sheriff's office for further questioning. Neither Muir nor Pierson were allowed to reenter the vehicle after they first exited.
During the subsequent questioning Muir informed the officers of his and Pierson's involvement in the theft of proceeds from vending machines at various business locations. Muir's primary role was to supply the vehicle and act as lookout for Pierson. During questioning Muir also revealed that a small quantity of marijuana was in the vehicle. While the pair were detained, the officers questioned employees at the businesses where the vending machines were located. A number of employees confirmed change was missing from their respective vending machines. An inspection by the officers of one of the vending machines showed, by the condition of the lock, that the machine had been recently tampered with.
After gathering this information the officers obtained a search warrant for the vehicle. The affidavit for the warrant listed as items to be sought, burglarious instruments, bolt cutters, proceeds from vending machines, and a controlled substance--marijuana. The search took place at approximately 6:30 a.m. the morning of January 11. It resulted in the officers seizing the named items including a bag containing approximately $40 in change and a film canister containing marijuana.
While searching the vehicle, the officers also located a heroin "fix" kit, including hypodermic needles and other drug paraphernalia. The officers did not seize the items, rather, they chose to obtain a second search warrant specifically listing these items. The subsequent search yielded the named drug paraphernalia, as well as a small quantity of narcotics, including heroin. Muir was charged with possession of the heroin.
After the start of criminal proceedings Muir filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the search of his vehicle. At the hearing on the motion, Muir asserted that the initial search of his vehicle for weapons was illegal. He contended that the first search was a mere pretext to obtain sufficient evidence which could be used to establish probable cause for the subsequent warrant. The district court denied Muir's motion. Muir appealed. After this first appeal was dismissed, Muir entered a conditional plea of guilty, judgment of conviction was entered and Muir was sentenced. Muir then filed a second appeal, this time from the order denying his motion to suppress and from his judgment of conviction.
We turn to the question of whether the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. We begin by considering whether the officers had authority to search Muir's vehicle for weapons. A warrantless search is, according to the protection guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment, "deemed to be 'unreasonable,' per se, 'subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 726, 701 P.2d 671, 674 (Ct.App.1985) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Among these exceptions is the "stop and frisk" allowed under the rule of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Terry held that brief detention by an officer of a suspect, with a frisk of the individual for the purpose of the officer's safety, was permissible if "(a) the officer has a reasonable, articulate suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity, and (b) the officer reasonably believes the person may be armed and dangerous." State v. Zapp, supra, 108 Idaho at 726, 701 P.2d at 673.
The scope of a permissible frisk was extended under the Supreme Court case of Michigan v. Long, 463...
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...investigating and detaining suspects who could immediately access weapons inside the vehicle. As we said in State v. Muir, 116 Idaho 565, 567, 777 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Ct.App.1989): "[W]hen the officers had a reasonable belief that a suspect posed a danger and may gain immediate control of a we......
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...Babb, 133 Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787. See also State v. Muir, 116 Idaho 565, 567-68, 777 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (Ct.App.1989). Baxter asserts that, under the Terry standard, to justify a frisk the officer must have reasonable suspicion that a suspe......
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...Babb, 133 Idaho at 892, 994 P.2d at 635; Fleenor, 133 Idaho at 555, 989 P.2d at 787. See also State v. Muir, 116 Idaho 565, 567-68, 777 P.2d 1238, 1240-41 (Ct.App.1989). In this case, Doe concedes that the officer was justified in stopping him. The state argues that the officer was also jus......